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PREFACE
Historical investigation is a self-justifying effort.
The discovery of the forgotten event or a different view of
a circumstance or condition contributes to the total body of
knowledge and needs no further defense.

However, in this

instance, there is a benefit in briefly tracing the rumina
tions that lead to this particular study.

In short, the

historical significance of the post-World War II AmericanMalayan relationship is hardly self-evident.
questions:

The obvious

why this subject and wherein lies the value?

The long, tortuous involvement of the United States
of America in what can be called, in an extended sense, the
Indochina W a r s , has precipitated a fascination in the story
of America's post-World War II involvement in Southeast
Asia.

In the main, the objective has been to fathom the

root causes for the American travail of the Sixties and
Seventies in Vietnam, Laos', and Cambodia.

Understandably,

the retrospective efforts proceed with a singleness of
-'-The term, Southeast Asia, is used throughout in the
contemporary context.
It apparently first came into use
during World War II; e.g., the creation of a South-East
Asian Command (SEAC) in 1943.
Prior to the war, the British
commonly referred to the area as part of South Asia; Ameri
cans usually spoke in terms of the Far East.

reference and emphasis; the subcontinent, Southeast Asia,
is viewed through the optics of Indochina.

As a result,

terms are often casually interchanged, adding to the concep
tual muddle; Vietnam is Indochina i£ Southeast Asia.

Rarely

are Southeast Asia or a specific nation outside of Indochina
subjects in themselves.

Often obscured or ignored is the

fact that in addition to Indochina, Southeast Asia is Burma,
- i
Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines, an area
of mainland and island inhabited by diverse people.

However,

the extra-Indochina American experience is often relegated
to footnote status.

The total region and its parts are

treated only insofar as they are relevant to the American
involvement in Indochina.

This general observation suggested

a question; does the American-Southeast Asia story change in
its essentials when viewed from a vantage point other than
Indochina?

Assuming that the Indochina involvement was

motivated, more or less, by a desire to halt the spread of
Asian communism, the question can be asked another way.
Does that motive explain American interest, influence, and
actions elsewhere in Southeast Asia?
Post-World War II British Malaya suggested itself
as a subject for investigation for several reasons.

First,

the Malayan experience contains elements which presumably
might have drawn American attention in view of the general
thrusts of American foreign policy as it took shape during

World War II, and as it evolved in the post-war period.

For

example, Malaya reverted to British colonial status in Sep
tember 1945 at a time when an accepted tenet

of American

foreign policy favored progress toward independence for
colonial peoples.

Though Great Britain had made a commit

ment in 1943 to the post-war preparation of Malaya for selfgovernment, progress toward that goal was frustrated.

The

first step proved false; the plan for reorganizing Malaya
into a union of states, initiated in October 1945, drew
resistance from the very people the British had tradition
ally sought to protect, the Malays.

The second attempt at

a "first step," the formation of the Federation of Malaya in
1948, was threatened within months by a savage, insurgent
communist activism that threatened both the British attempt
to set Malaya on the path of self-government, and the then
fragile sense of Malayan nationalism so necessary to an
achievement of home rule.

By that time, the emphasis of

American foreign policy had shifted from anticolonialism to
anticommunism.
This study suggests that, although American foreign
policy addressed itself to both colonialism and communism,
neither concern adequately explains the American interest
or influence in regard to Malaya.

Malaya's status as a

British colonial possession was never seriously questioned
by the United States; therefore, the preparation of Malaya
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for self-governing status and the task of meeting the com
munist threat remained British responsibilities.

However,

America did have an interest; prewar Malaya had been the
world's largest producer of natural rubber, a material
needed by both consumer and defense industries.

In 1942,

with the closure of Southeast Asia by the Japanese, ninety
per cent of the world's rubber-producing capacity had been
cut off; more than half of that capacity lay within Malaya.
Under the pressures of war, the United States Government
built a giant synthetic rubber industry where none had pre
viously existed, an industrial miracle often described as
second only to the atom bomb.

By 1945, America was produc

ing rubber at a rate equal to the total prewar world capac
ity.

The implications for the future were obvious.

The

American rubber products manufacturing industry would have
a national source of supply independent of all foreign areas
and the American military would never again be threatened
by the precipitous loss of a strategic material.

On the

other hand, British Malaya ,was economically dependent upon
the world's rubber markets and America had historically
constituted half of that market; therefore, the post-war
recovery of Malaya, the progress toward self-government and,
after 1948, the survival of Malaya in the rising tide of
Asian communism would all depend to a large degree upon her
ability to produce and market rubber.

V

The purpose of this study is twofold:

(.1) to

examine the American view of British Malaya at the end of
World War II; and (2) to recount the post-war Malayan expe
rience and search for the tracks of America's interest and
influence.

Evidence emerges that there were two American

perceptions of Malaya.

The first recognized Malaya as the

largest producer of natural rubber*

In this context, Malaya

was at once the source of a critical commodity and a poten
tial threat to an infant,

strategic industry. The second

perception hazily distinguished Malaya in the regional con
text of Southeast Asia, an area beset with confused efforts
to maintain the colonial systems, and communist efforts to
subvert both the colonial systems and progress toward non
communist systems of self-government.
A question persists among students of America's
Post-World War II foreign affairs:
have a Far Eastern policy?

did the United States

Writing at the close of the

Korean War, Edwin 0. Reischauer put the question in the
form of challenge in his work, Wanted:

An Asian Policy.^

■ 1

Writing some twelve years later in the midst of deepening
2Edwin 0. Reischauer, Wanted: An Asian Policy (New
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1955), pp. 181, 257.
For example:
Dr. Reischauer takes issue with both the absence of clear
policy, and the bankruptcy of policy in evidence; e.g., the
reluctance of the United States to take the lead in solving
colonial problems as a matter of policy and the reluctance
to provide economic aid versus military aid to Asian nations.

vi

American entanglement in Vietnam, Richard S. Kirkendall
observed that although American post-World War II policy in
Europe was clear, " . . .

a similar clarity was not to be

found regarding American interests in the Far East."J

As a

contribution toward an understanding of the condition, this
study claims value.
The selection of the end-date of the period under
study requires some explanation.

The year 1953 was chosen

for reasons to be found in events, both in Malaya and the
United States.

By 1953, the British and Malayan forces

under British leadership had turned the corner in the mili
tary struggle to contain communist insurgency.

Though the

threat remained for years to come, the heat had gone out of
what was termed with typical British reserve,
gency."

"the Emer

In America, 1953 saw the end of the administration

of President Harry S. Truman and the stewardship of his
second term Secretary of State, Dean A. Acheson.

Admittedly

a somewhat arbitrary point in the continuum of American
foreign affairs, the end of the Truman-Acheson period is
i

i

a convenient place to take stock.

Though the change in

American leadership from the Democratic to the Republican
Party did not result in a major shift in foreign policy, it
3

Richard S. Kirkendall, The Truman Period As A
Research Field (Columbia, Missouri:
University of Missouri
Press, 1967), p. 63.

vii

did reflect the political differences concerning government
involvement in the business affairs of the Nation.

In 195 3,

the United States Government withdrew from the synthetic
rubber business.
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CHAPTER I
POST-WAR AMERICAN POLICY DEVELOPMENT:
THE MAINSTREAM
At the time of the Japanese surrender in August 1945,
the United States Department of State had already settled
upon a policy of nonintervention in British Malaya.^

How

ever, that policy cannot be explained in the context of
Malaya; neither can it be described as an American disposi
tion toward the peoples of Malaya nor a conscious recogni
tion of a specifically Malayan condition or circumstance.
It was, rather, a reiteration in the specific of a larger
decision to follow a noninterventionist course in the
European colonial areas of Southeast Asia.
The noninterventionist policy of 1945 might suggest
that there had been a retreat from the earlier American
policy which had championed the cause of self-government as
lu.S. Department of State, "An Estimate of Condi
tions in Asia and The Pacific At The End of The War in The
Far East and The Objectives and Policies of The United
States" (hereafter cited as "Conditions in Asia and The
Pacific and Objectives and Policies of The U.S."), Foreign
Relations of The United States (hereafter cited as FRUSj:
Diplomatic Paper 1945, V o l . V I , The British Commonwealth
And The Far East (Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing
Office, 1969), pp. 570-573.
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set forth in the United Nations Declaration of January 1942
which embodied the principle of " . . . the right of all
people to choose the form of government under which they
will live."2

Although the contrast between the return of

colonialism in 1945 and the democratic ideals of 1942 might
seem a lightning rod to charges of abandonment, such judg
ments are neither accurate nor sustainable.

The world of

1945 was a complex place with events moving at breathtaking
speed.

The problems of war were quickly to be replaced by

the problems of peace, and the purposes of rather heady
principles set down amidst the urgency of 1942 simply had to
give way to the realities of the moment.

The first priority

was the conclusion of the war, a priority soon to be re
placed by the restoration of order to large portions of the
world which existed in the chaotic vacuums left by the
defeated axis powers.

To a large degree, policy was sub

jected to the pressures of changing priorities and the rush
of events.

It is more accurate to say that the principles

of 1942 were not consciously, abandoned; rather, they were,
/

of necessity, deferred.

Inasmuch as the American policy

statement concerning British Malaya was no more than a
^u.S., Congress, Senate, Atlantic Charter, A Decade
of American Foreign Policy;
Basic Documents, 1941-1949 ,
81st Congress, 1st Session (Washington, D.C.:
Government
Printing Office, 1950), p. 1.

3

reflection of the larger decision governing the colonial
areas of Southeast Asia, it is necessary to outline the
evolutionary process from the United Nations Declaration of
1942 to the British return to Singapore in September 1945*
Deyond the westernmost island of the Philippine
Commonwealth, the United States had limited pre-World War II
interests or direct involvement in Southeast Asia.

The focus

and motive of contact in the European colonial areas had
been trade, primarily the American importation of rubber and,
to a lesser extent, tin. 3

■

•

The relative importance and the

degree of mutual dependency between the colonial areas and
America were about equal.

The United States consumed about

half of the world's rubber and approximately forty per cent
of the tin; Southeast Asia produced ninety per cent of the
world's rubber and sixty per cent of the tin.

America took

these materials, not available elsewhere in the quantities
required, and, in return, provided approximately thirty per
cent of the area's total export earnings.^

However, the

^In four of the fiVe' years preceding 1941, natural
rubber was the highest value commodity imported by the
United States.
See New York Times, November 5, 1946, p. 38.
^See Henry Brodie, "The Post-War Patterns of Trade,"
in South Asia In The World Today, Phillips Talbot, e d .
(Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1950), pp. 125-126.
The approximate value of exports from Indonesia, Malaya and
Indochina in 1936 was $816.7 million; the value of exports
to the United States was $239.3 million.
The year 1936 was
selected by Brodie as representative of normal prewar trade
because of the minimum effect of distortion caused by the
Depression prior to 19 36 and the changes in trade and

American contact and involvement did not extend to the more
dramatic historical contexts of territorial acquisition or
intervention as had been the case in the Philippines and
China.

Though American interest Sharpened in the strategic

context during the preliminaries to the Japanese conquest
of 1941 and 1942, that interest was refocused with the loss
of the Philippines and remained peripheral throughout the
Pacific War.
The development of the American view of what Euro
pean colonial Southeast Asia should be when World War II
ended was, to a large degree, a reflection of the thinking
of President Franklin D. Roosevelt.

Beginning with the

Atlantic Charter drafted by Roosevelt and Prime Minister
Winston Churchill, Roosevelt pushed forward the concept that
colonialism must pass from the modern scene.

Throughout the

war until his death in April 19 45, Roosevelt continued to
express his thoughts concerning the future of colonial areas
however, there is indication that his enthusiasm was not
matched by consistency, or a facility in the subject of
i i
Southeast Asia— including the Philippines.
Roosevelt's
Secretary of War, Henry L. Stimson, once observed that the
currency values between 1936 and 1942.
Figures are attri
buted to the U.S. Department of State, Division of Research,
Far East.
Brodie, Special Assistant to the Chief, Division
of Research, Far East, presented these figures at the. Uni
versity of Chicago's Harris Foundation Lecture Seminar in
1949.

5

President was "all mixed up" in his understanding of the
location of the various Philippine Islands.

5

Though Roosevelt was a devotee of Wilsonian princi
ples concerning self-determination, he was not without human
failings in his selection of those who violated the princi
ples.

In Southeast Asia, he succumbed to judgments of good

and bad colonialists.

The French were "bad," and he was

insistent that the United States make no offer of substan
tive assistance to the Free French in any effort to reclaim
Indochina.

In the 19 30s, Roosevelt had been appalled at

the viciousness with which the French colonial fonctionnaires
had suppressed all native opposition to their rule.^

The

rapid collapse of France before the German armies in 1940
and the acquiescence of the Vichy Government to Japanese
requests for air and naval facilities in Indochina in 1941
added to Roosevelt's conviction that France was no longer a
great nation worthy of a share in the responsibilities of
^Quoted in Russel H. Fifield, Americans In Southeast
Asia:
The Roots of Commitment (New York:
Thomas Y. Crowell
Company, 1973), p. 37.
6 "Memorandum by President Roosevelt to the Secretary
of State, October 16, 1944," FRUS 19 4 5 , Vol. Ill, The Bri
tish Commonwealth and Europe (Washington, D.C . : Government
Printing Office, 1965), p. 777.

^Elliot Roosevelt, As He Saw It (New York:
Duell
Sloan, and Pearce, 1946); and Victor Purcell, "Lessons From
Malaya," The Nation, Vol. 178 (June 12, 1954), p. 500.

6

world leadership. 8

He believed that Indochina should be

given complete independence as soon as possible following the
war and that, until prepared, a trusteeship should be estab
lished.

At the Conferences at Teheran and Cairo in 1943,

Roosevelt had personally raised the issue and received at
least passive agreement for the concept from Joseph Stalin
and Chang Kai-shek.

9

.
Churchill did not support the idea;

trusteeship had far too obvious an application to the Bri
tish colonial area.

The Free French and the British, there

fore, supported each other in resistance to the plan and
quietly worked to influence the American Department of State
to support recognition of the French claim to Indochina .
However, Roosevelt remained committed and again raised the
proposal to Stalin at the Yalta Conference of February
1945.^

In March, General Charles De Gaulle attempted to

^Gary R. Hess, "Franklin Roosevelt and Indochina,"
Journal of American History, Vol. LIX (September 1972),
p. 35 3; also Walter La Feber, "Roosevelt, Churchill, and
Indochina:
194 2-45," The American Historical Review,
Vol. 80 (December 19 75), p. 1285.
^Hess,

"Roosevelt and Indochina," p. 357.

10Ibid., pp. 355, 358; "An Estimate of Conditions in
Asia and The Pacific and The Objectives and Policies of the
U.S.," p. 568; arid La Feber, "Roosevelt, Churchill, and
Indochina," p . 12 72.
llFRUS: The Conferences at Malta and Yalta (Wash
ington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 1955); p. 770;
and Fifield, Americans In Southeast Asia, p. 41.

1

dissuade Roosevelt, warning that the loss of Indochina and
the economic effect of that loss could weaken France's ability to resist communism.

12

At the time of his death,

Roosevelt remained insistent that Indochina not be handed
back to France and that the French should reenter Indochina
13
only m the status of trustee.
Although an Indochina
trusteeship was discussed at the highest level, there is
evidence that it was either not clearly understood or not
accepted as policy within the Department of S t a t e . ^
With less concrete justification than he had for
his opinion of the French, Roosevelt judged the Dutch to be
"good" colonialists, the record of heavy-handed rule in
the Netherlands East Indies notwithstanding.

The only

explanation for the judgment appears to have been a rather
shallow knowledge of the Dutch rule in the East Indies, and
his personal admiration and friendship for the Dutch royal
family.

Though he made no specific proposal for post-war

l^Hess, "Roosevelt and Indochina," p. 364; Fifield,
Americans In Southeast A sia, p. 38; and La Feber, "Roosevelt,
Churchill, and Indochina," p. 1293.
^ H e s s , "Roosevelt and Indochina," p. 365. La Feber
marks the change in Roosevelt's insistence that the French
not reenter Indochina, to an allowance that they might re
enter but only as trustee, as a significant change to his
original position in "Roosevelt, Churchill, and Indochina,"
p. 1293.
l^pifieid, Americans In Southeast A s i a , pp. 45-46;
and La Feber, "Roosevelt, Churchill, and Indochina,"
p. 1292.

8

trusteeship for the Dutch possessions, Roosevelt apparently
believed that the American example set in the Philippines
was a suitable model to be emulated and that the Dutch
shared his view. 15
The British did not escape Roosevelt's advice on the
future of colonial people; however, the issue seems to have
been raised in muted terms, perhaps a reflection of the
closeness of the Anglo-American alliance, the friendship of
the two leaders, and the sheer weight of the priorities of
war which occupied their attention.

At the Quebec Confer

ence of 194 3, Roosevelt did suggest that the British offer
Burma immediate independence within the Commonwealth as an
incentive for the people of Burma to stiffen their resolve
against the Japanese.

The proposal was received cooly; the

British were satisfied that the ruthless activities of the
occupying Japanese secret police would provide sufficient
stimuli.^

However, Roosevelt did not pursue the proposal

for Burma's independence as he did the Indochina trusteeship.
In fairness, the British had' made efforts between the wars
of 1914 and 19 39 in establishing an intent to prepare the

- ^ E l l i o t

Roosevelt, As He Saw I t , pp. 223-224.

■^John F. Cady, "The Historical Background of U.S.
Policy in SEA," in Southeast Asia:
Problems of United
States Policy, ed. by William Henderson (Cambridge, Massa
chusetts:
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1963),
p . 16.

9

Eastern Empire for self-governing status.

The British

promise, laid out in the Montagu Declaration and set in
motion by the Montagu-Chelmesford Reforms enacted by Parlia
ment in 1917, applied specifically to India, and implicitly
17
to Burma, but did not encompass Malaya.
(As will be seen,
Malaya posed quite special problems.)
In December 1943, the British Secretary for the
Colonies announced in the House of Commons that:
The main aim of the Government as regards the
political future of Malaya after its libera
tion will be the development of its capacity
for self-government within the Empire.
The announcement is curious both in its timing and urgency.
First, apparently no articulated planning preceded the
announcement; in fact, a detailed proposal was not made
l^Burma was considered administratively a part of
India until 1937.
The Montagu Declaration announced " . . .
gradual development of self-governing institutions . . .
responsible government in India as an integral part of the
British Empire."
Planning for Indian self-government con
tinued into World War II.
In May 1945, a British White
Paper outlined measures leading to self-government for
Burma and set a target date of 1949.
See Saul Rose, Britain
and South-East Asia (Baltimore:
The Johns Hopkins Press,
1969), pp. 77-79; and John C. Campbell, and others, The
United States In World Affairs 1947-1948 (New York: Harper
and Brothers, 1948) , pp. 215-218 (hereafter works in the
Council on Foreign Relations series are cited as USWA) .
1 ^ 3 9 5 h.C. Ded. 5s., 384, December 1, 1943, quoted
in Lennox A. Mills, Malaya: A Political and Economic
Appraisal (Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press,
1958), p. 24.

10

public until October 1945.

19

Second, there had been no

prewar, popularly-based nationalist demand from the peoples
of Malaya for an end to British rule.

Several explanations

for the 1943 policy statement are Suggested.

It was most

probably a sop to the Malayan resistance force, the Malayan
Peoples Anti-Japanese Army

(MPAJA).

The force consisted

primarily of Chinese Malayans, but leadership was dominated
by Chinese members of the Malayan Communist Party

(MCP).

Prior to Russia's entry into the war, the MCP had been as
anti-British as it had been anti-Japanese; however, after
the Russian entry, the MCP moderated its view toward the
"British Imperialist."

In the same month as the announcement

by the Colonial Secretary, an agreement was reached with the
MPAJA wherein they would be supplied with the British arms?
in return, the MPAJA was to harass the Japanese and to pre
pare to assist allied forces when the time came for libera
tion.^

That the announcement was meant to secure the

loyalty of the MPAJA and MCP is supported further by the
fact that in May 19 44 Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten,
\

. \

Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia Command (SEAC),
recommended that the British Government transmit the specific
post—war plan for Malaya to the M P A J A . ^
19

His stated aitn was

See below, p. 67.

20

Rose, Britain and South-East Asi a , pp. 126-128.

21

Ibid., p. 127.

11

to blunt any precipitous MCP plan to seize control at the
end of the war.

However, the plan was not released because

it was still in the formulative stages of

p r e p a r a t i o n . ^

The date of the announcement by the Colonial Secretary,
following on the heels of the 1943 Quebec Conference, could
also be taken as an attempt to soothe America's passion
for dismantling the colonial system.

In 194 3, there was

growing concern in England that Roosevelt might expand his
insistence on trusteeship for Indochina to include the
British colonial area. 2 3

The declaration concerning Malaya

may therefore have been designed to serve a double purpose.
It anticipated the possible problem of the MPAJA and MCP
and it served to demonstrate an agreement in principle
with Roosevelt's determined insistence that colonialism
must end.

By making the declaration, the British preempted

Roosevelt; an alternative to trusteeship for Malaya was
established before trusteeship could be proposed.

In either

event, placation of the MPAJA or Roosevelt, the announcement
concerning Malaya set the last stone in place.

Great

Britain had established the intent to pursue preparations
22ibid .
2 3La Feber,
p. 1279.

"Roosevelt, Churchill, and Indochina,"

for self-government in the entire Eastern Empire.
Though President Roosevelt had quite definite ideas,
if less definite plans for colonial Southeast Asia, it is
an overstatement to describe them as firm, doctrinaire
policy.

Roosevelt's proposals are best described as preli

minary soundings in search of commitment.

They most nearly

approached policy status in September 19 44 when his Secre
tary of State, Cordell Hull, submitted a memorandum on the
subject to Roosevelt.

The paper proposed that the prewar

colonial governments of Southeast Asia commit themselves to
grants of independence or self-governing dominion status to
the colonial areas as soon as practicable.

Toward this

end, the colonial powers should be urged to join in a
regional commission and pledge trusteeship status for the
colonies.

25

Hull did caution that such proposals would not

be received with enthusiasm by the colonial powers, but he
expressed the hope that the universal good to be realized
would overbalance any short-term benefits to be gained by
retention of colonies.

Roosevelt was pleased with the
■i

memorandum; apparently, it was an accurate synthesis of his
2^That the Malayan declaration was prompted by im
mediate concern over the MPAJA is reasonably clear in the
coincidence of the declaration and Anglo-MPAJA agreement
occurring in December 1943.
That it was prompted by British
concern over the trusteeship plan is not directly evidenced;
however, it is unlikely that the value of the declaration
in that context was missed by. the Foreign Office.
2^Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, Vol.
II (New York: MacMillan and Company, 1948), pp. 1600-1601.

13

and Hull's t h i n k i n g . ^
Hull's memorandum, suggesting a general proposal
applicable to the three colonial powers, may have been
prompted by a distrust of British post-war intentions.

It

had been decided at Quebec in 1943 that the liberation of
Southeast Asia was to fall primarily to the British.

With

the exception of the northern portion of Indochina above
the fifteenth parallel, the responsibility for liberation
was assigned to SEAC under Mountbatten.

Hull had since

received "persistent" reports that the British were contem
plating a "federation" arrangement in Southeast Asia under
their "aegis if not control" to include Burma, Malaya,
Thailand, and Indochina.

Hull transmitted the sujpstance

of these reports and his evaluation to Roosevelt in September 1944.

27

The source of the report,

several Burmese

officers, was highly questionable and the evidence was incon
clusive.

Although London had denied the report, Hull saw a

potential for danger in any American association should the
British, in fact, be considering such a plan.

The memorandum

suggests several things that might have been on Hull's mind.
First, given that the British would enter and retake South
east Asia, their ability to influence events would be

27

"Memorandum from the Secretary, of State to the
President:
Southeast Asia; British Attitudes, September 8,
1944," FRUS:
The Conference at Quebec 1944 (Washington,
D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 1972), pp. 263-264.
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unchallenged; i.e., there was little to be done short of
intervention.

Second, the British would arrive as the repre

sentative of the colonial powers.

Hull believed that an

American presence would be perceived by the people of South
east Asia as supportive of colonialism; he therefore recom
mended that no American civil affairs officer be permitted
po
to serve in the SEAC area.
The proposal for a regional,
multi-nation trusteeship was apparently put aside.

It was

not discussed at the Conferences at Quebec in 1944 or Yalta
in 194 5; though as previously mentioned, the Indochina
trusteeship was discussed at Yalta.
Within two weeks of Roosevelt's death, it became
evident that opposition to his plans for Southeast Asia was
not limited to the European colonialists but included some
among the highest levels within the State Department.

In

mid-April, a memorandum was prepared within the Office of
Far Eastern Affairs to be transmitted to the new President,
Harry S. Truman.

It was offered as a summary of Roosevelt's

views on Southeast Asia:

i i

President Roosevelt recognized the future impor
tance to the United States of Southeast Asia.
He saw the necessity of aiding the 150,000,000
people there to achieve improved social, eco
nomic and political standards.
He realized
that dynamic forces leading towards self^
government were growing in Asia; that the
United States - as a great democracy - cannot
and must not try to retard this development

28

Ibid.
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but rather act in harmony with it; and that
social, economic, or political instability in
the area may threaten the peace and stability
of the Far East and indeed the world.29
The memorandum was accurate as far as it went, but it did
not alert the new President to the regional trusteeship
scheme as agreed upon by Hull and Roosevelt in the preceding
September, or of the soundings concerning Indochina taken
as recently as the conference at Yalta in February.
At approximately the same time the Office of Far
Eastern Affairs was drafting the memorandum on Southeast
Asia, the Office of European Affairs was preparing a paper
on specific plans for Indochina, also to be transmitted to
President Truman.

In the coordination process with Far

Eastern Affairs, the basic point of disagreement between
the Roosevelt view and that of the Department; plus an
internal disagreement between the Offices of European A f 
fairs and Far Eastern Affairs, crystalized.

Both offices

agreed not to raise the plan for trusteeship; however, Far
Eastern Affairs modified the memorandum to include a policy
insistence that the French pledge self-government for Indo
china within the foreseeable future.

This disagreement

could not be resolved at the divisional level and was esca
lated for resolution to the Assistant Secretary of State
for European, Far Eastern, Near Eastern, and African Affairs,
^ Q u o t e d in Fifield, Americans In Southeast A s i a ,
.p p . 36-37.

lb

James C. Dunn.

Dunn took the matter to the Under Secretary

of State, Joseph C. Grew, with a recommendation that the
memorandum be scrapped and that the Indochina question be
allowed to drift rather than accept Far Eastern Affairs'
proposal to seek guarantees from F r a n c e . ^
Despite the differences within the Department, cir
cumstances did not allow the issue to remain unresolved.
The Philippine liberation had been completed in February
1945 and in March, the Japanese had surrendered in Burma.
Further military operations in Southeast Asia were imminent
and the U.S. Department of War had requested policy guidance.
In a June 1945 memorandum from the Secretary of State to the
Secretary of War, policy and objectives representing the
views of "the Department of State as a whole" were laid down
with individual attention given to a general policy for
colonial Southeast Asia and each of the colonial areas.. The
introduction stated that:
The United States Government may properly con
tinue to state the political principle which
it has frequently announced, that dependent
people should be given the opportunity, if
necessary after an adequate period of prepara
tion, to achieve an increased measure of selfgovernment, but it should avoid any course of
^Recounted in ibid., pp. 45-46, based on U.S.
Department of Defense, United States - Vietnam Relations,
1945-1967, Book 8 (Washington, D . C .: Government Printing
Office, 1961), pp. 1-25.
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action which would seriously impair the unity
of the major United Nations.
In regard to Indochina, the statement left little
doubt that the trusteeship proposal was dead:
The United States recognizes French sover
eignty over Indochina.
It is, however, the
general policy of the U.S. to favor a policy
which would allow the colonial people an
opportunity to prepare themselves for increased
participation in their own government with
eventual self-government as the goal.
It was estimated that the French would make some concession
to self-government and autonomy primarily to soften native
opposition to their return, but also to "avoid unfriendly
United States opinion."

The estimate noted that the French

would rely upon the British to support their interests
inasmuch as the British were equally committed to insuring
that no prewar colonial powers would "suffer diminution of
power or prestige."
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The Department of State analysis and estimates for
the Netherlands East Indies took note of the fact that the
Dutch Government would have two political problems with
which to deal.

First, there were old arguments, deferred by

the war, concerning autonomy between the East Indies Dutch
and the Netherlands Government.

Second, there was the

31

"An Estimate of Conditions in Asia and The Pacific
and The Objectives and Policies of the U.S.," p. 556.
(italics added).
^ Ibid. , p. 568

(italics added) .
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question of how to deal with Indonesian nationalism . 3 3
Though sketchy, the Dutch plan was to convene a constitutional
committee to work out solutions.

The objective was to grant

home rule to Indonesia and to: keep the new nation within the
Dutch Commonwealth.

The Department of State estimated a

"quiescent period" between liberation and the proposed con
stitutional conference.

Policy was stated to be noninterven

tionist and favored progress toward self-government using
the same language as that in the statement concerning Indo
china.

The statement concluded on an economic note t h a t x

escapes precise interpretation:
Traditional Dutch policy is in agreement
with the view of the United States which
favors equal opportunity for all nations
and their nationals.34
This could have been an endorsement, in the context
of Indonesia, of the Dutch system of rubber production
which consisted largely of native, small holders who grew
rubber as a second money-crop in contrast to the large,
foreign-owned plantation system in British Malaya and Ceylon.
The State Department's analysis of British Malaya's
prospects for recovery noted that the key would be the
recovery of the rubber-producing industry . 3 5
3

3'ifrid. , pp. 573-574 ..

35Ibid., pp. 571-572..

^ X b j d .f

The
5 7 4

.
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estimate concerning possible political difficulties missed
the mark in that it predicted the source of dissatisfaction
to be the Malayan Chinese who had traditionally been kept in
a second class status by the British in deference to the
Malays.

This assumption, based on prewar conditions, was

reasonable inasmuch as the estimate also noted that thus
far the British Government had not revealed its plans for
Malaya.

It did take note of pressures being brought to bear

upon the British Government by English business interests to
recognize the claims of the Chinese and Indian Malayans, and
to abandon the protectionist policy which favored the Malays.
(As will be seen later, it was the attempt to do just that
which brought the British into conflict with the Malays in
1946, rather than the Chinese as predicted by the American
Department of State.)

As far as policy was concerned, the

statement was clear if by now somewhat repetitive:
The United States is following a policy of non
interference in any British possession but we
favor a policy which would allow colonial people
an opportunity to prepare themselves for in
creased participation in their own government
with eventual self-government as the goal.
The
United States favors a policy of equal economic
and commercial opportunity for all nations . 3 6
The last statement concerning commercial opportunity suggests
several explanations.

Xt could have been a reference to

36Ibid., p. 572.
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the prewar British dominance of the Malayan rubber- and tinproducing industries to the near exclusion of all but British
investors.

It might also have been a reference to the

British-inspired, prewar International Rubber Regulation
Committee which had acted as a production and pricing cartel;
or, a general reference to the imperial preference system
of trade— or all of these.
The policy guidance given by the American Department
of State calls forth several observations.

Most importantly,

the warning to avoid any action that could threaten the
unity of the United Nations
tion)

(stated in the introductory por

sets the condition as the first priority.

Having said

that, all other statements of "policy to favor a policy" for
preparing dependent people for eventual self-government
pale.

37

.
Granted, the concept to pursue actively the cause

of colonial independence was conceived by no less a level of
authority than the Presidency and by September 1944, had
reached the point of being a working paper consensus between
Roosevelt and his Secretary of State.

Still, the level of

authorship does not necessarily guarantee that concepts con
tinue to develop of their own momentum in the absence of the
author.

Changes in leadership create an atmosphere conducive

to the abandonment of schemes unpopular within an agency, and
^ Above, pp. 16-18.
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the resurrection of schemes kept chained in the dark by the
o l d

l e a d e r s h i p .

38

jn the last year of World War II, the

changes in leadership were nearly continuous.^

Secretary of

State Hull left the Cabinet in November 1944 and was replaced
by Edward R. Stettinius.

In December, the Office Of Under

Secretary of State was created and manned by Joseph C. Grew.
Stettinius could barely have settled in among such preoccupa
tions as the coming climax of the War in Europe and the Yalta
Conference when Roosevelt died and Truman was sworn in as
President.

In July, following the San Francisco Conference

of the United Nations, Stettinius stepped down to be replaced
by Truman's choice, James F. Byrnes.

In August, Under Secre

tary Grew was replaced by Dean Acheson.

Though necessitated

by failing health, death, and politics, these rapid and con
tinuous changes in personalities were hardly conducive to
policy continuity or the growth of fragile concepts.

This

seems particularly valid when the personal style of conduct
ing foreign affairs, which was Roosevelt's habit, is taken
into account.

When he departed and the guard changed, the

continuity was broken and there was nothing for the newcomers
to do but look to the institution for guidance; i.e., the
Department of State.
38a personal, though hardly novel, observation.
38Dean Acheson, Present At The Creation:
My Years
in the State Department (New York: W. W. Horton and Com
pany, 1 9 6 9 ) , p . 559.
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As previously mentioned, it was upon the advice of
James C. Dunn, Assistant Secretary of State,, that the issue
of Indochina's future, the focus of Roosevelt's plans, was
cut adrift.

In addition to Dunn, who was considered to be a

"Europe-firster," the leadership above him following the last
round of changes, did not share Roosevelt's personal interest
in Southeast Asia.
Europe-oriented.

Grew, Byrnes, Acheson, and Truman were
This is not to infer that they were pro

colonialism or consciously against independence for Southeast
Asian colonies; rather, these subjects did not draw their
attention.

Given the speed and magnitude of events between

Roosevelt's death and August 1945, it is not surprising that
the future of Cambodia or Sumatra was absent from the list of
urgent matters.

The question of policy concerning Southeast

Asia was left to the offices within the Department of State.
In retrospect, given that the United States and her colonial
ist allies were still engaged in pursuing the defeat of
Japan, the abandoning of Roosevelt's plans to secure firm
pledges for an end to colonialism seems reasonable, if not
\ 1
unavoidable.40 American pressure upon her allies to give up
40An opposite view is. defensible.
For example, the
United States could have recognized the changed situation
and . . . "identified with nationalist groups."
Instead,
the United States chose to recognize "legalities" and "shoe
horned" the colonialists back into Southeast Asia.
See
Harold Issacs, "A Policy For. the U.S." in South Asia in the
World Today, Talbot (ed.), pp. 226-227.
This view, while
defensible inasmuch as it noted a failure to actively support
nationalism, went too far in its implication that the United

their eastern empires could have resulted in an untimely
divisiveness.
In the summer of 1945, the political future of South
east Asia was secondary by comparison with the immediate
requirements to see to the defeat of Japan and the civil ad
ministration of liberated areas.

(Though somewhat akin to

the pre-World War II colonial order, the wartime lines of
division in Southeast Asia had been drawn according to the
more pragmatic military necessity and reflected the various
theaters of operations.)

At the Potsdam Conference of July

1945, the final adjustments to the military theater areas
were made.

SEAC was expanded to include that portion of

Indochina below the sixteenth parallel

(the northern portion

remained within the China Theater), and the remainder of the
Dutch East Indies and British Borneo were added.

Although

there were zealous offers of increased Dutch military parti
cipation and movement of French troops from the Continent to
assist in the liberation of their respective colonies, time
ran out on August 14 with the Japanese surrender announcement.
It was left to the. British to liberate the area and take the
surrender of the Japanese occupation forces.

On the day

Japan announced acceptance of the Potsdam surrender terms,
States took action to reestablish the prewar status q u o . A
more balanced description would state that the United States
Was passive, thus allowing the expected; i.e., the return of
the colonial powers to their possessions.
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SEAC forces landed in the Cochin area of Indochina.

On

August 30, a British Naval task force arrived in Hong Kong.
Mountbatten accepted the surrender of Japanese southern
forces at Singapore on September 12 and, on September 20,
British and Dutch forces landed on Java.

The British field

commanders made it clear in the French and Dutch areas that
they were acting on behalf of the legitimate colonial author
ities.

In Indochina, the Vietminh were ignored. 4-*-

In the

Dutch East Indies, the nationalists under Dr. Achmed Sukarno
would not be ignored and, after a Dutch refusal to discuss
the future with the leaders of the newly-proclaimed republic,
the British found themselves fighting Indonesians as proxy
for the Dutch.

Thus began a period of recurring violence

which would last until 1949 . ^
In the period between the end of World War II and
Korea, the United States policy of nonintervention in colo
nial Southeast Asia was effective inasmuch as America largely
41Major General Douglas M. Gracey accepted the
surrender in South Indochina and recalled; "I was welcomed
. . . by the Vietminh . . 1 'welcome'; and all that sort of
thing . . . very unpleasant situation . . . and I promptly
kicked them out." Quoted in Purcell, "Lessons From Malaya,"
p. 501.
On August 17, 1945, Indonesian nationalists under
the leadership of Dr. Achmed Sukarno proclaimed a republic.
On October 1, 1945, the Dutch Government refused to discuss
the future of Indonesia with the group and within the month
armed clashes occurred between the nationalists and British.

avoided direct involvement as an active supporter of one or
the other side in disputes that seemed never ending.

As a

world leader, however, America was active in the roles of
mediator, advisor, and intermediary.

For example, the

United States persuaded the British to abandon their earlier
insistence that Thailand be treated as a defeated nation.
America had chosen to virtually overlook the Thai-Japanese
alliance of December 1941, and the Thai declaration of war
issued in January 1942 against Great Britain and America.
Britain, on the other hand, wished to exact reparations
primarily in the form of needed rice and a concession to
build a canal across the Kra Isthmus.

In December 1945, the

United States began repeated pleas to the Dutch Government
and Indonesian nationalists to seek a peaceful solution to
their dispute.

In 1947, America offered to provide good

offices to the belligerents and, in 194 8 , made the U.S.S.
Renville available for the negotiations which did produce the
first effective truce in the Indonesian dispute.

In 1946,

the French asked the United States and Great Britain to
i

i

mediate her dispute with Thailand over Indochina territory
seized by Thailand during the war.
To the colonial peoples of Southeast Asia, the
American policy seemed, at best, ambivalent.

Although

America officially refrained from taking sides in the dis
putes between the colonialist and the colonialized, non
involvement invariably favored the stronger side, in most

cases the colonialist.

After 19 47, the United States was

seen to have "leaned" toward the colonialists in recognition
that the dependency relationship between the retention of the
colonial areas might contribute to European economic recovery
and the success of the Marshall Plan.

The communist or

nationalist activitist seized upon the American passiveness
as a demonstration that Ame r i c a 1s real interest was in the
continuation of colonialism.

And, of course, the colonial

peoples were well aware of the concentration of American aid
in Europe and that the little aid which did flow into Southeast Asia was filtered through the colonial governments.
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Post-war British Malaya was initially tranquil by
comparison with her colonial neighbors; however, she was of
considerably more specific and immediate interest to the
United States than her neighbors.

But it was not the issues

of borders or nationalism that drew America into importance
and sometimes conflict in British Malaya.

The point of

tangency between a colonial area the size of Florida and the
most powerful nation of the post-war world was the produc
tion and price of natural rubber.

The short period between

1941 and 1945 had completely changed the relationship

^Campbell, USWA;
1947-1948, p. 184.
For a Southeast
Asian's critique and evaluation of American policy in
general agreement with Campbell, see "Address by Carlos P.
Romulo" delivered at the Harris Foundation Lecture Seminar,
1949, in South Asia T o d a y , Talbot, e d . , p. 156ff.

between the prewar world's largest producer and its largest
customer.

Whereas Malaya had produced half the world's rub

ber and America had consumed that amount, the two were now
potential competitors.

In 1945, the United States produced

synthetic rubber in amounts twice that of Malaya's prewar
capacity and could deliver it to the American manufacturer
at less than the price of the prewar Malayan product.

The

potential for self-destructive competition was, however,
foreseen.

Almost unnoticed in 1943, the Governments and

businessmen of Great Britain and the United States had
quietly begun to anticipate the problem.

CHAPTER II
MALAYA AND THE U.S.:

A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP

Given the condition of the European colonial nations
at the close of World War II, a question arises.

France and

the Netherlands had been defeated, occupied, and exploited
by Nazi Germany; England had narrowly escaped the same fate
and had been nearly exhausted in the effort.

All three had

been isolated from their Southeast Asian empires which had
been left to their own devices under Japanese rule.

Conti

nental Europe, in particular, had borne all the calamities of
war.

The interruption in industry and trade had all but

ruined the economy.

The destruction and deterioration of the

industrial plant and the isolation of occupation left the
prospects for recovery clouded for the immediate future.
Added to this were the simpler, humanitarian problems of
^-John C. Campbell and other, USWA:
1945-1947 (New
York:
Harper and Brothers, 1947), pp. 358-359.
Spared the
occupation and devastation visited upon Europe, Great Bri
tain was nonetheless in dire economic straits.
Between
1941 and 1945, the value of United Kingdom exports fell by
half while import values rose by fifty per cent.
The aver
age annual trade deficit for 1942-44 was 918 million pounds
sterling.
At the same time, British foreign investments
worth $4.5 billion were sold or lost while foreign members
of the sterling area accumulated sterling balances worth
$14 billion in London.

29

feeding and housing the war-weary.

Given that the eastern

empires were little better-off in terms of condition and
prospects, the question is; why were the colonial nations so
intent on shouldering the responsibilities for dependent
areas and the immediate liability that those responsibilities
represented?

In short, what had been lost that had to be

regained?
Prewar colonial Southeast Asia occupied a minority,
but important position in the economic systems of the mother
countries.

The eastern empires are best portrayed as one

corner of a triangle that described trade among Europe,
colonial Southeast Asia, and the United States.

Southeast

Asia was primarily a supplier of raw materials to industrial :
Europe and America.

The most significant items were the

twentieth century strategic materials, rubber and tin. 2
Along the first side of the triangle, Southeast Asia exported
raw materials to Europe and imported European-finished goods.
Southeast Asia enjoyed an export balance in this trade on a
2Size and order of importance can be estimated in
terms of the net trade surplus of South and Southeast Asia
for 19 36 (includes India and Ceylon).
"Ores and metals"
(primarily tin) and rubber accounted for 2 1 per cent and
34 per cent respectively of the total.
Taken in the con
text of "raw materials" Cwhich accounted for 64 per cent
of the total net surplus) rubber nnd "metal and ores" ac
counted for 52 per cent and 33 per cent respectively.
See
Brodie, "Post-War Patterns of Trade," p. 12 8 .

near two-to-one basis.

However, it must be recognized that

the exporters were, in the main, the same foreigners who drew
off the export surplus earnings as returns on their invest
ments? i.e., minus operating and colonial government expenses,
surpluses were returned to Europe and the United Kingdom.
Along the second side of the triangle, Southeast Asia ex
ported the largest part of her raw materials to the United
States.

In this trade, the Southeast Asian export balance
3
was large, approximating a twelve-to-one advantage.
Al
though the possible American market in Southeast Asia was
relatively small, it was kept to a minimum through import
tariff systems preferential to the colonial mother countries.
As to the third side of the triangle, Europe was the largest
market for American exports, primarily raw materials and
agricultural products.

Because of relative self-sufficiency,

America enjoyed a favorable balance of trade with Europe and
the United Kingdom.

It was in this deficit trade with the

United States that Europe was able to apply to advantage the
surpluses earned in the Southeast Asia-American trade.

The

surpluses flowed to Europe and the United Kingdom in the form
of profits to the mine and plantation owners:
3

Ibid., pp. 125-126.
The value of 1936 exports from
Indonesia, Malaya and Indochina to the United Kingdom and
other non-Asian countries was $373.2 million; imports to**
taled $197.7 million.
In trade with the United States, the
value of 1936 exports was $239.3 million while imports to
taled $ 2 0 . 8 million.
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There has been a continuous and substantial
export balance of trade from Southeast Asia.
In 1939, this excess amounted to about
$250,000,000 or approximately' $2.00 per
capita for the entire population of the area.
The primary cause of the excess was the neces
sity of paying the earnings upon landownership
and other capital investments of foreigners,
largely in England and the Netherlands although
to a lesser extent in China, the United States,
and Japan.
Thus the export balance resulted
in European credit in the United States, since
much of the surplus export came h e r e . With
these credits, Europeans, including the British,
were able to buy a considerable volume of goods
from us [the United States] in excess of the
.
value of goods which they sent directly to u s .
The surpluses served to double advantage in that the American
dollars earned also represented a monetary advantage of pro
viding dollar exchange to be applied to the deficit without
forcing a continual and uncontrollable drain on the dollar
currency holdings of the mother countries.

Seen in the per

spective of post-war 1945, the recovery of the colonial areas
and their potential for producing raw materials, profits, and
dollar exchange was of considerable importance to the three
colonial nations.
The benefits of the. triangular trade were greatest
to Great Britain and Malaya in comparison to the French and
Dutch areas and their mother countries.

First, measured

against the total value of exports from Malaya, Indochina,
4Roland S. Viles, "Southeast Asia in World Econo
mics" in The New World of Southeast Asia, Lennox A. Mills,
ed. ( M i n n e a p o l i s i
The University of Minnesota Press, 1949) ,
p . 35 7 .
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and Indonesia, Malaya exported forty per cent of the total.
Second, measured against the value of exports to the United
States, Malaya exported seventy-two per cent of the total
value.

Simply put, Malaya exported more than either the

French or Dutch areas and a higher percentage of Malayan
exports earned dollar exchange.

Third, though Southeast Asia

had a large balance in trade with the United States, Malaya's
i

i

balance was greater than her colonial rivals; whereas the
total value of American imports was equal to eight per cent
of exports, the value of American imports into Malaya equaled
only three per cent. 5
In the period immediately preceding World War II,
approximately thirty per cent of the total value of Malayan
exports was earned in American markets.

In return, in 19 38,

the United States took approximately fifty-five per cent of
Malayan tin and forty-one per cent of the rubber.^

Though

^Brodie, "Post-War Patterns of Trade," pp. 125-126.
The total value of 19 36 exports from Indonesia, Malaya, and
Indochina was $816.7 million; the value of Malaya's exports
was $364.1 million.
The value of exports from the three to
the United States was $239.3 million; the value of Malaya's
exports was $171.4 million.
The value of imports among the
three from the USA was $20.8 million ( 8 per cent of exports
to the USA); the value of imports from the USA to Malaya was
$5.4 million (3 per cent of exports).
^Lennox A. Mills, "Prewar Malaya" in Malaya, pp. 1920.
The year 19 38 is a questionable index as it is the ex
ception in the period 1935-1941 and shows America's share of
Malaya exports down by sixteen per cent from those calcu
lated for 1936 in ibid. However, 19 38 is a dramatic demon
stration of the directness of the linkage between Malayan
export values and the American auto industry.
The value of
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rubber was the more valuable of the two, tin was also a main
element of the export economy; however, tin was declining in
importance as early as. the ,1930s. and after 1945 was unable to
regain its former importance.

The post-war inability to

recover was a result of combined and complex forces:

heavy

war damage and a shortage of needed recovery capital; pro
hibitive increases in production costs; the increase in com^
t

s

petition developed during the war, such as the expansion of
mining in Bolivia and the creation of a government-owned
smelting industry in the United States; and the inescapable
fact that Malayan ore was a diminishing resource.
1937 rubber exported from the British area to America was
$125 million; in 1938, it fell to $50 million.
The American
auto industry's annual absorption rate in early 19 37 was
650,000 tons; a year later, it was down to 300,000 tons.
The
average of monthly indexes of American auto production for
19 38 was fifty-four per cent of the 1937 average.
See
P. T. Bauer, The Rubber Industry: A Study In Competition and
Monopoly (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press for The London
School of Economics and Political Science, 1948), pp. xi-xii,
133.
^In 1945, not a single tin dredge was operable.
The
unit replacement cost in 194 7 was three times the prewar cost
of about $450,000.
See Mills, Malaya, p . 2QQ.
Representa
tive production figures are:
1940, 81,000 tons; 1946, 8,000
tons; 1955, 61,000 tons.
By 1955, other factors had come
into play to put a ceiling on the possible output; e.g., cur
tailed defense stockpiling.
See "Table G, Rubber and Tin Malayan Production and World Prices , 11 in J. M. Gullick,
Malaya, Revised (New York:
Frederick A. Praeger, 1964),
p. 248; Norton Ginsburg and Chester F. Roberts, J r . , Malaya
(Seattle, Washington:
The University of Washington Press,
1958), pp. 400-403, 405; James W. Gould, The United States
and Malaysia (Cambridge, Massachusetts:
Harvard University
Press, 1969), p. 151; and U . S ., Department of Commerce,
"Malaya - Summary of Basic Economic Information," Business
Information Service; World Trade Series, No. 597, June 1954,
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The most significant prewar issue and irritant
between British Malaya and the United States had been the
price of natural rubber.

Until 1910, eighty per cent of the

world's rubber had come from Central and South America and
the native hevea tree.

The British had successfully trans

planted the hevea tree first to Ceylon in the mid-nineteenth
century and only later to Malaya.

The demand for rubber

after 1900 grew first with the bicycle, then with the auto
mobile industry and the supporting tire industry.

Two

factors combined after 1910 to make Malaya the world's
largest producer:

the South American hevea was ruined by

leaf blight, and the demand for automotive vehicles boomed.
Both the expansion of the rubber plantation or estate system :
of Malaya and the demand for automotive tires were given
impetus by World War I.

By 1919, world consumption had

risen to 300,000 tons per year, three times the consumption
in 1914.

However, because of the lead time required to in

crease capacity (the hevea requires five to six years growth
before it can be tapped) and the inability to hedge market
operations, prices do not mirror either supply or demand at
0

p. 7. For information on the American Government's smelting
industry and the increase in Bolivian output see U.S., Con
gress/ Senate, Committee On Currency And Banking, Mainte
nance Of The Domestic Tin Smelting Industry, S. R p t . 263;
80th Cong., 1st. sess., 1947, Senate Miscellaneous Reports
on Public Bills, Vol. II.
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any given time.

In periods off sharply increasing demand,

the price will soar out of all proportion, but the lag in
capacity can— -as it did following 1919— produce a situation
wherein production catches demand just as demand begins to
fall.

Following 1919 prices, which had ranged from U.S.'

$.60 to over $1.00 per pound in 1914-1919, fell to $.17 in
1921-22.

At that time, natural rubber production was almost

a British monopoly.

8

.In an effort to break the boom or bust syndrome, the
British implemented the Stevenson Rubber Restriction Plan in
1922. 9

The plan was aimed at controlling supply, thereby

controlling price through export tax rates which limited the
amount a producer could profitably put on the world market.
The plan was temporarily successful— prices rose to over $1.00
in 1926-1927— but had to be abandoned in November 1928; it
backfired badly.

The artificial shortage raised prices? how

ever, it also stimulated production outside of the
p

See Paul Lamartine Yates, Forty Years of Foreign
Trade (New York: MacMillan and Company), pp. 113-116; and
Gould, The United States and Malaysia, pp. 66-67/ 72. For
world price, production and consumption statistics, 1910-1945,
see U.S., Congress, Senate, Subcommittee on Banking And
Currency, Rubber Production And Importation Policy Hearings,
Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Banking
And Currency, Senate, on S.J. Res. 79, H. J. Res. 77, and
S.J* Res. 83, 81st Cong., 1st. sess.r 1947, p p . 54^48 (here
after cited as Senate Hearings:
Rubber Act of 1947) .
.S ., Congress, Senate Hearings:
Rubber Act of
1947, pp. 13-14, 57; Ginsburg and Roberts, Malaya, p. 391;
and Rose, Britain And South-East A sia, p. 6 6 .
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British-controlled area, most notably in Indonesia, but also
in Indochina, Liberia, and South America.

New plantings

matured after, 192 8 and the resulting glut on the market :
started prices on a downward slide that accelerated after the
Great Depression curtailed consumption in 1930.
prices had crashed to $.02-3/8.

By 1933,

The Stevenson Plan also

changed the relationship of producers.
in 1922, the British
1 '
■
areas produced seventy per cent of the world*s rubber; in
1928, the figure had slipped to fifty-two per cent.

Between

1922 and 1928, Indonesia doubled capacity (by 1940, the
Dutch were producing nearly as much as Malaya) while the
British areas had increased by only forty per cent.

However,

though diminished, the British retained their majority status
and the accompanying potential to affect prices.

Because of

that influence and the dependency of the Dutch and French on
the processing and shipping facilities of Malaya's entrepot,
the British assumed a position of leadership among the South
east Asian producers and initiated action to conclude an
International Rubber Regulation Agreement
1934.10

(IRRA) in December

Under the agreement signed by France, the Nether

lands, Siam and Great Britain, an International Rubber
•^For complete information on the IRRA see Bauer,
"Part II, The Establishment of International Regulation,"
The Rubber Industry, pp. 75-110.
This is claimed as the
only documented work on the subject,
see also, Ginsburg
and Roberts, Malaya, pp. 413-414.
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Regulation Committee

(IRRC) was formed; the task was to

estimate world demand and to restrict equally the amount each
rubber producer would place on the market.

Thus, the IRRC

artificially created price competition among consumers.
Long-range IRRC efforts included restrictions on new planting
and replanting with high yield trees to reduce production
costs.

Whether or not the IRRC could solve the long-term

problem became academic after the closure of Southeast Asia
in 1942; however, the IRRC was able to raise and stabilize
prices to just above

$.22

.

a pound in the three years prior to

World War I I . 1 1
The Stevenson Plan and the IRRA were thorns to the
American rubber manufacturers who, with some justification,
resented the unilateral British price manipulation under the,
former and subjugation to an international production-pricing
cartel under the latter.

As the major consumer, the industry

felt denied of the influence that would have been theirs had
it been a free market operation.

The industry's resentment

was not to be forgotten and was to color post-war American
negotiations on rubber price and supplies.
Though the production capacity, supply, and price of
rubber remained matters to be hammered out between the
llHThe Unpredictable Commodity - Rubber," United
Nations World, Vol. 2 (July, 1948), p. 61; and U.S., Congress,
Senate Hearings:
Rubber Act of 1947, pp. 13-14, 57.
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American industry and the IRRC until 1941, World War II intro
duced new, previously unconsidered factors.

By mid-1942, the

United States Government had taken complete control of Ameri
can importation of natural rubber.

By late 1943, the Govern

ment 's synthetic rubber capacity exceeded Malaya's prewar
natural capacity.

If there had been any question about the

future American role in determinations of supply and price
policies, the dominant position of the United States Government after 1943 made the answer axiomatic.
A brief summary of the United States entry into the
rubber business is necessary here, if for no other reason
than to spare the reader some of the confusion experienced
by the United States Congress after 1945 in its efforts to
remove Government controls.

The urgency of war had resulted

in hasty, sometimes redundant legislation, overlapping au
thority, and a proliferation of bureaus, boards, and
1 -a

offices.

^Representatives of American industry had attended
meetings of the IRRC but in a nonvoting "kibitzer" status.
See "Unpredictable Commodity," pp. 61-62.
1 9 4 2 , domestic allocation was given to the Rub
ber Reserve Board (RRB) under the Office of Production Ad
ministration, later absorbed by the Office of War Mobiliza
tion and Reconversion (OWMR). Purchase and foreign develop
ment of natural rubber remained under the Reconstruction
Finance Corporation's (RFC) Rubber Reserve and Rubber Devel
opment Corporations.
However, there were reorganizations
and minor rubber "divisions" scattered about the Executive.
By 1947, when Congress set about decontrolling rubber, the
trail was lost and legislation to end allocations was writ
ten for the RFC; the State Department had to advise the

The Government's movement from a position of no in
volvement to one of complete control of the industry was slow
and deliberate, but borne by necessity.

By 1939, the pace of

world rearmament had begun to increase the /demand for rubber.
In America, increasing rearmament efforts existed in an
environment of business-as-usual.

As both military and

civilian demand increased, the national stocks of rubber,
all privately owned, began to fall.

The industry was to

later charge that it need not have been so, if the IRRC had
responded to requests to increase supplies.

One estimate

stated that the IRRC kept production at seventy per cent
between 1934 and 1941 m

the interest of price stability.

14

In mid-1939, at the urging of the Department of War,
the Government concluded an agreement by treaty with Great
Britain wherein a half-million bales of American cotton were
traded for 90,000 tons of rubber to be supplied outside of
15
IRRC quotas.
Both commodities were to be stockpiled for
war emergency only and were not to be placed on the market
Senate Subcommittee that allocation was under RRB, under OWMR
and, in turn, under the Office of Temporary Controls.
See
Senate Hearings:
Rubber Act of 1947, pp. 112-113.
^ " T h e Unpredictable Commodity," p. 61.
15

For full text, debate, and amendment see U.S.,
Congress, Senate, 76th Cong., 1st. sess., July 6 , 1939, Con
gressional Record, Vol. 84, Part 8 , pp. 8681-8682.
~
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without prior consultation.

Delivery was slow and stocks

continued to fall— the 1939 end-year level was half the
average for the preceding eight y e a r s . ^
In 1940, the alarm was taken up by the industry in
the colorful person of John L. Collyer, President of the
B. F. Goodrich Company, who launched a one-man campaign
to warn of the dangers of foreign dependency.

In presenta

tions to members of the industry, he punctuated his message
with moments of drama, such as the destruction by fire
cracker of a toy ship sailing on a map of the Far Eastern
trade routes.

Collyer caught the attention of the Senate

Military Affairs Committee, was invited to testify, and
called for a stockpiling program and the immediate develop
ment of a synthetic industry.

(Goodrich was in the produc

tion development stage of synthetic manufacturing and offered
to run the proposed government facility.) 17

Under the

National Defense Act of June 28, 1940, the Reconstruction
Finance Corporation

(RFC) was authorized to construct synthe

tic facilities with an annual capacity of 40,000 tons; the
RFC was also authorized to purchase 800,000 tons of rubber
for stockpiling and chartered the Rubber Reserve Corporation
^ U . S ., congress, Senate Hearings On The Rubber Act
of 1947, p. 15.
17'"rrouble In Synthetic Rubber," Fortune, Vol. 35
(June 1947), pp. 156-157.

for that purpose.

Progress was slow in both efforts and

at the time of Pearl Harbor, America's total stock was
663,000 tons including 100,000 tons enroute on the high seas—
the minimum wartime estimate called for 700,000 tons per
year.

18
In June 1942, under authority of the Second War

Powers Act, the Government took total control of all sources
and uses of rubber.

Imports by private concerns were banned;

the authorized synthetic capacity was raised to 805,000 tons;
and domestic allocation of rubber was given to the Govern
ment's Rubber Reserve Board

(RRB) as was authority to deter

mine product specifications and use.

The allocation of the

small remaining supply of natural rubber among the Allies
was given to the Anglo-American Combined War Resources Board.
Prices to be paid by manufacturers were fixed by AngloAmerican agreement:

natural at the 1941 level of $.22%; and

synthetic at $.18%.

The RFC chartered a second company, the

Rubber Development Corporation, whose task was to encourage
and finance increased natural capacity, primarily in Central
America.

The growing period of the hevea tree was the

limiting factor and despite efforts to increase production,
the total wartime supply was only 315,000 tons.
18

19

U.S., Congress, Senate Hearings On The Rubber Act
of 1947, p. 15.
^ I b i d . , pp. 15-16.
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In September 1942, a report by the Presidentialappointed Rubber Survey Committee' chaired by Bernard M.
Baruch concluded:
. . . Unless corrective measures are taken
immediately this country will face both a mili
tary and a civilian collapse . . . Unless
adequate new supplies (natural or artificial)
can be obtained in time, the total military
and export requirements alone will exhaust our
crude stocks before the end of next s u mmer.^
f i
Catastrophe was initially averted through conserva
tion

(35 mile per hour speed limit and gasoline rationing);

tire rationing; increased use of reclaimed rubber; and strict
limitation on the use of natural rubber.

At a total Govern

ment investment cost of $700,000 ,000, the production of syn
thetic rubber increased rapidly; from a privately-owned
experimental capacity of 8,0 00 tons in 1941, production rose
to 24,000 tons in 1942, to 234,000 in 1943, and to 763,000
in 1944.

The capacity at w a r 1 s end reached 1,100,000 tons.,

a figure which exceeded America's 1941 consumption of
21
775,000 tons.
By 1943, it was clear that the American synthetic
monopoly was growing in capacity and improving in quality
and price into an obvious competitor for natural.

The poten

tial impact on post-war Malaya was not missed by the British,
2'0lb id - , p - 15
^ N e w York Times, March 31, 1945, p. 21.
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and in late 194 3, they seized upon the pending expiration of
the IRRA as a cause for initiating discussions with the
United States.

On December 7, 194 3, the British Minister in

Washington submitted a memorandum to the State Department
advising that neither the Dutch Government in exile nor the
British (the two available signators) had any intention of
renewing the IRRA which was to expire at the end of December
!'

194 3.

22

I

'

The memorandum invited the United States to join m

a new agreement; it also included a draft agreement which
would establish an International Rubber Committee.

The

American response a week later was to decline, citing as the
reason that the action as proposed was "too quick."

The

American counter proposal was a suggestion that the IRRA
first be allowed to lapse, so as to assure all concerned that
any new agreement had no connection with the IRRA. 2 3

Of it

self, the British draft was inoffensive describing a commit
tee without executive authority whose chief function would be
to gather data and to study problems.
^ T h e Department of State record of the 1943-1944
discussions are contained in "Termination of The Interna
tional Rubber Regulation Agreement; Participation of The
United States. In Exploratory “Discussions For A New Agree
ment ," U.S.., Department of State, F R U S ; Diplomatic Papers
194 4 , V o l . II, General; Economic and Social Matters (Wash
ington, D.C.;
U . S . Government Printing Officef 1967),
pp. 950-987 (cited hereafter as Termination of The IRRA) .
23

Dispatch.: Secretary of State to the Ambassador In
The United Kingdom, January 10, 1944, in ibid., pp. 950-951.
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The British countered the 'American hesitation with an
Anglo-Dutch offer to terminate formally the IRRA on April 31,
194 4, the date on which the grace period for renewal ex24
pired.
Again, conclusion of an agreement prior to expira
tion was urged.

The Americans advised that representatives

of the Rubber Development Corporation were available to dis
cuss the matter with the British Far Eastern Emergency Rub
ber Committee— in essence saying there was no immediate requirement to establish new international machinery.

25

In

further exchanges, the British continued to press for an
American commitment.

In what appeared to be a studied slip

of the tongue, the British added that any discussion could
not confine itself to " . . . crude rubber only."

26

The

Americans continued to insist on the expiration of the IRRA
as a precondition to assure that nothing was done to confirm
American industry *s suspicion that the proposed new agreement
was really " . . .

the old one in d i s g u i s e . I n what could

24Ibid., p. 951.
^ D i s p a t c h ; Ambassador In The United Kingdom to the
Secretary of State, January 14, 1944, in ibi d ., pp. 954-957.
2^Memorandum of Conversation Between the Director
of The Office of Economic Affairs, Department of State, and
The Commercial Secretary of The British Empire, Washington,
D.C., March 18, 1944, in ibid., pp. 957-959.
^Me m o r a n d u m Of Conversation By William T. Phillips,
Commodities Division, Department of State, Washington, D.C.,
April 15, 1944, in ibid., p. 959.
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have been a veiled threat to reconstitute the IRRA and IRRC,
the British noted, in late April, that they and the Dutch
also had their industries to contend with; and, with or with
out the Americans, Great Britain was committed to a new
agreement with the Dutch.^8

After the April expiration of

the IRRA, the Department of State advised the British infor
mally that the matter had been discussed with representatives
of the American industry who were highly suspicious of the
proposed agreement.^9

However, the two Governments agreed to

meet with the Dutch in London in August to discuss the matter
further; the meeting was referred to as an "informal interna
tional rubber study group."

The August meeting produced for

mal agreement to establish a permanent International Rubber
Study Group

(IRSG) and the first meeting was set for January

1945.30
In December 1944, a curious incident occurred.

The

British Ministry of Supply was approached by representatives
of the Provisional French Government who wished to join the
^Letter:
Colonial Secretary of The British Empire
to The Office of Economic Affairs, Department of State,
April 26, 1944, in ibid., pp. 962^963.
^ M e m o r a n d u m of Conversation By William T. Phillips,
Commodities Division, Department of State, Washington, D.C.,
May 4, 1944, in ibid., p. 965.

30Ibid., pp. 984^986; and U.S., Department of State,
Department of S t a t e Bulletin,; Vol. XI (September 24, 1944),
p. 328.
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IRSG a,t its first meeting.

In support of their application

for admittance, the French stated that there would be an
estimated 200,000 tons of natural rubber available in Indo
china at w a r 's e n d .

The British transmitted the French

request to the Americans but recommended disapproval citing
the provisional status of the French Government and the pre
cedent that admittance could set for others wishing to join
at this late date.

Admittance for all interested parties was

proposed for the future.

The United States agreed and added

that the French estimate of available rubber was probably
"too high.'"31
The results of the first meeting of the IRSG was
marked by but two observations:

(1) it was agreed that the

speculative information concerning the rubber-producing
areas of Southeast Asia prevented accurate, future estimates?
and (2), any estimates would be based for the present upon
the assumption of "no new production capacity." 32
The timing of the 194 3 British initiative to secure
an agreement with the United States suggests additional
■^Exchange of Dispatches Between the Second Secre
tary of The British Ministry of Supplies and The Office of
Economic Affairs, December 14, 1944 and January 2, 1945, in
Termination Of The IRRA, pp. 296-297.
32U.S«, Department of State, "The RSG: Discussion
And Appraisal of The Future Rubber Situation," Department
of State Bulletin, Vol. XII (February 5, 1945), pp. 161-162.

:
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motives beyond the obvious one of post-war planning.

Prior

to December 194 3, plans had been sketched out at the first
Quebec Conference for the liberation of Southeast Asia.
Though the timetables were tentative, the inevitability of
Allied victory was assumed.

Given that the urgencies of the

moment were yielding to concerns for the future, the British
initiative of 1943 regarding rubber still seems premature.
To the American Department of State, the urgency to replace
the IRRA must have seemed odd at that particular moment; the
French and Siamese were not available for consultations and
the liberation of the areas was tentatively planned for some
time in 1946.

The British could, however, have gained two

advantages in an early Anglo-American agreement.

First, the ;

agreement would have been concluded without concern for two
of the IRRA signators; i.e., the French and Siamese.

In

short, if an agreement favorable to the British and Dutch,
who constituted 80 per cent of world capacity, could be
worked out prior to liberation, the remaining two would be
left to shift for themselves at w a r ’s end.

If the fear was

overcapacity, the British would certainly have been more
comfortable not having to consider the requirements of France
and Siam whose combined capacity could only have made a bad
situation worse.

There is also a possibility— if the suspi

cion concerning British plans for a federation had any
truth--that the British were prepared to speak for
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all. 3 3

That a British desire to avoid French and Siamese

involvement and the advantage of dealing with a Dutch Govern
ment in exile was a factor is indicated by the fact that no
overtures were made to the French after their liberation, and
in the British recommendation of December 1944 that French
membership in the IRSG be deferred.
cannot be ignored:

A second possibility

the British may have perceived an advan

tage in discussing the future with the American Government,
rather than with private American manufacturers.

The British

were aware that the Government-owned synthetic industry would
be turned over to the private sector as soon as practicable
after the w a r . ^

Should the matter be left to the post-war

period, the British could face a difficult time with a can
tankerous American industry motivated primarily by the con
cerns of business enterprise and the memories of the old IRRC
price and production cartel.

On the other hand, the United

33Above, pp. 14-15. A British account (written with
out benefit of the American Government documents) recounts
an initial plan among the British, Dutch and Indian Govern
ments to extend the IRRA until eighteen months after the
war's end.
That scheme was rejected by the Colonial Office.
However, it appears rejection came after the American
response of mid-December 1944.
See Bauer, Rubber Industry,
pp. 307-308.
-^That the Government would not continue to "own"
the industry after the war was a valid assumption.
The syn
thetic patents were privately owned; the plants were under
private management; and Government equipment was mixed with
private.
The. discussions that followed V-J Day between
industry and the Government proceeded from the assumption
that the question was "when," not "if." See below, p. 105.
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States Department of State might possibly be more sensitive
to the plight of the British economy/ the circumstance of. the
Malayan people, and concepts of free trade.

In short, be

cause of the international focus of interest, the United
States Government might be persuaded to keep its synthetic
industry in check.

However, no agreement was concluded and

the international discussions concerning the future were left
to drift in the IRSG.
That no formal American commitment could be forced in
1944 was, at least in part, a result of the dearth of infor
mation concerning conditions in Southeast Asia; however, a
speculative observation can be added.

It would be reasonable

to conclude that the American Department of State might have
breathed a sigh of relief at being able to defer the issue.
Several of the possible problems involved ran straight to the
heart of American hopes and plans for a reordered system of
world trade.

Since the Reciprocal Trade Agreements of 1934,

the United States had led the effort to liberalize trade;
i.e., to do away with trade practices that restricted through
tariff or quota the ability of nations to buy and sell to
fair advantage.

America hed taken steps during the war to

keep alive the objective of removing trade barriers.

The

Reciprocal Trade Agreements. Act had been extended in 1940 and
was again extended in 1943, 1945, and 1948.
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Other steps were taken to prepare the way
for the post-war removal of trade barriers.
Though they were declarations of intent more
than promises to act, Point Four of the A t 
lantic Charter and Article VII of the Mutual
Aid Agreements [Lend Lease] helped set the
stage.
The latter, particularly, became a
vehicle for some of the most important discus
sions of international economic cooperation.
Without committing the British to end imperial
preference— a favorite target of American
trade policy--Point Four and Article VII pointed
the w a y .35
t
The IRRA aside, Malaya was an example of the imperial prefer
ence at work; e.g., cheap Japanese textiles, like American
products, were kept out by tariff in preference to English
goods; the export duties on tin were paid by all but the
United Kingdom and Australia.^6
The possible dilemma of rubber could prove to be
difficult:

(1) if Malaya could quickly swing back to a pre

war level of production; and

(2) if synthetic could not com

pete with natural in a free market.

How then could America

protect her Government synthetic industry short of protec
tionist trade restrictions?

And if she chose to protect, who

but the Dutch, British and their colonies would suffer from
the lost market?

The possible problems and solutions did not

fit the plans for liberalizing trade.

That the Department

of State was aware of the difficulties is hinted at in a
^^Campbell, USWA: ' 1945-1947, p. 384.
36Rose, Britain And South-East A sia, p. 66.

May 1945 letter to the Senate Committee on Agriculture and
Forestry.

The State Department successfully urged the defeat

of a proposed bill that would have created a Federallysubsidized program to grow a natural rubber producing plant
(kok-saghyz) as an alternative to the synthetic Industry.
The Department characterized the proposal as "premature,"
noting that the advantages could not be "properly evaluated"
because of the uncertainties of post-war conditions.

It

added an observation that synthetic could prove to be both
better and cheaper than any natural product.

37

The Department may also have been sensitive to rum
blings of British dissatisfaction over the potential power of
the United States to dictate the post-war terms of trade.

In

January 1945, a member of Parliament had asked in Commons if
the United States was adhering to the terms of Lend Lease
that had been imposed upon the recipients;

i.e., was America

insuring that the five tires on an exported automobile contained no more than ten per cent British rubber?

38

was Lend Lease; however, the choice of the example

The issue
(rubber)

and the timing (a week after the first meeting of the RSG)
is a provocative coincidence.
37

Letter From The Acting Secretary of State to The
Chairman, Senate Committee On Agriculture and Forestry,
May 19, 1945, in U.S., Congress, Senate, Providing And Insur
ing A Dependable Supply of Domestic Natural Rubber, S. Rept.
1912, 79th Cong., 2nd sess., 1946, Senate Miscellaneous
Reports, Vol. 4, p. 3.
38

New York Times, January 31, 1945, p. 4.
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The liberation of Malaya and the conditions of the
plantations simultaneously occupied British concern.

In

July 1945, the British Government announced plans for the
rehabilitation of the Malayan rubber industry.

The Govern

ment would purchase all available rubber, and priority would
be given to providing technical experts and necessary supplies
to the estates.

39

So too did the subject of rubber apparently

rise to a new level of interest in America.

On September 7,

1945, two days after the first advance military units landed
in Malaya, the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion
(OWMR) formed an Inter-Agency Policy Committee On R u b b e r . ^
Membership included representatives of the Departments of
State, Justice, War, Navy and Commerce; the War Assets Commis
sion; the Civilian Production Administration; and the RFC.
Called the Batt Committee after its Chairman, William L.
Batt, Vice Chairman of the OWMR, this group constituted for
mal recognition that the future had become the present, and
that the time to begin coordinated planning had come.^

The

~^Ibid., July 23, 1945, p. 4.
^Qjbid., September 9, 1945, p. 39. The announcement
gave the reason as "fears of serious surpluses" by 1946.
The
Committee produced two reports.
See "Inter-Agency Policy
Committee On Rubber, first and second reports" quoted in
U.S., Congress, Senate Subcommittee Hearings On The Rubber
Act of 1947 , pp. 6-32, (hereafter cited as The ~Batt Committee,
First (Second) Report) .
4 3-The inter-agency approach was presumably a result
of the realization within the Executive of the necessity
"to assure conformity between our foreign economic operations
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Committee's charter included:

maintenance of the synthetic

capacity;- encouragement of research to expand the possible
markets; establishment of natural stockpiles; development of
a Western Hemisphere natural capacity; and the establishment
of " . . . mutually advantageous programs for import from the
42
Far East."
The Batt Committee was to become the Govern
ment's authority on, and t h e ,architect of, a post-war nation
al rubber policy.

Its two reports, published in February and

July 1946, were to lead the way for Congressional action.
Before the Japanese surrender could be arranged,
even before America appointed a post-war Consul, a rubber
survey team, hastily assembled by the British Ministry of
Supplies, had landed in Malaya.

Among the members were three:

unofficial American representatives, buyers for the Goodyear
and Firestone Companies, and an independent purchasing agent.
It would seem that the British and American Governments and
industries were holding their breath in anticipation of the
group's findings.^3
and national foreign policy"; e.g., the creation of The
Office of Foreign Economic Administration in 1942.
See
Acheson, Present At The Creation., p. 46.
42The Batt Committee, First Report, February 19,
19 46, p. 6.
^ T h e British, group landed on September 8, 1945.
The
surrender was taken on the 12th, the same date the United
States appointed its first post-war Consul to Singapore.
See
New York Times, September 9, 19 45, p. 8; and U.S., Department
of State, Foreign Service List January 1, 19 4 6 , Department of

The problems posed by the natural-synthetic dilemma
were buried in complexity.
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In one form or another, they

touched upon at least three American policy issues.

First,

economic policy from the Atlantic Charter, through the
Bretton Woods Act, to the American initiatives to create an
International Trade Organization had established an intent to
speed world economic recovery and to foster multilateral
trade.

Second, foreign policy towards British possessions

was clearly noninterventionist.

Third, there were growing

pressures to reverse the war-time trend of Government involve
ment in and control of private enterprise.
all interests:

How then to serve

national defense, business, free trade, the

Malayan economic recovery?

To attempt to serve all could be

to serve none.
State Publication 2517 (Washington, D . C . :
Printing Office, 1946).
44

U.S. Government

For agreement with this summary see "Rationalizing
Rubber," St. Louis Post-Dispatch, April 28, 1946, quoted in
U.S., Congress, House of Representatives, Extension of
Remarks by Representative John B. Sullivan, 79th Cong., 2nd.
sess., April 28, 1946, Congressional Record, Vol. 92, Part
10, p. 2457.
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CHAPTER III
POST-WAR PROSPECTS:- THE UNION
AND ECONOMIC RECOVERY
Just as the relative position of British Malaya in
the context of the prewar trading triangle makes her illsuited to regional economic generalizations, so too is Malaya
a poor choice for inclusion in a general discussion of colo
nial governments and post-war political developments.

Though

later subjected to pressures common among her neighbors, such
as rising nationalism and communism, the uniqueness of the
Malayan experience accounts for the differences between
America's relationship to Malaya, and the French and Dutch
colonial areas.

Whereas the United States was drawn into the

post-war, colonial affairs of the Dutch and French, she
avoided any such entanglements in Malaya— -albeit a result of
the absence of cause, rather than conscious deliberation.
The British returned to Malaya amidst victory parades
and triumphal arches.

Though the return of the colonialists

elsewhere may have been met with reactions ranging from hos
tile rifle fire to the whipped-dog snarls of those who saw
no change save the exchange of masters, a large majority of
the Malays were sincerely pleased to see the return of their
British mentors and protectors.

The reasons for this seeming
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departure from the expected lay in the history of the BritishMalayan experience, a history somewhat unusual among the
annals of colonialism.
\

Although the English presence in Malaya dates to the
late eighteenth century, British Malaya as it existed in 1941
was the product of a series of treaties concluded between the
Malay Sultans and the Crown in the period 1874 to 1909.

The

British originally secured the treaties to halt civil wars
among the Sultans and acts of piracy, both of which inter
fered with the orderly conduct of trade.

However, the trea

ties were initiated before the first rubber plantation was
established and before large scale, modern tin mining ap
peared.

Whereas the treaties were intended to insure the

security of trading activities, they later served to control
and protect substantial capital investment in plantations and
mines after 1900.

Though the tin and rubber trades followed

the ups and downs of the world economy, a general trend of
economic development continued until 1942 at which time
Malaya enjoyed a standard of living that was, by regional
standards, the envy of her neighbors.-*-

In part as a result

of the mutual, if not equal, benefits of economic development,
-*-The best examples were a higher per capita income,
basic education, and better health services.
See Ginsburg
and Roberts, Malaya, pp. 363-367; and Mills, The New World
of Southeast Asia, p. 181.

and partially as a result of the fact that the British ruled
through the Sultans, the maintenance of colonial control re
quired little use of force.

The absence of the heavy hand

produced a relationship founded in a considerable amount of
mutual respect and a Malay tolerance for and trust in the
British.

Though not a relationship of equals, rather the

relationship of a benevolent father for children, it did not
contain that rawness of the master-servant relationship which
breeds hatred and characterized the British elsewhere and the
Dutch and French almost everywhere.
British Malaya is a deceptively simple term which
fails to suggest what was, in fact, a most complex, plural
istic collection of states, colony, and people.

In 1941,

there were nine Malay States described in the jargon of the
British Colonial Office as "protected states."
the nine were located on the mainland:

Eight of

Kedah, Perak,

Kelantan, Trengganu, Pahang, Selangor, Negri Sembilan, and
Johore.

The ninth, Brunei, was located in the central coast2
al area of British Borneo.
Four of the mainland states—

2
.
•
Referred to by the American State Department m its
1945 estimates as "anomalous," British Borneo is a subject
unto itself.
It consisted of three units:
(1) Sarawak was
controlled by the English Brooke family who ruled as Rajas
from the early nineteenth century; (2) Brunei, the Britishprotected state; and (3) North Borneo, owned by the North
Borneo Company.
Both Sarawak and North Borneo were handed
over to the British in July 1946 and became Crown Colonies;
repair of war damage was beyond the resources of private inter
ests.
Both were incorporated into Malaysia by 1963.
Brunei
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Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan and Pahang— -had been loosely
joined since 1896 as the Federated Malay States, which oc
cupied the central portion of the Malay peninsula and includ
ed the richest tin and rubber producing areas.

Each of the

nine states was technically sovereign; however, under the
treaties concluded with the Crown, Sultanic authority was
limited to those matters concerning the Mohammedan religion
(the faith of the Malay)

and Malay custom.

In all other

matters, both foreign and domestic, the Sultans were bound
to accept the advice of the Crown, the quid pro quo being
British guarantees of Sultanic succession and a generous
annual income.
The Straits Settlements

(referring to the Malacca

Straits) comprised the British Crown Colony of Malaya and
consisted of:

the island, port city of Penang and the adja

cent coastal area, Province Wellesely; Port Swettenham; the
city-port of Malacca; and the island, port city of Singapore.
The essential difference between the "protected states" and
the Crown Colony, other than the obvious degree and visability of British rule, was citizenship.

An individual born in

the Straits Settlements was a British subject, while one
born in the States was a British protected person.
remained a protected state.
See Gould, The United States In
Malaya, pp. 78-79; and Cady, History of Post-War Southeast
A s i a , p. 647.

In a descending hierarchal arrangement, the lines of
British colonial authority differed slightly among States and
Colony.

The senior British authority for all of Malaya was

the Colonial Governor of the Straits Settlements who ruled
from Singapore.

He was assisted in administering the Settle

ments by Legislative and Executive Councils.

The power of

the Legislative Council, however, was subject to the Governor
in that membership was subject to his concurrence, as were
legislative proposals.

In regard to the Federated States,

the Governor of the Straits Settlements also served as the
High Commissioner for the Federated Malay States and, in
this capacity, he presided over a Federal Council headquar
tered in Kuala Lumpur, the Federation Capital.

Coucil mem

bership consisted of a British Federal Secretary, the four
British residents, and four unofficial Malay members nomi
nated by the Secretary.

In the Unfederated States, the Bri

tish advisor served directly under the Governor and presided
over councils which were variations of, and modeled on, the
council system used in the Settlements.
During the war, the decentralized organization and
assumptions of British colonial rule in Malaya were found
adaptable for the purposes of the Japanese.

Because of the

feudal reverence and fealty of the Malay for his Sultan and
the existence of a native civil service, the Japanese for
mulated no plans to alter substantially the arrangements;
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i.e., whatever was required in the Malayan States would be
worked out between the Japanese and the Sultans while Singa
pore, joined with Sumatra for a brief time, was ruled di
rectly by Japan.

The maintenance of the Sultans'

sovereignty

and the survival of the native civil services worked to great
advantage in facilitating the post-war recovery process.
By comparison with the Dutch and French experience,
then, the British return to Malaya was less traumatic for both
the Malays and the British.

In summary, the causes were:

First, the British, like the Americans in the Philippines,
were able to insert a military force sufficient in size to
assure an orderly transfer of control, whereas the French and
Dutch were incapable; second, as already mentioned, the basic
structure of the prewar colonial arrangement remained intact;
third and of primary importance, the Malay people had no
desire to pursue the future without their British protectors.
The most fundamental difference between Malaya and the rest
of Southeast Asia was that the Malays or "people of the
3
country" were a minority in their own land.
As a result of
the growth of the rubber and tin industries, and the need for
a large labor force, Chinese and Indians had come to Malaya
in the millions.

Therefore, any scheme or desire for self-

government would require a reckoning with, the foreign
^P. T. Bauer, "Nationalism And Politics In Malaya,"
Foreign Affairs, Vol. 25 ( A p r i l 1947), p. 515.
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majority, a reckoning the Malays were unwilling to face.
The term "British protected" had originally meant
protection of Malay from Malay and Malaya from external en
croachment; however, the term had new meaning as early as
1920.

The boom in rubber and tin had found the Malay people

ill-suited by temperament, being farmers and fishermen by
tradition, and insufficient in4 numbers to work the mines and
plantations.

To fill the void, the British had encouraged

the immigration of Chinese and Tamil Indians.

By 1941, the

population, swelled by immigrants, had grown to an estimated
five million, a four-fold increase over the estimated popula
tion at the turn of the century.

Fifty-five per cent of that

population was non-Malay, 45 per cent being Chinese and 10
per cent Indian.

The Malay accounted for only 4 3 per cent.

(The remaining 2 per cent were British, Europeans and
Eurasians.)

In the Federated and Unfederated States, the.

figures were slightly different:

38 per cent Chinese, 11 per

cent Indian, and 49 per cent Malay.
Chinese majority in Singapore:

Most dramatic was the

77 per cent Chinese, 12 per

cent Malay, and 7 per cent Indian.

The population increased

during the War, though at a retarded rate, to 5,849,000; but
the ratio among the three Asian races remained unchanged.^
^These figures were published after formation of The
Federation of Malaya in 1948; therefore, the populations of
the Straits Settlements, other than Singapore, were included
with the adjacent State; the total for Malaya is the sum of
the populations of the nine States (including adjacent

62

The Chinese were the more successful of the immi
grants.

Many entered commerce and trade, and supervisory

positions in the British and European-owned mines and planta
tions.

Unlike the Indians, who usually stayed in Malaya for

no more than three years, the Chinese remained indefinitely.
Prior to 1911, the law of Imperial China viewed migration as
illegal and the threat of punitive action discouraged return.
1

In the inter-war period, the uncertainties caused by the
Kuomintang rise to power in the 1920s, followed by the SinoJapanese War of the 1930s, served both to encourage migration
and discourage return.

In addition, the conditions of insta

bility gave rise to investment of capital by the Chinese in
the more tranquil areas.

By 1939, the Chinese investment in

Malaya was estimated at $200,000,000.^
The religious and social habits of the Chinese were
considered by the Mohammedan Malay to be of a lower order
bordering on the barbaric.

(The only lower society was the

Indians who were looked down upon by both the Chinese and
Straits Settlements) and Singapore.
For complete analysis
based on the Malayan Census of 1947 and 19 55 see Ginsburg
and Roberts, Malaya, pp. 47^6 3.
5The figure apparently refers to the capital worth of
Chinese in Malaya, regardless of the original source of
capital or citizen status, since the figure is given sepa
rately and is not included in estimates of total foreign
investment.
See Mills, NeW World of Southeast A s i a , p. 184;
and Rose, Britain and South-East Asia, pp. 81-82.
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Malays.)

This, coupled with Chinese success and superiority

as petit bourgeois, gave rise to intense resentment among
the Malays.

The Chinese remained socially isolated and

politically interested in Kuomintang China.

Outright hostil

ity and violence between Malay and Chinese races was, how
ever, minimal prior to World War II, a tribute to the British
ability to keep oil upon troubled waters.
The general theme of British rule was that the Crown
governed at the request of the Malay people and, therefore,
rule entailed by a responsibility to preserve the rights and
primacy of the Malays, the true "people of the country."

In

the twenty years preceding 1941, there had been some incon
clusive discussion of the future which generally spoke to the
issue of eventual self-government in terms of the administra
tive mechanism of transition.

The first step to precede any

planning for self-government was to be the establishment of a
capable civil service which would eventually emerge from a
*

shadow status and become the nucleus of a Malayan government:
As this service developed, British administra
tion would fade out by stages rather like the
Cheshire cat.
The British would first surrender
their executive power and revert to the status
of advisors as in the Unfederated States; then
the main body would be withdrawn leaving depart
mental consultants; and finally there would be a
complete transfer and even the smile would go.6
^Rose, Britain And South-East A sia, pp. 81-82.

Between the World Wars, two schools of thought devel
oped around the question of whose "smile" would replace that
of the British.

The first, the pro-Malayan or devolutionist

school, saw Malaya as a collection of states ruled by Sultans
wherein the Malay had a position of privilege and the
Chinese and Indians were but tolerated guests.

The second,

the pan-Malayan school, viewed the country as a multi
racial nation which came into existence after 1900 in which
the Malays were but one of several races with no special
claim to primacy over the Chinese-Indian majority.

The

pro-Malayan school was the more popular among the British
colonials who, for the most, had a genuine fondness for
the usually gentle, well-mannered Malay; the British colon
ial had a decided dislike for the more aggressive and often
troublesome Chinese.

The English sense of fair play favored

the weaker race and saw little justice in any plan that
would cast the Malays to an uncertain fate under the inevit
able dominance of the numerically superior Chinese.

There

was also a businessman's argument for either school.

For

the pro-Malayan:

the Malays were not business competitors

of the Britisher whereas the Chinese were.
Malayan :

For the pan-

the Chinese could provide acumen and leadership in

business, industry and civil service at a fraction of the
cost of English and Europeans charged with such tasks— if
the Malays could be brought to accept subservience to the

-
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Chinese.

7

The pro-Malayan school remained the preferred ap

proach among the Colonial Service administrators through the
19 30s although no concrete plan for self-government emerged.
It would seem, however, that the idea of self-government and
the pro-Malayan view wefe mutually exclusive.

To accept the

one with the other was to doom the first to failure; i.e., a
western style democracy ruled by an elite group selected from
t

among a minority.

\

At any rate, until World War II, the Bri

tish had acted to protect the primacy of the Malays, and the
Malays, with few exceptions, were content to have it so.
The Japanese interlude had served to intensify the
racial animosity between Malay and Chinese.

As the majority

of overseas Chinese remained loyal to Kuomintang China,
resistance to the Japanese was accepted as a proper Chinese
activity.

In turn, the Japanese viewed the Chinese Malayans

as enemies and treated them as such.

On the other hand, the

Japanese did not treat the Malays as conquered enemies.
Japanese propaganda ran thus:

The

the Malays had been exploited

by the British, an enemy defeated and driven from the coun
try.

The Malays had been equally exploited by the Chinese,

a race still locked in combat with Japan.

The intent was to

whip up hatred for the British, and to capitalize on the
latent Malay hatred and distrust of the Chinese merchant,
^Among others see ibid.; Gullick, Malaya, p p • 75-76;
and Bauer, "Nationalism And Politics In Malaya,
pp. 505-506.
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money lender, and foreman.

8

They failed in the former but

succeeded in the latter with the unwitting aid of the Chinese.
The Chinese assumed the task of resisting the Japan
ese in Malaya.

Malay participation was minimal and accounted

for less than ten per cent of a force estimated to be six or
seven thousand at its strongest.

Other than rescuing a few

Allied fliers and killing an .occasional Japanese, the MPAJA
spent most of its efforts in acts of banditry and extortion
against Malayan villagers.

To add a final twist in a seem

ingly unending tangle of circumstances, the MPAJA fell under
the control of the MCP which owed its ideological foundings
to the Chinese Communist Party.

In addition to terrorizing

the Malays, the MPAJA also turned their efforts to dealing
with Kuomintang Chinese.

When Mountbatten landed in Septem

ber 1945, the first order of business was to suppress the
civil disorder which had increased during the last weeks of
Japanese rule.

Malays were cutting the throats of their

Chinese creditors in the urban areas, while MPAJA units freebooted about the countryside murdering Chinese and Malay
alike, and settling old political and personal scores.
^By all accounts, the treatment of the Chinese during
the war was a touchy subject.. The Malays, particularly the
police, cooperated to the point of collaboration while the
Japanese brutalized the Chinese.
See Gullick, Malaya,
p. 90.
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Although it took the remainder of 1945, general order was
restored by SEAC

forces.^

In October 1945, the British Colonial Secretary an
nounced plans to reorganize Malaya into a Malayan Union, the
first step in beginning the preparations of the country for
self-government as promised in the December 19 4 3 declaration
of policy.

The scheme soundedireasonable enough:

the

Federated and Unfederated States would be joined in a Malayan
Union; the Straits Settlements

(Singapore excepted) would be

absorbed by the adjacent states; and Singapore would be re
tained as a Crown Colony (neatly dodging the problem of the
overwhelming Chinese majority).

There was to be a new Union

citizenship for all born in the States, though those who
held British citizenship by virtue of colonial status would
retain it.

To effect the reorganization, new treaties had

to be negotiated with the Sultans " . . . which will enable
His Majesty to possess and exercise full jurisdiction . . .
[and] once done . . . [it is] intended in Order in Council
to constitute the Malayan Union.
Sir Harold MacMichael, a former High Commissioner for
Palestine, was dispatched as Special Envoy to secure the
treaties.

In less than 90 days, MacMichael was back in

9See above, pp. 59-60.
l^George Hall, Colonial Secretary, quoted in New
York Times, October 11, 1945, p. 3.
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London; apparently, there had been little negotiation.
Sultans were in no position to argue any proposal.

The

All had

remained on their thrones during the occupation, and British
confirmation of their status was not guaranteed.

Several of

the Sultans had cooperated with the Japanese to the point of
collaboration and were not anxious to test MacMichael1s
authority to press the matter.
The treaties were formal
! \l
renunciations of all nominal sovereignty; i.e., they formal
ized the de facto authority held under the old treaties.

The

important difference was that, to all effect, the status of
the States changed from protected state to colony.
legality of the treaties was questionable:

The

(1) because of

the possible duress imposed by MacMichael; and (2) because
two of the states, Johore and Trengganu, were constitutional
monarchies whose Sultans were technically without authority
to surrender sovereignty.

However, the legal questions were

ancillary to the outcry that came* upon publication of
MacMichael's report and the British White Paper of February
194 6 that promulgated the Union.

The report established as

one purpose of the reorganization to give a new status to
the Chinese and Indians:
Although the special position of the indi
genous Malays needed to. be safeguarded,
reforms were overdue in the system of

representation in order to permit the claims
of other races . . . to receive reasonable
satisfaction.il
The White Paper proposed Union citizenship for all persons
who had lived within Malaya for ten of the fifteen years
preceding the establishment of the Union? thereafter, citi
zenship would require five years residency.
The Union was a complete "volte face of the proMalayan policy, and aroused a storm of protest among the
Malays."

The result was the unplanned "miracle" of

MacMichael1s mission— it aroused a spirit of national iden
tity among the previously disinterested Malays.

Under the

leadership of the British educated Data Onn bin Jaafar,
Mentir Besar

(Chief Minister)

to the Sultaji of Johore, local

Malay opposition groups sprang up in village and town
throughout the peninsula.
several factors.

The reaction was the result of

First, the four northern States had had a

taste of autonomy during the war when the Japanese honored
Thai claims to the area; neither had really bothered to rule.
Second, the wartime activists of the predominantly Chinese
MPAJA and their post V-J Day spree of terrorism had raised
Malay anti-Chinese feelings to fever pitch.

Third, the

educated Malay civil servants and teachers who followed
11Sir Harold MacMichael, "Report on a Mission to
Malaya," Colonial No. 194, London:
His Majesty's Stationery
Office, February 1946, quoted in Bauer, "Nationalism In
Malaya," p. 509.
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Dato Onn realized the inescapable, that the citizenship plan
would inevitably lead to Chinese domination.

By April 1946,

Dato Onn had organized the first viable, politically-oriented
group in the Malay's history, the United Malay National Orga
nization (UMNO).
English.

The UMNO was not without allies among the

There was a considerable outcry against the Union

from the old-hand, Colonial Service Revolutionists.

In

November, the Labor Government conceded that the proposal was
fatally flawed and proposed a constitutional conference to
include the leaders of the UMNO and their advisors, plus
. .
.
12
leading members of the Union administration.

The crystalization of a Malay cause celebre into a
political force, in turn, caused the creation of a counterforce.

When the British Government yielded to UMNO demands

to withdraw the most controversial clause of the Union pro
posal, i.e. the citizenship scheme, non-Malay groups joined
in opposition to the UMNO.

Fearing a formalization of Malay

dominance, numerous non-Malayan communal and ideological
groups joined together to form the All Malayan Council^ of
1.

Joint Action

(AMCJA) .

Before it shattered into pieces in

■^For various accounts see ibid., pp. 508-510; Mills,
Malaya, pp. 34-4 2; Rose, Britain And South-East A s i a ,
p p . T29-130; Mills, New World of Southeast A s i a , pp. 204-205;
and Ginsburg and Roberts, Malaya, pp. 46 3-465.
l^Among the groups joined in the AMCJA were the
Malayan Democratic Union, Malayan Indian Congress, PanMalayan Federation of Trade Unions, and MPAJA-Ex-Service
Comrades.
The common strain was opposition to the UMNO while
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the communist uprising of 1948, the AMCJA did participate in
the drafting of a proposed Federal constitution in May 1947
that was to have some influence on the document which was
finally adopted and established the Malayan Federation in
January 1948.
The attempted Union was not the* only mistake made by
the British Labor Government in their early post-war appraisal
of the needs of Malaya.

Unlike Churchill, the Government of

Prime Minister Clement R. Attlee was not dogmatically opposed
to communism in all its possible forms.

Though well meant,

but not exactly applicable in the nonindustrial Asian con
text, the Labor Government encouraged reconstruction and
expansion of trade unionism in Malaya.

In keeping with the

then general strategy of world communism, MCP leaders
directed their early post-war efforts to infiltrating and
gaining control of the unions.

The disbanded MPAJA and its

civilian supportive arm, the MPAJA-Union, reformed into the
MPAJA Ex-Service Comrades Association and The People's Demo
cratic Movement.

As the only effectively organized political

group, the MCP members emerged as leaders of the General
Labor Union (GLU) from its inception in late 1945.

The first

the forces for dissension were a Chinese majority and at
tempts by the communists to dominate. See Ginsburg and
Roberts, Malaya, pp. 464-4 65.
14Ibid.
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test of strength came in February 1946 when the GLU called a
general strike ostensibly a holiday honoring the MPAJA veter
ans.

Mountbatten responded decisively, prohibiting the

strike, but the British won this first confrontation as much
a result of popular disinterest in the strike as they did
through the government ban.

Reviving a 1940 Trade Union

Enactment Ordinance which required actual trade employment as
a condition of holding union office, the British forced the
breakup of the GLU, but it was soon reorganized into an
equally communist-dominated Pan-Malayan Federation of Trade
Unions

(PMFTU).

By mid-1948, the PMFTU controlled the major

ity of key positions in some 277 registered unions and was
affiliated with the communist-led World Federation of Trade
Unions IS
If the political events in Malaya into 19'4 8 drew any
particular interest from the United States, it was not appar
ent.

Considering such events as those in progress in China

and Indonesia, those taking shape in Indochina; and the
relentless pressures in Europe, all of which were communist
inspired if not directed by Moscow, it is understandable.

To

the American Department of State, the proposed Union; the
l^For the best summary of the MPAJA's post-war trans
formation see ibid., pp. 462-467.
The degree of communist
influence in the PMFTU became obvious after it and the MCP
were declared illegal in 1948 and the number of unions
dropped from 399 to 162.
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formation of the UMNO and its opposition, the AMCJA; and the
British policy of accommodation, demonstrated in the proposal
for a constitutional conference, might have seemed one of the
few situations in the world that was going w e l l .

The Bri

tish were apparently in tune with the American policy to
"favor a policy" leading to increased participation of depen
dent people in governing their own affairs.
Beyond the common experience of the Japanese presence,
the trial of each of the Southeast Asian countries had varied
considerably in the details and effects of conquest/ occupa
tion, and liberation.

A few examples serve to illustrate.

The Philippines, Burma, Malaya, and the Netherlands East
Indies had been taken in 19 41 and 194 2 in military operations
which involved the clash of Japanese and western and colonial
forces.

In contrast, Indochina fell within the Japanese ring

through negotiation with Vichy France, and thus escaped the
destructiveness of major combat operations.

When the tide

turned against the Japanese, Burma, the Philippines, and,,
portions of Borneo again became battlefields in the death
struggle between Japan and the West.

However, Malaya and

Indochina were spared the intense destructive battles of
liberation by the precipitous Japanese collapse.

Cities such

l^One opinion is that :the British attitude of con
ciliation and reasonableness was influenced by a desire to
avoid action which might bring adverse American public opi
nion.
T. H. Silcox, "Forces For Unity In Malaya," 'inter
national Affairs, Vol. XXV (October 1949), p. 462.

as Saigon and Kuala Lumpur survived the War unscathed, where
as Manila was described as being the most devastated city of
World War II, a distinction shared only with Warsaw.
The damage to Malaya had been extensive, though not
fatal.

The tin mines had fallen into ruin; mining equipment

had been wrecked in the British retreat or wantonly destroyed
by the Japanese.

The tin smelters of Penang, the grandest in

the prewar world, had met a similar fate.
by the British remained down.

Bridges destroyed

Railroad tracks on the east

coast had been ripped up and moved by the Japanese in an
attempt to build a line to relieve Burma in 1943.

By 1945,

the rubber plantations had begun to recede into the jungles.
The Japanese had literally choked on the riches of Malaya.
Their industrial needs did not approach the world-supply
capacities of their captive.

Had the need existed, Japan had

early-on lost both the security of the sea routes and the
merchant fleet needed to move the materials.

All the ad

vancements, both social and economic, that had made Malaya a
dynamic if primative country, suffered under the inept man
agement and stupidly destructive practices of the Japanese.
Prospects for economic recovery were mixed.

The

ability of the great, entrepot ports of Singapore and Penang
to become again centers of commerce and shipping would depend
upon the reconstitution of world and regional markets and
the ability of the mines and plantations to begin producing.
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For the mainland Malay States, recovery would be tied
directly to the recovery of rubber and tin.
The most immediate problem facing the British upon
their return to Malaya was an acute rice shortage.

Starva

tion was already a reality in some areas and malnutrition
was widespread.

Prewar Malaya had not made an attempt to

match population growth with increased rice production,
' ^
choosing to put farmland into the more profitable rubber
tree and depending instead upon imports from the rice sur
plus countries of Thailand, Burma and Indochina.

In 19 39,

Malayan rice production had been only forty per cent of
annual consumption.

At the time of liberation, Malaya's

rice stocks were down to thirty-seven per cent of the 1940
level.

Efforts by the British Military Authority, the inter

im government under SEAC, were able only to avert immediate
disaster.

Rationing was imposed and the British Government

assumed responsibility for government-to-government pur
chases.

Although widespread famine was narrowly averted, the

problem of rice supplies and prices remained to plague Malaya
into the 1950s.

As supplies increased, controls were relaxed

and prices increased at a rapid rate into 194 8 when an ap
proximate balance in supply and demand was achieved and
prices began to stabilize in near free-market conditions.
Though at a slowed rate of increase, prices continued to rise
in the general inflationary environment.

The high price of
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rice became, and continued to b e , a major factor in the
inflationary push which was to cause continual labor demands
for wage increases, an issue that later served as fertile
ground for both anti-British and communist agitation.-^
As previously explained, the recovery prospects of
the tin industry were gloomy; however because it remained a
shortage, strategic material, what tin could be produced was
at least assured a market; and, as a result of later British
and American military stockpiling programs, was assured
price stability.

Yet, due to the diminished size of the

industry, it could not assume a leading role in the recovery
effort. 18

The reconstitution of the shipping industry of the

entrepot had to overcome the war losses to British shipping,
a matter complicated by the precipitous termination of
Lend-Lease in August 1945.

The problem was somewhat amelio

rated by the charter of liberty ships on cash terms worked
out with the United States.
l^Cady, in Southeast A s i a , Henderson, ed., pp. 15-16;
Gullick, Malaya, pp. 85-86; Mills, Malaya, pp. 31-32; and
Rose, Britain And South-East Asia, p. 192.
Thailand profited
most from the Malayan rice shortage; Siam had a rice surplus
and did not hesitate to sell at exorbitant prices.
See
James C. Ingram, "Thailand's Rice Trade And The Allocation of
Resources" in The Economic Development of Southeast A s i a ,
C . D . Cowan, ecH (New York:
Frederick H. Praeger, 1964) ,
pp. 105-107.
•L^See above, pp. 31-33, n. 7, p. 33.
19Campbell, USWA:

1945-1947, p. 34 8.
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By mid-October, the survey of damage to the rubber
areas was nearly complete and was encouraging; less than ten
per cent of the more than 3,000,000 acres in hevea had been
destroyed by the Japanese in their futile efforts to increase
rice production.

The trees had actually grown stronger dur

ing the rest period, though the nonproductive years repre
sented a loss of over $200,000,000.

The British Ministry of

Supply had located some 70,000 tons of rubber stored in
Straits ports, and the first shipment left for England on
September 16th.

on

Several long-range problems were to slow the recovery
of rubber to full production.

Bridges and railway lines had

to be repaired to regain plantation-to-port transportation.

.

The major problem, which would prove to be the limiting factor
in the rate of recovery, was labor.

The backbone of the

plantation labor force had been the Indian immigrants who
had moved back and forth between the two countries since 1910
with the rise and fall of rubber fortunes.

During the war,

thousands had been conscripted by the Japanese to build the
"railway of death" into Thailand.

The survival rate among

the Indian rail workers had been one in three.

The appalling

mortality and general population dislocation which occurred
^ New York Times, September 17, 1945, p. 3; Octo
ber 3, 1945, p. 9; and Mills, New World of Southeast A s i a ,
p. 201.
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during the occupation had reduced the plantation labor force
by thirty to fifty per cent, depending on the a r e a . ^
The unsettled conditions immediately following the
Japanese surrender were anticipated and, by Anglo-American
agreement, the wartime Controls of rubber procurement and
allocation were unchanged.

The two Governments continued to

purchase for their domestic industries, the prices of natural
I V

and synthetic remained fixed at the wartime levels, and
international allocation was determined by the Combined War
Resources Board; however, the Board was to be terminated,
at American request, on December 31, 1945.

22

Almost as soon as the first shipment of Malayan rub
ber left for England, the British producers began to call for
a removal of the price ceiling.

The RFC's Rubber Reserve Cor

poration was authorized to sell natural to the American con
sumers only at the set price of $.22%.

The British producers

^ G i n s b u r g and Roberts, Malaya, pp. 323; 329-330;
John F. Cady, The History of Post-War Southeast Asia (Athens,
Ohio:
Ohio University Press, 1974), pp. 1 3 - 1 4 and New York
Times, October 31, 19 45, p. 9.
22The process of decontrolling world trade was swift;
however, certain strategic shortage items, notably rubber
and tin, were placed under international allocation commit
tees after the War Resources Board was dissolved; e.g., Combined Tin and Rubber Committees, European Coal Organization,
International Emergency Food Council ClEFC). By mid-1947,
other than the IEFC, only the Combined Tin Committee re
mained.
See Campbell, USWA:
1945-1947, p. 352; New York.
Times, September 20, 1945, p. 33; and November 27, 19 45,
p. 10.
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argued as early as September that the price was too low; that
the British industry was already paying $.30 for Ceylonese
and South American rubber; and, in view of the need for
dollar exchange, the British Government was being too coopera
tive in agreeing to sell to America based on the Rubber
23
Reserve Corporation's break even price.
In what could have
been a reference to the future vof rubber price agreements,
the Colonial Secretary in his announcement of the Union pro
posal, leveled a warning at the consumers of Malaya's re
sources as well as the owners of the mines and plantations.
The Secretary stated:
No one must rely upon privilege or regard
Malaya simply as a source of material wealth
. . . while it is to the advantage of all the
world and not only Malaya that the production
of her mineral and agricultural resources be
restored and developed by industry and research,
it is right that the Malayan people should be
assured of their full share in the rewards of
their industry.24
Though part hyperbole— the majority of the mines and estates
were owned by British interests--the "full share" could only
have been a reference to an increase in the total price of
the resources, thereby yielding a net increase in wage and
revenue income of direct benefit to the people of Malaya.
That is quite different from increasing the Malayan "share"
23New Yor k Times, September 25, 19 45, p. 28.
24Quoted in ibid., October 11, 1945, p. 3.

80

which would require a decrease in somebody else's share;
the question being, whose?

The return on privately invested

capital must be paid, or capital retreats, and that return
has a finite floor.

An increase in wages, revenues and

operating expenses must be accommodated by the only remaining
variable in the equation:

selling price.^5

In November, the IRSG met for the second time in
London with France sitting as a new member.

The basis for

predictions was more solid than it had been in January:

a

minimal loss to Malayan capacity; no damage in Indochina;
however, due to the inability of the Dutch to restore civil
order, the extent of damage in Indonesia was still unknown.
The IRSG concluded:

the current price of rubber was too low

to bring out Malayan rubber; the estimate for 1945 was two to
three hundred thousand tons; and the cost of synthetic pro
duction was down to a level that would make it costpc
competitive.
There were rumors, emphatically denied, that
^ S e v e n t y per cent of the total (prewar) foreign in
vestment in Malaya was British.
There was considerable con
centration:
over half of the large rubber estates (over 100
acres) were owned by London's Guthrie & Company; a third of
the tin mines were controlled by the London Tin Corporation.
The prewar return on a total investment of approximately 100
million pounds sterling had been about ten per cent.
See
Rose, Britain And South-East Asia, pp. 6 3-64; and Mills,
Malaya, pp. 19-20.
26u .s ., Department of State, "Report on The Second
Meeting of The Rubber Study Group," The Department of State
Bulletin, Vol. XIII (November 25, 1945), p. 840. For a
British estimate of just how price-competitive synthetic
was see Bauer, Rubber Industry, pp. 296-300.
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the American State Department had come with "deals" to pre
sent to the producers, such as shutting down inefficient syn
thetic plants

(thus reducing production)

ural price guarantees.

in return for nat

The estimates of the IRSG would sup

port the necessity for "deals" since the prediction was that
the estimated total supply of natural and synthetic rubber
would exceed 2,700,000 tons b y 1948— twice the prewar world
consumption rate.

The official American response was that

synthetic production was a domestic matter, not within the
province of the IRSG, and a question that must wait for the
Batt Committee's report.^7

Apparently as a result of the

facts and figures then coming from Southeast Asia, the issue
of synthetic production cooled for the moment.

The most

optimistic estimate put the date for natural's recovery into
1948; for the immediate future, rubber would remain a short
age material and all, both synthetic and natural, would be
needed.

On the occasion of the first arrival of Malayan

rubber in New York, the. RFC announced that the world alloca
tion of natural would be determined by a six-nation Combined
^ New York Times, November 27, 1945, p. 10.
In fact,
the RFC was closing down some of the oldest, higher-costing
operations, but the reason was inefficiency.
High cost nat
ural purchasing programs were also being ended; e.g., wild
hevea hunting in the Congo and Amazon regions. See New York
Times, January 17, 1946, p. 42; and Raymond Dennet and
Robert Turner, eds., Documents On American Foreign Relations,
Vol. VIII, July 1, 1945 - December 31, 1945 (Norwood, Massa
chusetts:
Princeton University Press, 1948), p. 172.
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Rubber Committee

(Russia and China were to sit with the
2o
three producers and the United States).
The damage done to Malaya appeared to be repairable

within a reasonable period of time, giving hope for a rela
tively rapid economic recovery.

Part of the capital needed

for recovery would come from prewar revenue surpluses worth
$216*000,000 and war damage Compensation schemes designed to
assist the rubber and tin industries.29

December 1945,

the British Government announced a ten-year grant program for
colonial areas of the Empire totaling about 120 million
pounds sterling, five million of which was earmarked for
Malaya.

That the announcement was made, one day prior to

passage of the Anglo-American Loan Agreement in the House of
Commons with a flourished reference to the burden the program
would place upon the meager financial resources of Great
I

Britain begs a c o m ment,^
There are indications that some of the early post-war
British decisions concerning or affecting Malaya were influ
enced in part by the proposed Loan Agreement; still approval
of the Loan by the American Congress was not a certainty.
^ New York Times, December 25, 1945, p. 1.
^Mills, Malaya, pp. 200-201.
^ T h e grant was announced on December 12, 1945; the
Loan was approved in the House of Commons the next day.
See
New York Times, December 13, 1945.
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It would, therefore, be reasonable to assume that British
actions would be tailored to either support, or at least
minimize objection to, the $4.4 billion credit proposed in
the Agreement.

Accepting that view offers a possible,

partial explanation for three British decisions.

First, the

British agreed to supply the United States with Malayan rub
ber at near bargain prices through the temporary continuation
of the wartime agreements despite objections from the British producing industry. 31

This suggests an unwillingness on

the part of the British Government to engage in price hag
gling while the Loan was still uncertain.

Second, the an

nouncement of the grant to Malaya, though a small part of a
large program, may have been designed to encourage speedy
passage of the Loan through the American Congress.

Given the

condition of the British economy in December 1945, it would
seem that the ability to meet the full commitment to the
dependent colonial areas would hinge on securing the Loan.
Third, the reasonable and accommodating response to the Malay
opposition to the Union proposal, and the permissive approach
to anti-British groups suggested to at least one observer
that a partial explanation lay in the desire to avoid any
action that could generate adverse American public opinion. 39
■
^ S e e below, pp. 86-89, for price agreements prior to
and following American approval of the Loan.
^^Silcox,

"Forces For Unity In Malaya," p. 462.
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This is not to say that there was a direct conscious connec
tion between America and Malaya via the Loan, rather that
the British view of Malaya was to some degree influenced by
England's need to avoid any situation which could antagonize
her potential creditor.

•''

v
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CHAPTER IV
MALAYAN RECOVERY AND THE RUBBER ACT OF 1947
The early post-war recovery effort in Malaya was
launched with considerably more dispatch and success than in
the Dutch and French areas.

While the French and Dutch were

forced to expend precious time and energy in restoring order,
a necessary prelude to economic recovery, the British were
able to concentrate their energies on restarting the income
producing sector of the economic system.^

The tin mining

and processing industries having been badly crippled, the
burden of recovery fell upon the virtually undamaged rubberproducing industry.^

For the immediate future, at least

until the pent up demand for rubber was met, a market for
^-By the end of 1946, the Dutch had managed only to
restore a modicum of order in the urban areas of Java and
Sumatra and the outer islands.
The rubber-producing interior
areas were left to nationalist guerilla factions.
The Dutch
insistence on regaining full political control remained the
prime objective throughout the last all-out, unsuccessful
Dutch police action in late 1948.
See Cady, Post-War
Southeast A sia, pp. 36, 46-48.
By November 1946, the situa
tion in Indochina had deteriorated to open fighting between
French troops and Vietnamese communists.
See ibid., pp. 5052. For a graphic portrayal of the frequency of conflict
in the two areas see "Chronology of Events" in Campbell,
USWA:
1945-1947, pp. 557-565.
^See above, pp. 31-33 and n. 7, p. 33.
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all that Malaya could produce was guaranteed.

The remaining

key variable in the rubber-recovery equation was the market
price.

The last time demand had so far exceeded supply had

been in the years immediately prior to World War I at which
time prices had soared to over $3.00 a pound.^

Had there

been a free market in 1945, there is little question that the
price would have risen to a 1945-equivalent level.
1

However,

\

as a result of a continuation of war time cooperation between
the Governments of America and Britain, the question of a
free market was deferred.

Paramount among the differences

between 1945 and 1914 was the dominant position of the United
States, a position secured by the dependency of the colonial
nations upon America for assistance in their economic recov
ery.

There was little the European colonial nations were

capable of doing without American aid and cooperation and,
therefore, agreement.
Because of the dominant place of rubber in the Malay
an recovery potential, and the dependency of rubber upon the
American market, the relationship between the two was direct.
A decision in Washington concerning the price of natural rub
ber, the specification of rubber used in a tire, or the pro
duction and price level of synthetic rubber had direct and
immediate impact in Malaya.

What the United States decided

would affect levels of employment, wages and revenues, and
^Yates, Forty Years of Trade, p. 113.
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the rate at which dollar exchange would flow through Malaya
to London.
With the termination of the Anglo-American War Re
sources Board set for the end of 1945, new arrangements for
distribution and pricing of natural rubber were required.
Under Government-to-Government contracts negotiated in Decem
ber 1945 and January 1946, it was agreed between the British
and American Governments that the British Board of Trade
would remain the sole authorized purchaser of Malayan rubber,
and that the RFC would continue to pay the Board $.20% per
pound.

4

.

That level assured price stability for the American

manufacturers at near the wartime level.

The contract

was good until the end of March 1946, temporary continuation
of the wartime price level having been agreed to as being
in the interests of all concerned until the prospects for
recovery became clearer.

At the same time, the six nation

Combined Rubber Committee set the American quota at fifty per

.

cent of Southeast A s i a ’s production.

5

The January agreement, good through March 1946, was
later extended through June 1946 on the same terms.

However,

renewal of the contract at $.20% brought immediate protest
4
New York Times, December 25, 1 9 4 5 , p. 1; and
January 29, 1946, p. 28.
^Ibid., June 4, 1946, p. 36.
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aimed at the British Board of Trade from London rubber
interests.^

Again the Labor Government was criticized for

allowing a source of dollar exchange to slip away.

The Lon-

don-headquartered British Rubber Growers Association stated
that the price was too low to support both the cost of opera
tions and the cost of the recovery effort which in their view
was being "thwarted by low prices and politicians."

In May,

in a move to still growing producer resentment, the Board of
Trade raised the price they would pay to $.30% (equalling
the price paid m

Ceylon).7

London then called for a meeting

with the Americans, Dutch and French to negotiate new price
7
agreements.
Though the British were forced, at least
through the end of June, to sell to the United States at a
loss, the Americans could be persuaded only to raise the
price to $.23%.

In return, the RFC was authorized to make

direct purchases of its allocated amounts, rather than buying
through the Board of Trade's agents.8
^Ibid., April 8, 1946, p. 33; and April 26, 1946,
p. 17.
The protest was made through the British press, the
Government having declined to comment perhaps due to the
critical phase of the Loan's passage through Congress.
The
complaint had basis inasmuch as the price of rubber remained
at the 1941 level while the price of rice was 5 to 10 times
1941 levels.
See ibid., November 30, 1946, p. 23; and above,
pp. 75-76.
7New York Times, May 7, 1946, pp. 28-29; and June 4,
1946, p . 36.
8Ibid., June 21, 1946, p. 31. The advantage was
being able to select quota shares.
The RFC bought through
private agents under contract.
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By August, authorities were predicting a recovery to
seventy per cent of Malaya's prewar capacity by the end of
1946.

9

For reason not precisely clear, the Rubber Growers

Association requested that a free market be restored upon
expiration of the British-American contract at the end of
1946.

Though the Association admitted the probability that

the price could fall, the reason given was that it was time
for the price to "find its own l e v e l . T h e r e

are several

possible explanations for the apparently risky proposal by
the Growers Association.

They must have known that the

American Government's stated commitment to the synthetic
industry was limited to the maintenance of an on-line capa
city sufficient to the national defense requirement, a capa
city one-fourth the size of the million ton facilities built
during the war and less than half the 1946 production level.
The level of production had been and was to continue to be
reduced as supplies of natural rubber became available; i.e.,
the level of synthetic production was being fitted to the
demand situation as a supplement to natural.

The great ques

tions were? how much of the Government's national capacity
9Ibid., August 12, 1946, p. 32. Passage of the Loan
in July, removing it as a cause for concern, may have em
boldened the growers,
10The Batt Committee, Second Report was made public
on July 28, 1946.
See ibid., July 29, 1946, p. 25? and
below, pp. 96-97.
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would be absorbed by private industry, when, and at what
level would they produce?

If a privately-owned American syn

thetic industry was to compete with Malayan natural/ other
things being equal/ then the choice would be based on price.
In the conditions of 1946, the price of synthetic was lower
than natural/ the price of natural having been fixed by
Anglo-American agreement.^

If free market operations could

be restored before the American Government began to divest
itself of its synthetic monopoly, and natural was reduced to
a price that rendered synthetic noncompetitive, American
manufacturers would not step forward and absorb an unprofit
able industry.

In short, a price fall in natural in 1946

could cool private industries1 interest and "scotch the
synthetic snake.

On the other hand, the British producers

may have meant exactly what they said; i.e., it was time to
discover the worst.

Supplies were increasing faster than

originally anticipated.

The Combined Rubber Committee's

fourth quarter Malayan allocation to the United States had
been met easily with a month to spare, and estimates showed
that Malaya would produce more than had been allocated for
l^The wholesale RFC price to industry in August 19 46
for synthetic and natural was $.18% and $.25% respectively.
There was a $.0 3% premium in natural; i.e., it cost $.0 3%
less to process than synthetic; natural, therefore, still
cost $.04 more than synthetic.
12"Trouble In Synthetic," p. 165.
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the last quarter of 1946.

As early as September 1946, then,

Malaya was facing the threat of overproduction in terms of
total allocated, or committed d e m a n d . T h o u g h the United
States immediately agreed to take additional supplies in the
fourth quarter, the Malayan Rubber Grower's Association
(meeting for the first time in Singapore since 1941) asked?
what action would the British Government take to assure ab
sorption of the rising suppli e s ? ^

Before the question could

be answered, stocks of rubber began to back up in Malaya, and
Singapore banks suspended loan operations secured by unallocated rubber. 14

The British Board of Trade immediately

agreed to purchase all unallocated rubber; called for a meet
ing with the United States? and announced plans to restore
15
free market operations by the end of the year.
The Board
of Trade was then quickly faced with a new problem.

Because

of the uncertainty of the moment, only the United States and
Great Britain had taken delivery of their allocated share.
The Board of Trade was now forced to absorb additional sup
plies with no guarantee that buyers could be found? i.e.,
/

-^New York Times, August 12, 194 6, p. 32? and August
23, 1946, p. 9. One problem ignored was the need and ability
of the non Anglo-American consumers to absorb stocks. The
consuming industries in Europe; e.g., Italy, had to be first
brought into production.
^ Ibid. , September 9, 1946, p. 54.
l^Tbid., September 26, 1946, p. 2.
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the unsold allocated supply plus the unallocated supply were
raising stocks in the United Kingdom.
At the September meeting between representatives of
the Board of Trade and the State Department, the Americans
drove a hard bargain, agreeing to purchase additional amounts
of rubber but at $.20% rather than the earlier contract price
of $.2 3%.

16

However, should the amounts not be available in

Malaya, any shortage was to be made up from United Kingdom
stocky but at the $.20% figure*

17

Apparently, the American

representatives blamed the British for the tangle; i.e., by
allowing the growers to publicly raise the spectre of a free
market, the British had forced the rest of the consumer
world to adopt a wait and watch policy.-^
The Board of Trade *s problems were not yet over.

In

October, authority was given for London rubber brokers to
contract for supplies to be delivered to countries other
than America and Great Britain, and in November, the London
Rubber Exchange in Mincing Lane was reopened.-^

As a result,

the unallocated supplies in Malaya were snapped up at just
over $.20% and Malaya was unable to deliver on the September
-^Ibid., September 25, 1946, p. 34.
17Ibid., October 2, 1946, p. 49.
^ I b i d . , OcLober 7, 1946, p. 34.
Ibid. , October 11, 1946, p. 38; October 27, 1946,
p. 41; and November 19, 19 46, p. 46.
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RFC contracts.

Before the terms of the contract were met,

using supplies from United Kingdom stocks, the British Government lost $7,000,000.20
If the Malayan rubber producers did not have enough
to concern them, the American elections of November 1946
added to their worries.

At the third meeting of the IRSG,

held in November, the British expressed concern over the
Republican majority that had been elected to the United States
Congress.

Would the traditional party of laissez-faire, high

tariff and protectionism move to put synthetic into the
private sector, and then protect the infant industry against
21
cheap natural rubber?
The answer to the British question
would have to wait.

The legislative authority for the

United States Government to produce synthetic rubber as a
Government monopoly was due to expire at the end of March
1947, and the task of proposing new legislation would fall to
the new Congress.

22

Meanwhile in Washington, the Batt Committee had been
at work since September 1945 attempting to develop an
20Statement of Alan Grant, Senate Subcommittee Hear
ings On The Rubber Act of 1947, p. 125.
^ New York Times, November 23, 1946, p. 26; and
November 30, 194 6, p. 26. At the third IRSG meeting, France
announced an end to government purchase for January 1, 1947.
The IRSG also invited any who wished to do so to attend
further meetings.
^ S e e above, pp. 40-41.
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integrated policy approach to the problems of natural and
synthetic rubber.

In the Committee's first report, published

in February 1946, it was recognized that an interim approach
was all that was possible for the moment; the still unsettled
conditions in the Dutch and French areas and the sketchy pic
ture of the rate of recovery in Malaya still clouded the
future.

The Committee's recommendations were more or less

adopted as they were being formulated:

continue high levels

of synthetic production to keep the total supply and the
demand of rubber in balance; continue international alloca
tions as determined by the Combined Rubber Committee; main!

tain price stability (a free market would serve only to dis
criminate in favor of the United States); declare surplus
that part of the synthetic industry excess to a capacity of
600,000 tons

(the figure had double significance as the

estimated minimum capacity for a sustained national emergency
and the estimated consumption for 194 6); maintain a Govern
ment stockpile of natural; continue domestic Government
allocation and specification controls and request legislation
to replace the Second War Powers Act, due to expire in March
1947; relax the controls on natural specification as supplies
increased; and, study ways to secure private ownership of the
synthetic industry. 2 3

.
As already noted, these recommendations

^ B a t t Committee, First Report, pp. 22-31.
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were reflected in the price and allocation agreements that
were concluded in January, March and June of 1946, and the
continuation of Government controls.
The second Batt Report, published in mid-July 1946,
dealt in considerably more detail with the problems which
were already beginning to take form.

The Committee recog

nized that the time when synthetic would be forced into com
petition with natural was approaching faster than originally
anticipated.

Therefore, if in the interest of national

security the synthetic industry had to be maintained at a
given level of production, by what means and to what extent
would the Government protect the industry?

The dilemma was

to legislate production and assure consumption of synthetic
while at the same time retaining "conformity with our inter
national obligations and economic foreign p o l i c y . " ^

In

short, how could America deny a portion of the world*s rub
ber market to the Far Eastern producers and, at the same
time, lead the way toward an end Of trade preferences and
the creation of a multilateral system of world trade?^4
In an effort to cover all possible alternatives, the
Committee evaluated the traditional tools of protectionism,
but categorically rejected each.

Direct tariff was labeled

24An example:
prewar France was a prime user of
discriminating import tariffs.
In May 1946, the United
States had persuaded France, in negotiations concerning a
loan, to revise the tariff downward.
See below, p. 100.

96

"a blunt instrument for the purpose desired" that would in
vite the complacency that infects protected industry, and
would have a generally adverse effect on foreign and domestic
9c
trade. J Import quotas were found to be no more than another
way to achieve the results of tariff, but with the added
disadvantage of depressing world production.

Other methods

considered included a domestic excise tax on natural products
(forcing a synthetic preference); a vastly complicated certi
fication plan whereby natural would be allocated on the basis
of synthetic consumption; and a Government subsidy to the
synthetic industry.27

It is worth noting that in the solu

tion evaluation-selection process of the Batt Committee's
considerations, the assumption that synthetic was a quality
and price competitor of natural was not fully accepted.

On

the contrary, in the rejection of the more radical proposals,
such as import tariffs and quotas, the rationale included
" . . .

domestic consumer preference for natural rubber be

ignored."

9Q

The Batt Committee's preferred solutions gave equal
attention to the three major problems.

First, maintain a

minimum required level of synthetic production in the interest
^^Batt Committee, Second Report, pp. 44-45.
26ibid., p. 45,
28Ibid., p. 44.

27Ibid., pp. 46-49.

of national defense only, thus minimizing the adverse ef
fects of forced consumption and Government monopoly of a con
sumer industry.

Second, terminate the Government's natural

purchasing monopoly as soon as possible in the interest of
free trade.

Third, get the synthetic industry into the

hands of private ownership as soon as possible?

29

that would,

in view of the Committee, require careful supervision.

The

Government should sell to private industry facilities capable
of maintaining the national defense production level of
250,000 tons; or, if bidders could not be found, retain own
ership and continue production under RFC direction.

Sale,

of course, assumed that the capacity could be marketed on a
profit level acceptable to industry.

An additional 350,000

ton capacity should be sold? or, if bidders could not be
found, retained as Government assets and placed in a nonproducing, stand-by status for use m

a national emergency.

30

Although the movers and shakers among the Batt Com
mittee's membership cannot now be readily identified, it is
reasonably apparent in the record of later Congressional
^ Ibid. , p. 50.
30

Batt Committee, First Report, p. 26.
The estimated
requirement for synthetic production in 1947 was .35-.4
million tons based on the assumption of equal recovery rates
in Malaya and in Indonesia.
The estimate proved correct but
for a> different reason? Malaya exceeded expectations while
Indonesia lagged.
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examination of the rubber policy question that the State
Department representatives championed the recommendations to
terminate exclusive Government purchase, and rejection of the
use of tariff or quota to protect synthetic.

William T.

Phillips and Donald D. Kennedy were the Departments ex
perts. 31
During 1946, there were two items high on the State
Department's list of priorities which touched implicitly
upon the issues being wrestled in the restricted context of
the Batt Committee.

The first was the on-going, wholly

American initiatives to establish a multilateral system of
world trade through establishment of a United Nations International Trade Organization (ITO) 32

The second item was

llphillips, Chief of the Commodities Division, parti
cipated in the Washington discussions with the British con
cerning termination of the IRRA in 1943-44.
Kennedy, Chief
of the International Resources Division, led the American
delegations at the IRSG meetings and price talks in 1946.
Both were alternate representatives of the State Department
to the Batt Committee for their Chief, William L. Clayton,
Assistant Secretary of State For Foreign Economic Affairs.
Clayton's advocacy of Hull's ideas on multilateralism and the
principles of free enterprises are reflected in his leader
ship during negotiation of the British Loan, the proposed
International Trade Organization, and the General Agreements
On Tariffs And Trade.
Clayton's tempered opinion that the
prewar British preferential system of trade should not be
reconstructed must have filtered through Phillips and Kennedy
into the deliberations of the Batt Committee.
For a wellbalanced summary of Clayton and his economic views see
Richard N. Gardner, Sterlinq-Dollar Diplomacy:
The Origins
and the Prospects of Our International Economic Order, New
Expanded Edition (New York and London:
McGraw-Hill Book
Company, 1969), pp. 195-199.
^Gardner's "minimum" definition of a multilateral
system is adopted:
" . . . one in which barriers to trade
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securing Congressional passage of the British Loan which,
including formulative negotiations, took from September 19 45
until July 1946.
another way.

Each was dependent upon the other in one or

Two of the terms of the British Loan were di

rectly influenced, if not dictated by, the ITO Proposals.
On the other hand, progress of the ITO Proposals depended
upon passage of the Loan since any meaningful international
discussions of trade would be dependent upon Great Britain's
financial state of health.

Since both Britain's monetary

position and the terms of international trade directly af
fected Malaya, and inasmuch as the State Department was the
formulating agency for both American policies, it followed
that the Department would seek to assure that the rubber
policy to be enunciated by the Batt Committee would not con
flict with either.

By the time the Committee was well into

its task, it had become increasingly evident that, due to the
continued instability in the Dutch and French areas, the dis
cussion of Far Eastern rubber was for all practical and im
mediate purposes a discussion of Great Britain's Malayan in
dustry .
and payment are reduced to moderate levels and made nondiscriminatory in their application.
In monetary policy . . .
[it] does not require . . . elimination of all . . . ex
change control . . . It does require the 'convertability'
of currencies . . . In commercial policy . . . [it] does not
mean the elimination, but only the reduction of tariffs and
other trade barriers . . . Barriers remaining after this re
duction must be non-discriminatory in . . . application."
Ibid., p . 13.
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In February 1946, the United States had submitted
Proposals for Consideration by an International Conference
on Trade and Employment to the United Nations Economic and
Social Council which, in turn, adopted the proposals and
established a Preparatory Committee to draft a convention for
international consideration.

The agenda for the committee,

which did not meet until October due to delays in passage of
the Loan, was based primarily upon the American Proposals.
The Department of State had diligently sought to secure
agreement for the principles embodied in the Proposals among
the trading nations prior to the first meeting of the Prepa
ratory Committee.

For example, in the negotiations concern

ing the British Loan in the fall of 1945

(prior to submission

of the Proposals to the United Nations), the British had been
prevailed upon to indorse the Proposals as part of the conditions of the Loan. 33

In negotiations with the French in

May 1946 concerning the conditions of a loan and settlement
of Lend-Lease accounts, an agreement in principle had been
elicited.
■^"Article 9: Import Arrangements," Financial Agree
ment Between The Governments Of The United States And The
United Kingdom quoted in ibid., Appendix.
For a brief
account of British acceptance of the principles see Campbell,
USWA;
1945-1947, pp. 384-385.
For a complete discussion
see Gardner, Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy, pp. 188-223.
■^The French expressed "complete agreement" and an
intention to change duties to an ad valorem basis with no
increase over prewar levels.
See Campbell, USWA:
1945-1947,
pp. 385-386.
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Two principles of the Proposals were clearly re
flected in the Batt reports.
of surplus commodities.

The first concerned the problem

During American preparations for the

ITO Preparatory Committee, there had been a difference in the
approaches of the Departments of State and Agriculture.

The

State Department favored only selective, protective exclusion
of certain surplus commodities

(primarily foods)

from the

multilateral trading scheme envisaged for an ITO charter.
The Department of Agriculture disagreed, favoring a protec
tive commodity provision that would have committed the United
States to buffer stock plans, two-price systems and compre
hensive commodity agreements.

The State Department objected

on the grounds that the proposed, selective ITO rules, de
signed to handle only "burdensome surplus," would lose all
meaning; and that use of devices, such as the buffer stock,
could be subjected to political pressure from producerinterests to use them as a means of raising, rather than
stabilizing, prices.

Though the State Department's view pre

vailed, the issue between the two Departments was not resolved
until the eleventh hour before the October meeting of the
35
Preparatory Committee.
The second ITO issue related to the Batt Committee's
deliberations was the use of quotas.

Many countries, parti

cularly the underdeveloped, wanted freedom to use quotas
^5Ibid., pp. 340-343.
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expressly as a means to protect their infant industries.

The

Department of State prevailed in the debates in the Prepara
tory Committee and the ban on the use of quotas was accepted
as the rule; although, as in the case of commodities protec
tion, provisions for the exception were ado p t e d . ^
Both principles are evident in the second Batt Com
mittee report.

There was no consideration of price stabili

zation devices for the natural rubber surpluses which were
predicted to appear after 1948.

That the ITO principles

regarding surplus commodities were entering the status of
operational policy was also reflected in the hard bargaining
of the United States in September 1946, wherein America low
ered the price to be paid for rubber in the face of the,
albeit artificial and temporary, surpluses of Malayan rub
ber.

A second indication that the principles of the Pro

posals prevailed in the Batt Committee was the reportedly
unanimous condemnation of continued Government purchasing as
constituting a "price cartel" and a recommendation that the
O O

program be abandoned at the end of 1946.
36Ibid., pp. 388-389.
Examples included Australia,
China and Latin American nations.
3^Above, pp. 99-100.
38»Trou]:)ie In Synthetic," pp. 116-117; and U.S., Con
gress, The Rubber Act, H.J. Res. 118, 80th Cong., 1st. sess.,
March 17, 1947, Congressional Record, Vol. 93, p. 2151.
There was later indication that the condemnation was less
than unanimous.
Batt had sent a letter to the Chief of the
Rubber Reserve Board (RRB), the allocation authority, in
which he solicited R R B 1s support for continued purchase

In the post-war 1945 negotiations concerning the Bri
tish Loan, two points had direct relevance to the monetary
relationship of England and British Malaya, and, therefore,
an indirect relationship to American-Malayan trade.

The

first was the so called "sterling area dollar pool."

During

the war, London had secured voluntary agreement among the
sterling area countries that all American dollars would be
held in a common pool? i.e., no country was free to spend its
dollar earnings.

The pooled dollars were released by the

British Government to best effect in the effort to control
the huge, wartime imbalance in trade with America.
effects were achieved:

Two

(1) dollars were conserved and spent

only for items deemed essential to the war effort? and

(2)

the dollar holdings of Great Britain were kept at a level not
otherwise possible.

39

.
The second point in the Loan negotia

tions was the maintenance of the "blocked sterling balances."
Again a wartime expedient, the sterling area countries ran up
considerable balances in the supply and provisioning of Great
Britain

(in short, British debts outstanding)? however, these

debts were not paid? rather, they were carried as balances,
offset by reverse trade, to be settled at the end of the war.
before Congress.
Batt wrote that by so doing "Government can
wield an effective price influence on Far Eastern rubber m a r 
kets."
See Statement of Alan Grant, Senate Hearings: The
Rubber Act of 1947, p. 124.
39

Gardner, Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy, pp. 214-215.

40Ibid., p. 205.
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The effect of the dollar pool and blocked sterling
balances, if allowed to continue after the war, were incom
patible with the goals of the proposed ITO.

In the example

of Malaya, the effect would have been a classic example of
bilateralism.

The dollars to be earned in rubber could not

be spent by Malaya in dollar markets.

The value of Malayan

products sent to England would be paid for in the form of
sterling balances, redeemable in reverse trade from England;
or, if drawing was permitted at all, only in nonconvertible
sterling currency— meaning that the best use of the currency
would be within the sterling area.

Such a system of trade

would be open to America at one point and in one direction
only.

Malaya would export to the United States but would

import from the sterling area.

It would be a revised, strict

er version of the prewar trade triangle with the added burden
imposed of reconstituting British area markets in addition
to earning dollars.

Suffice it to say that it was the

imperial preference achieved through monetary restriction
rather than trade restriction.

Under the terms of the Loan,

however, the British agreed in principle to end both practices.
In addition to its relationship to the ITO Proposals,
the application of the two conditions of the Loan Agreement
to this discussion of Malayan-American.trade is important,
though not critical, because the United States was to later
41
Appendix.

.
Article 7 and 10, Financial Agreement, m

.
ibid.,
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question British compliance with the Agreement.

It is a

very involved issue clouded by the fact that neither nation
ever agreed to the other's characterization of "pooling" and
"blocking"; therefore, compliance was equally debatable.42
However, the American question was to be raised in the con
text of Malayan rubber because that trade was again to be
come the sterling area's largest earner of dollar surpluses,
and Malaya was to build up a considerable sterling balance
in the Bank of England.4^

Without getting any further afield,

the point to be made here is that the Batt Committee's
Reports indicate that the eyes of its State Department mem
bers were fixed on the ITO Proposals, that the State Depart
ment's view prevailed, and that the Committee's recommenda
tions were structured and selected in large measure in ac
cordance with their compliance with the principles of the ITO
Proposals.

It could be said that the rubber policy was an

experimental application of the principles of multilateralism,
rubber being a suitable laboratory subject inasmuch as it
remained one of the few commodities under Government control.
Returning to August 1946 and the British growers' call
for restoration of a free market for natural rubber, some
42Gardner, Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy, pp. 214-215.
^ A n d r e w Roth, "Britain's Secret Sterling Balances,"
The Nation, Vol. 174 (February 23, 1952), pp. 174-175.

note must be taken of the reaction of the American manufac
turers.

Within a week of the British growers1 proposal,

Collyer of the B. F. Goodrich Co. answered with a public re
quest for termination of exclusive RFC purchase by the end
of 194 6 . ^

However, his request contained elements of a

challenge; Collyer also called for an end to all controls and
the sale of the synthetic industry to private interests.

He

noted that at the current price levels, Malayan rubber would
have to fall from the August wholesale level of $.25^ to less
than $.17 to be competitive with synthetic, and expressed
confidence that synthetic could "stand on its own two

f e e t . " 4 5

Long a leading spokesman for an early return to a free market
in natural, decontrol of the synthetic industry, and an end
to Government ownership, Collyer was quickly joined by other
industry leaders. 4 6

As one observer put it, "imitation . . .

in the U.S. rubber industry has always been so prompt as to
verge on the simultaneous."4^

Herbert E. Smith of the U.S.

Rubber Co. added:
We favor free markets in both natural and syn
thetic . . . in applications totaling more than
250,000 tons [the National Defense minimum] . . *
synthetic rubber today can hold its own in com
petition with natural on a price and quality
basis.
44New York Times, August 14, 1946, p. 33.

45Ibid.

46por Collyer-quotes spanning 1944-46 see "Trouble
In Synthetic," p. 118.
47Ibid., p. 157.

48Ibid., p. 116.
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The lines were straightening.

The British producer

was ready to endure the expected price drop presumably to
reestablish a market and preference for natural before syn
thetic could try its wings.

The American manufacturer was

ready to take the synthetic industry out from under Govern
ment protection and use its capacity to meet current demand
to depress the price of natural while simultaneously estab
lishing a market for synthetic.

That the British gauntlet

was thrown prematurely was evident in the immediate market
confusion which resulted in the September market glut and
the price loss in the RFC contract to absorb the glut.
Though not evident for several months following the American
industry's challenge, it developed that the American call for
free markets and free enterprise was also premature and badly
miscalculated.

By February, when Congressional hearings be

gan to consider America's policy beyond expiration of the
Second War Powers Act, the industry was to come before the
House and Senate Committees and, almost to the man, ask for
a continuation of Government controls including purchase
as being in the best interests of National defense and the
consuming public.
The "Big FOur" of the American rubber industry had
become convinced that the synthetic rubber products of 1946
were equal to the natural product of 1941; more importantly,
the industry believed that the consumer was equally
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convinced.

49

.
The Goodrich Co. had launched an extensive

advertising campaign, initiated by competitors, designed to
convince the public that a tire made mostly of American syn
thetic was superior to the prewar natural product.

The first

indication that all was not well came with reports of a
"whisper" campaign among competing retailers implying that
their product was actually 100% natural; sales reflected the
amount of natural claimed.

A faux pas by the well-intentioned

President of Seiberling Rubber Co., J. Pennington Seiberling,
caused an industry furor.

Known in the trade as L 'affaire

Seiberling, he had publicly warned consumers not to drive over
fifty miles an hour on synthetic tires during the coming warm
months of 1946:
He was told [by his peers] he had committed
a deplorable act that would trammel the
hands of the U.S. delegation, about to go
into bargaining with the British [the June
1946 meetings] on the price of the next
batch of rubber.
A second blow fell in October in L 1affaire DeVoto when Benard
DeVoto, travel editor of a major American magazine, recounted
how Mhe blew through 10,000 miles
brand-new synthetic tire casings."
study confirmed the worst;

" . . .

. . . and out through five
An industry marketing
70 per cent of the public

preferred natural rubber tires, and only 8 per cent synthe
tic . .

The industry was faced with a real dilemma— if

^ T h e "Big Four” are B. F. Goodrich C o .; Firestone Tire
and Rubber Co.; Goodyear Rubber Co.; and United States Rubber
Co.

109

the Congress was to grant their August request for an end to
Government controls:.

Should hut one manufacturer break ranks

and produce a natural-tire, competition would drive the
others to follow suit, the price of natural would soar, and
the infant synthetic industry would collapse:
There is no question that the boisterously
free enterpriser of rubber would prefer to
get out from under the umbrella held by
government over the infant synthetic indus
try— if only they could be assured that
synthetic would not fold up with the umbrella.
Congressional Hearings were conducted in February and
March 1947 on Joint Resolutions To Strengthen The Common
Defense By Maintaining An Adequate Domestic Rubber-Producing
Industry, first in the House of Representative's Committee
On Armed Services, then in the Senate's Committee On Banking
And Currency.

The Batt Committee's second report of July

1946 served as the legislative proposal and, with the excep
tion of the recommendation to terminate the Government's
purchase program, survived the mark-ups with little contro
versy.

in the Hearings/ the center of debate was whether or

not the Title III of the Second War Powers Act, which pro
vided for exclusive Government importation of natural/ should
be allowed to lapse at the end of March 1947.

The two

^ T h e discovery of the consumer preference for nat
ural and other blows to confidence in synthetic are recounted
in "Trouble In Synthetic," pp. 116-118, 157.
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Congressional Rubber Subcommittees followed the Batt Commit
tee's lead to restrict the purpose of legislation to assure
an American production capacity only insofar as the interests
of national security required.

However, the industry's re

presentative argued strongly for acceptance of their newlydeveloped thesis that national security was threatened by a
free, natural rubber market, and would impose an unfair
burden upon the American consumer.

The issues of patriotism

and consumer interest were reenforced by ancillary arguments
concerning charges of British manipulation of the market,
and the threat of unemployment among American synthetic
workers should the synthetic industry be curtailed in the
face of mounting natural supplies.

The industry claims con

cerning the past, and warnings for the future were found
lacking when Government witnesses challenged some of Big
Rubber's claims.

First, since V-J Day, the industry had

enjoyed significant expansion of their domestic market and
profit margins over the prewar experience, the larger part
of the profit increase being a direct result of the price
C 1

stability insured by the Government's supply monopoly. x
In addition to unprecedented price stability, the industry
had been able to abandon the prewar practice and cost of
^Estimates published in mid-19 47 show sales among
the Big Four rose from $755 million in 1941 to over $2
billion in 1946.
Profit on sales rose from 4.9 per cent to
7.3 per cent.
See "Trouble In Synthetic," pp. 118, 161-163.
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carrying a five-month raw material inventory.

Assured of .
52
supply by tbe RFC, they. carried but two months.
Second,

the warnings of the vulnerability of national security to a
repeat of the crisis, of 1942 lost much of its impact when
expert testimony was given that there had not been a critical
shortage of rubber after 1942 other than new natural— wartime
needs had been met with reclaimed and synthetic.

In fact,

after 1942, the tire shortage had been induced through ra
tioning to curtail nonessential, private use as a means to
reduce the consumption of gasoline. 53

Third, it had long

been a claim that the RFC synthetic operation did not cost
the Government anything; i.e., synthetic was sold at the
break-even price.

That was true in late 1946 with the phas

ing out of low-efficiency plants but had not been true for
the majority of the history of synthetic.

It was also

claimed that the Government's purchase operation cost the
tax payer nothing and that continuation would protect him
because of its price influence.

However, the chief of the

Rubber Reserve Corporation's buying operation explained that
such was true only on ex-dock sales.

The practice was that

the RFC held the stocks for sixty or more days until needed
52See Statement of John C. Houston, Jr., Commissioner
of The Civilian Production Administration, Senate Hearings:
Rubber Act Of 1947, p. 65.
^3Ibid., p. 66.
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by the industry— the RFC bore the costs for maintaining over
half the industry supply inventory.

The practice could

" . . . only be described as a sweet set-up for the industry
and just the reverse for the American tax payer." 5 4
Representative Fred L. Crawford, Chairman of the
House Subcommittee On Rubber, led the fight for termination
of Government purchase.

He pointed out that since the end of

British purchase and allocation by the Combined Rubber Com
mittee

(both ended 1 January), Malayan rubber was flowing

away from the United States.

Faced by the RFC's maximum bid

price of $.20^, the Malayan dealers simply tried everybody
else at $.20-5/8 first, and they usually got it.

Not only

were supplies shrinking, but what did come to the RFC agents
55
was inferior.
Crawford found an unexpected ally among
rubber's Big Four when Harvey S. Firestone, Jr. of Firestone
Tire and Rubber Co. supported termination.

Firestone dis

missed his peers stating, "they fear a price rise":
There is both a moral and economic issue . . .
Do we kill the Malayan goose, the golden egg
of the export market and throw the economy of
British Malaya and the Dutch East Indies out
of kilter?56
^Statement of Alan Grant in ibid., pp. 124-133.
-^Statement of The Honorable Fred L. Crawford in
ibid., pp. 62-63.
^S t a t e m e n t of Harvey S. Firestone, Jr. in ibid.,
pp. 168-170., It is worth noting that Firestone owned or
controlled a 75,000 ton natural capacity in Liberia.
The
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In a strong letter in support of termination, Acting
Secretary of State Dean Acheson dismissed industry charges
that the British were out to recall the days of the IRRA:
On this point the British Government has
stated . . . that there is no truth in
allegations that there are any regulations
'which set up a seller's market or that
the United Kingdom has any arrangement
with the Dutch affecting the sale or price
of natural1 . . .57
The advocates for continuation of the purchase plan
asked for extension until at least September 1947 on the
argument that by then Indonesia would be settled and the flow
of rubber increased to. a point which would dampen the expected
price rise.

This group included all of the major producers

(except Firestone) and represented some seventy per cent of
American consumption.^^

Though there was an attempt to amend

the Bill in the House, the termination of Government purchase
only other American-controlled operation of significance was
the U.S. Rubber Co.'s Malayan Rubber Co. which totaled only
20,000 acres.
57Letter to the Committee from the Honorable Dean
Acheson read by Robert C. Hill, in ibid., pp. 111-113.
5^The most vociferous advocate was Paul W. Litchfield
of the Goodyear Tire And Rubber Co.
Known in the trade as
"Stability Litch," he leveled charges that the Far East
producers were holding back stocks waiting for the free
market, and predicted that if purchases were continued until
September 1946 synthetic and natural would be in "settled
competition" by March. 1947.
Testimony, ibid., pp- 94-102.
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C Q

remained a key provision of the Act.

There was no con

certed effort among the rubber interests to end the Govern
ment monopoly of synthetic.

The advocates of free enterprise

were not willing to take the capital risk necessary to pur
chase an industry that, for the moment, had little market
security.

The industry consensus was that if a natural tire

was placed on the 1946 market " . . .

the U.S. synthetic

industry would last only a few weeks . . ."60

jn addition to

continued Government purchase, the industry also called for
an increase in the required amount of synthetic to be used.
This appears to have been an attempt to insure that a signi
ficantly large portion of the synthetic capacity was kept in
operation against the day when synthetic gained consumer
confidence, at which time the industry would be willing to
buy the Government facilities rather than build their own.
However, the Bill provided that the ratio would be adjusted
^ U . S . , Congress, The Rubber Bill, H.J. Res. 118,
80th Cong., 1st. sess., March 17, 1947, Congressional Record,
Vol. 93, pp. 2156-57.
60»»Trouble In Synthetic," p. 116.
61specification had limited natural use; e.g., in
1944-45, the allowable percentage in a tire was 11 per cent;
by 1947, the amount was about 23 per cent. Under the Act of
1947, specification would apply to synthetic only with a
sliding minimum adjustable by the Executive to 25 per cent.
The reason for ’the slow relaxation despite the rising rate
of natural supplies was the phenomenal demand (tires were
produced at a rate of 100 million per year by the first
quarter of 1947).
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as natural became available, but would not fall below a
level which would insure consumption of 250,000 tons, the
national defense figure.

The argument was over what that

figure should be; the Government estimated the lowest figure
at 25 per cent based on a million ton consumption.

The in

dustry counseled 30 per cent.
Inasmuch as the question of Government purchase was
answered, the future of the synthetic facilities remained the
unknown.

Since a capacity of at least 400,000 tons was

estimated as needed until natural production fully recovered?
and, inasmuch as the private industry expressed no desire to
purchase the facilities, the question was deferred pending
further Congressional study.

62

The Rubber Act was, there

fore, termed "interim legislation" with an expiration date of
April 1, 1948.

In the interim, the power to determine speci

fication was delegated to the Executive, and the RFC retained
ownership of facilities with a total capacity of 600,000 tons.
The Rubber Act of 1947 passed both houses of Congress
by March 24th and was signed into law on March 31, 1947.

g2

Statement of John L. Collyer in Senate Hearings:
Rubber A c t o f 194 7 , pp. 82-85. Collyer was the exception and
worked three sides of a triangle.
He favored continued pur
chase for price stability; thirty per cent specification to
insure the highest guarantee of synthetic consumption; and
public sale of the synthetic facilities presumably because
Goodrich had held the technological lead, held the largest
part of the domestic market in special synthetic products,
and operated a large share of the facilities.
See above,
pp. 40-41 and "Trouble In Synthetic," p. 157ff.
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No case can be made that there was any discernahle political
partisanship involved in the Act? on the contrary, it was of
little public or political interest.
to the experts.^3

The issues were left

Once the industry was heard and the Govern

ment *s experts had reached a consensus, there was little
expertise in any other quarter that could be brought to bear.
Though there was a difference among both the industry*s and
Government's experts on the issue of continued purchase,
that difference was blurred.

In examination of the possi

bilities of disposing of the synthetic facilities, the Gov
ernment noted the problem of "scrambled" Government and
privately-owned equipment.

Just so, the Government and pri

vate experts were "scrambled."

Batt returned to Capitol Hill

as the President of SKF Industries to support his Committeefs
recommendation for termination.

Conversely, William J. Sears

of the Rubber Division of the Office of Temporary Controls,
and a former executive of the U.S. Rubber Co., testified for
63<rhe Batt Committee Reports remained the blue print
for Congressional action. With the exception of the attempt
to amend the Bill CH.J. Res. 118) in the House, the debates
in both houses were uninspired and at times uninformed.
Time in the House was yielded for a lengthy tribute to Saint
Patrick, and the discussion went to the comparative virtue
of synthetic and natural golf balls on two occasions.
In
addition to the House Debate already cited see also U.S.,
Congress, Senate, Debate on H.J. R e s . 118, 80th Cong., 1st.
seas., March 24, 194 7, Congressional Record, Vol. 93,
pp. 2437-2448.
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continued purchase, a position opposite to that of his

.
64
Government superior.
Despite the fears of skyrocketing prices, the price
of natural rubber remained relatively stable following pas
sage of the Rubber Act of 1947.

Harvey Firestone took credit

for the return to free enterprise in newspaper a d s , and was
given credit for being correct in his prediction that the
price would not go through the roof.

What was not given any

particular notice was the fact that the tire industry had
overproduced prior to March 31st; by early June, the indus
try was reducing inventories by selling tires at a ten per
cent discount, and had laid off some 3,000 rubber workers.
The industry also curtailed new purchases of natural, a
temporary method of controlling price as effective as any,
while they waited for production to bring supply and demand
into balance.^^
In a general comment covering the post-war period,
The Council on Foreign Relations was to observe later that
Statement of William L. Batt, Senate Hearings;
Rubber Act of 194 7 , p. 141; and U.S., Congress, House,
Mr. Fred L. Crawford quotes Sears* testimony before House
Armed Services Committee in debate on H.J. Res. 118,
Congressional Record, Vol. 93, p. 2151.
^ A l t h o u g h the industry may have overproduced to
ease the transition into a free market, it appeared that
there was also some truth to claims that the Malayan growers
were holding back.
The result was that in June the price
broke, falling from $.21 to $.15; a further drop to $.10 was
feared.
See "Rubber, The Bad Old Times,” Time, Vol. 49
CJune 23, 1947), p. 86.
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economic policy was " . . . more effected by special groups
than any other phase of foreign policy."

The Council

noted that legislation often reflected the " . . .

the per

suasiveness of those who stood to gain or lose rather than
the over-all requirements of foreign policy."

Since the

decision to end Government purchase was a major policy deter
mination affecting a high-value commodity, some judgment is
necessary.

In this case, the determination was guided by

a very small group of legislators and administrators who
accepted the view that the United States should not continue
a course of positive action that would control a free market
to the expressed advantage of an American industry.

That

the decision was in opposition to a large industry says
something for the virtue of the legislative system.

York:

^ R i c h a r d P. Stebbins and others, USWA:
Harper and Brothers, 1951), pp. 85-86.

1950

(New
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CHAPTER V
MALAYA IN TRANSITION AND THE RUBBER ACT OF 1948
By the end of 19 47, Malaya was returning to normal.
In the main, the potential for difficulties, posed by the
Union reorganization initiated in 19 46 had been defused
through ongoing negotiations among the British Government and
representatives of the Malayan races.

Indications were that

the proposed alternative to the Union, the Federated Malayan
States, would provide the centralized organization necessary
to the movement of Malaya toward increasing home rule, and
would be acceptable to a majority of those who had opposed
the Union.

Of importance equal to the relative political

calm was the success of the economic recovery borne on the
recovery and expansion of the rubber-producing industry.
However, modification to the terms and direction of prewar
trade reduced the possible benefits of the recovery; i.e.,
each advantage was counterbalanced to a varying degree by a
disadvantage.
By comparison with the Dutch and French areas,
Malaya*s recovery was phenominal in terms of gross figures.
In 1947, Malaya registered both an increase in the value of
exports and an increase in her share of the area's exports
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relative to prewar days.

The value of 1947 exports from

Malaya, Indonesia and Indochina was $875,000,000? Malaya ac
counted for 70 per cent of the total.

This startling domi

nance by Malaya was the net effect of opposite forces.
Whereas Malaya registered gains in the value of exports over
prewar days, Indochina and Indonesia registered losses.
Measured against the value of 19 36 exports, 1947 values
showed that:

Malaya's exports increased 59 per cent

($612,500,000 over $364,100,000); while Indonesia decreased
56 per cent? and Indochina decreased 64 per cent.

In addi

tion, the position of Indonesia and Indochina among regional
traders had changed.

In 1936, the order of magnitude among

the five leading exporters had been:
Indochina; Ceylon? and Siam.

Malaya? Indonesia?

In 1947, the order was:

Malaya? Ceylon? Indonesia? Siam? and Indochina.^
Because of the requirement to import manufactured
goods

(all three countries)? food (Malaya and Indonesia)? and

industrial products for recovery (all three); the trade ad
vantage of prewar days was lost.
by far in the better condition.

Again, however, Malaya was
In 1947, Malaya's exports

equaled 94 per cent of imports; Indonesia's exports were 67
per cent? and Indochina's exports were only 49 per cent of
imports.

A truer indication of just how bad conditions were
1Brodie, "Postwar Patterns of Trade," pp. 125-126.

in Indonesia and Indochina emerges when it is noted that
imports were also far below prewar levels.
Despite the value increases in Malayan exports, her
trade advantage evaporated solely in the changes in her trade
with the United States.

There was little change in Malaya's

trade with the rest of the world.

Excluding the United

States, Malaya's exports in 1936 amounted to 66 per cent of
imports:

imports consisted primarily of rice from the surplus

areas of Southeast Asia, manufactured goods from England
and Japan, and tin ore and rubber imported for reexport.

In

1947, the figure actually improved to 70 per cent, a reflec
tion of the general scarcities among traditional exporters.
However, in trade with the United States, Malaya's imports
increased from 3 per cent of exports in 1936, to 31 per cent
in 1947.

In short, the increased importation of goods from

America had changed Malaya from a trader with a $69,100,000
surplus in 1936 to a trader with a $34,300,000 deficit in
1947.2
The source of strength for the Malayan recovery lay
in the rubber production industry.
in 1947

(645,000 tons) than in 1940
2

More rubber was produced
(547,000 tons).^

However,

Ibid. In South Asia, including India and Ceylon m
addition to Southeast Asia, Siam was the only country to show
a trade surplus and an increase in both exports and imports.
3
The Federation of Malaya Annual Report, 1948, pp. 50,
67 cited in J. M. Gullick, Malaysia (New York:
Frederick A.
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the advantages of increased rubber production were somewhat
offset by the slow recovery of tin production, which reduced
■>

the total possible export value? in 1947, tin production was
only one-third of the 1940 level.^

The greatest disadvantage

to Malaya was, however, the change in the terms of trade.
The approximate loss in purchasing power to the South Asia
region was 13 per cent, meaning that 13 per cent less could
be purchased with each dollar earned in export than could
have been purchased in

1936.5

However, the terms of trade

were far worse for Malaya as an exporter of rubber and tin
and an importer of rice:
The average export price of rubber in 194 7 was
only 113 per cent of the 1936 price? of tin,
162 per cent of 1936 . . . Prices of such major
imports as textiles and grains, however, were
roughly 400 and 425 per cent higher in 1947
than in 19 36.5
In terms of the two key items in Malaya's trade, the
loss was considerable.

In the 1930s, a pound of rubber

bought five pounds of rice?
in the late 1 9 4 0 s . T h e

"the ratio was about one for one

total effect of the increase in

rice costs plus the slow recovery of domestic production
Praeger, Inc., 1969), p. 102.
(Malaysia is a revised retitled edition of Gullick's earlier Malaya.)
4Ibid.
5Brodie,

"Postwar Patterns of Trade," p. 124 i

6Gullick, Malaysia, p. 103.

put
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the total 1947 supply at 50 per cent of the 1940 level.^
Though a simplification, suffice it to say that despite in
creases over prewar days of 59 per cent in the value of ex
ports and 20 per cent in rubber production, Malaya was in
deficit and still in a rice shortage.

However, the trends

were all in the proper direction giving promise of return to
a surplus trade status in 1948.
The position of the United States in the economy of
British Malaya had clearly changed.

As the majority consumer

of Malaya's largest trade item, the American manufacturer had
an influence upon the price of rubber heretofore denied by
the old IRRA.

The price of rubber varied but slightly above

the American bid.

In addition, Malaya was now part of an ex

panding American market in the Far East but, because of its
small size relative to total American export trade, Malaya
had no influence on the price to be paid for American goods.
As such things are measured, the conditions of trade were to
the advantage of the United States and of considerable disg
advantage to Malaya.
7Total supply in 1940 was 970,000 tons; in 1947, it
was 494,000 tons.
Federation Annual Report, pp. 51-52 cited
in ibid.f p. 101.
8Brodie explained the causes as the changes in the
debtor status of South Asia and the advantage of the United
States to exploit the markets ahead of other sellers immedi
ately after the war in "Postwar Patterns of Trade," pp. 132133.
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The Rubber Act of 1947 had done little to clarify the
future prospects of natural rubber.

Though natural was

traded in a free market after April 1, 1947, the larger ques
tion of the future of the American synthetic industry was
still unanswered, having been deferred.

Despite the tempo

rary price losses of June 1947, the general conditions of the
market were stable and brought little audible complaint from
the British producers.

One Malayan planter, commenting on

the American reduction in buying in the summer of 1946,
recalled the days of the IRRA and the disadvantaged position
of the Americans at that time, and allowed that the United
States could not be blamed for "not wanting it to happen
9
twice."
Despite the lower price, the Malayan industry
registered significant activity in 1947.

Malaya exported

953,697 tons of rubber in 1947, over half of which went to
the United S t a t e s . ^

Earlier estimates had predicted that

the demand for rubber would slacken in mid-1947 as the pentup demands of wartime were met; however, as seemed so often
the case, the predictions were wrong and demand remained
high, thus guaranteeing a market for Malaya natural, and the
9 "Rubber:

The Bad Old Times," p. 86.

^ New York Times, January 10, 1948, p. 28. The total
of Malayan exports was always higher than production would
indicate^because of entrepot imports, processing, and re
export.
Indonesia was estimated to produce only about
350,000 tons in 1947, most of which went through the Malayan
entrepot.
See ibid., November 30, 1946, p. 23.

United States1 synthetic capacity which was still producing
above the national defense minimum.

In fact, in anticipation

of the predicted slackening of demand and the increasing
supply of natural, the RFC began to curtail its synthetic
operations, reducing the on-line capacity to about 400,000
tons.

By early 1948, in the face of continued demand, the

Government had to reimpose allocation controls on synthetic
to insure an equitable distribution among manufacturers.

11

By early fall 1947, the price of natural had recovered
from the summer slump to approximately $.23.

The total earn

ings for British rubber shipped to America for 1947 was
$339,000,000 and resulted in a dollar surplus to the British
Commonwealth of approximately $200,000,000.

Malaya had again

become the leading earner of dollars for the sterling area.
If 1947 had been a good year for the Malayan production in
dustry, it had been even better for the American manufacturing
industry which exceeded $3 billion in sales.

12

In regard to the progress of Malaya toward selfgovernment within the Commonwealth, the tactical errors of
the Malayan Union were approaching correction in late 1947.
^ Ibid. , February 14, 1948, p. 23.
12

See Address by William T. Phillips to the Chemical
Engineers Club of Washington, D.C. quoted in U.S., Congress,
House, Extended Remarks of Fred L. Crawford, January 22, 1948,
Congressional Record, Vol. 94, pp. A420-A421; and New York
Times, January 2, 1948, p. 31.
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During the constitutional conference of 1946, the British
Colonial Office and the UMNO had agreed upon changes to the
Union scheme.

On the matter of general organization, it was

agreed that the nine States would constitute the Malayan
entity and that Singapore would remain a British Crown Colony.
There were two key concessions granted to the Malays in the
constitutional proposals of 1946.

First, the citizenship

rules were tightened to grant automatic citizenship only to
those born in the area of the new Federation States.

All

others were required to apply for Federal citizenship and had
to have resided in the Federation area for fifteen of the
preceding twenty years.

Second, the pre-Union prerogatives

of the Sultans were reinstated and expanded.

The British

retained authority only in the areas of finance, national
security, and foreign affairs.

As observed by Gullick, the

Sultans were no longer to be subject to advisors and resi
dents, but would be subject to new pressures from the people
working through the constitutional prerogatives of represen
tative government.^ ^
Before initiating the new Federation, the British
wisely submitted the draft constitution to the various
l^Gullick, Malaysia, pp. 105-108; and Ginsburg and
Roberts, Malaya, p. 44 6. As a technical matter, the Union
was formally created in April 1946, replacing the British
Military Authority under Mountbatten with the Union headed
by Sir Edward Gent.
The Union organization proceeded with
out imposition of the citizenship rule.
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communal associations for their perusal and advice so as to
avoid the appearances of fait accompli which had been a
factor in the reaction to the Union announcement.

As men

tioned earlier, the opposition to the UMNO and the reestab
lishment of the Anglo-Malay prerogatives consisted primarily
of the AMCJA, a strange collection of political bedfellows
consisting of racial groups, communists and various other
assorted interests.

The AMCJA demands included unification

of Singapore and the States; an elected legislative body;
equal rights for all residents of the country; a return of
full sovereignty to the Sultans; Malay control of custom and
official status for the Moslem religion, and programs to
advance the economic development of the Malay community.
These last three demands were a concession on the part of the
Chinese-Indian majority to the Malay members of the AMCJA.
Almost as soon as the British agreed to scrap the Union
scheme in November 1946, the most influential Malay group, the
Malay National Party (MNP), withdrew from the coalition and
formed the Malay Council of Joint Action (MCJAl•

The domi

nance of the Chinese and Indian majority, and the strong
influence of the MCP were more than the Moslem/ Malay MNP
could comfortably tolerate.

The MCJA was short-lived as it

was joined by other Malay anti-British or anti-UMNO groups
and reformed into a Peoples' United Front (Pusat Tenga
R a 1ayat or PUTERA) .

The AMCJA and PUTERA maintained a loose
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alliance of expedience into 1948.
was some clarity:

By mid-1947, then, there

the AMCJA-PUTERA coalition was united

inasmuch as it opposed the proposed constitution of the
Federation.

However, the AMCJA was opposed on the grounds

that the new constitution separated Singapore, and that the
citizenship laws were unfavorable to the Chinese and Indians,
while the PUTERA was more in opposition to the dominance of
the elitist, civil servant, and Sultan characteristics of the
UMNO.14
The opposition to the Federation plan was a failure.
The weakness of the AMCJA-PUTERA coalition was
its inherently negative character.
Its own
program was an uneasy set of compromises be
tween irreconcilable points of view which
carried little conviction or popular appeal.
What appeal it might have had was undermined by the strong
influence of the MCP, which had members in both factions and
resorted to such heavy-handed tactics as strike and intimi
dation of any in opposition.

An attempt to show strength and

unity through a general strike in October 1947 showed the
disarray within the coalition? " . . .

the moderates in this

coalition were not prepared metaphorically to man the bar
ricades."

The plan for Federation was, in fact, supported

by the British, the Sultans, the Malay upper-class, and most
of the Malay peasantry.

The opposition was simply too

14Victor Purcell, Malaysia (New York: Walker And
Company, 1965), p. 109; and Ginsburg and Roberts, Malaya,
pp. 466-468.

129

factionalized to oppose successfully.

Faced with British

resolve to form the Federation in February 194 8, the Malay
PUTERA accepted the inevitable and the coalition dis1 c:
solved.
From 194 5 until formation of the Federation, the MCP,
working through its domination of the PMFTU, was producing
increasing disenchantment among the British Labor Government.
The policy of restraint, based on the hope that the Malayan
labor movement would mature, gave little promise of fulfill
ment.

The Labor Government went so far as to send represen

tatives of the boiler-makers, printers, and railway men's
unions to Malaya to advise the Commissioner.

The English

labor leaders were appalled at the propensity of the PMFTU
and its affiliates to call strikes for little reason, though
they paid no strike benefits.
Although a thorn to Malayan recovery, the MCP was
unable to gain popular support, primarily because of the lack
of a cause.

True, the price of rice was terribly high and

wages were an issue, but that was not enough.

Attempts at

raising the ire of the people against the British, even to
the extent of digging up the question of British abandonment
of Malaya in 1942, were unsuccessful.

The Malays were for

the most part indifferent to such issues and, after all,
recovery was moving along, people were working, the Sultans
15Gullick, Malaysia, p. 109.

were on their thrones, and the British were proceeding with
plans for increasing participation in government.

Similarly,

despite the AMCJA, the majority of the Chinese were still
Kuomintang loyalists and therefore shunned the communistinfected AMCJA, being content to remain clear of Malayan
, .. .
16
politics.
On January 21, 1948, the Sultans signed pacts with
the Crown which ended the Union and established the Federa
tion.

The event was marred only by an ineffectual MCP-led

protest strike of 30,000 Singapore workers on February 1,
1948, the day on which Sir Edward Gent was sworn in as the
High Commissioner of the Federation of Malayan States at
Kuala Lumpur.

17

American interest in the events in Malaya in 19461947 was minimal, if any.

The relative calm that accom

panied the internal political maneuverings and the transition
to the Federation were overshadowed by the deteriorating
events elsewhere.

The attempts by General George C. Marshall

to gain a working truce between the Communists and Nationalists
16

Hessell Tiltman, "Letter of The Week; Singapore New
Deal," New Republic, Vol. 116 (April 21, 1947), p. 3ff; and
Gullick, Malaysia, pp. 109-110.
The AMCJA had one partial
success in 1947 when it allied with the Singapore, Chinese
Pan-Malayan Council For Joint Action to boycott city elections
as a protest against the Federal constitution.
Less than
one-fifth of eligible Chinese cast ballots.
17

New York Times, January 22, 1948, p. 16; and
February 2, 1948, p. 7.

in China had been abandoned in early 1947 and by July, the
Nationalists were in a state of full mobilization.

In

Indonesia, the hopes of the Cherbon Agreement, signed by the
Dutch and the Republic of Indonesia, were shattered by a
failure of the two to reach a working.agreement.

By July

1947, the Dutch mounted military operations against the
Republic, and American attempts to provide good offices were
abandoned a month later.

In August, Ho Chi Minh rejected

France’s "last" offer to incorporate all of Vietnam into the
French Union, France to retain control only in the areas of
foreign policy and security.

However, at the middle and

lower levels of the United States Government, British Malaya,
the rubber producer, was still under scrutiny as the House
Armed Services Committee went to work on revisions to the
Rubber Act of 1947 which was due to expire at the end of
March 194 8.
Within a month of passage of the Rubber Act of 1947,
the Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee began
preparations for consideration of replacement legislation.
This time, however, the committee was to rely upon its own
study and analysis, rather than those offered by the Executive
as had been the case with Batt Committee's reports.

Following

informal meetings with Government and industry experts, which
began in May 1947, the Subcommittee toured synthetic plants
in Texas, Kentucky, and Ohio where hearings were conducted.
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The questions posed by the Subcommittee were much the same as
those posed in the earlier interim legislation:

how much on

line synthetic production must be maintained and what should
the standby capacity be; how was absorption of the on-line
capacity to be assured; if the plants were to be turned over
to industry, by what method;

"What protection against foreign

imports . . . should be established," and what effect would
synthetic have on the world market?-^
The unpredictable representatives of industry came
before the Congress in considerable disagreement.

There was

Big Rubber, a majority of the production capacity; the re
claimed rubber industry, and local industry interests.

In

Texas, the Subcommittee heard an impassioned and chilling
account of the effects of Government control.

The reduced

consumption of rubber following the glut of tires on the
market in mid-1947 had led the RFC to begin reducing synthe
tic output.

The decrease later proved to be temporary, a

false indication that the predicted leveling of demand
did not occur) was taking effect.

(which

As a result, curtailment

of production had caused the lay-off of Beaumont workers; and,
almost simultaneously, the price of natural, which bottomed
Congress, Senate, Committee on Banking And
Currency, National Rubber Policy, Hearings before a subcommit
tee of The Committee on Banking And Currency, on S. 2187 and
H. Res. 5314, 8GthCong., 2nd. sess., February 24th and
March 2nd, 1948, p. 15 (hereafter cited as Senate Hearings:
Rubber Act of 1948).
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at $.14 in July, quickly rose to $.23.

19

In a slightly

oblique attack on Government control, the representatives of
the reclaimed rubber industry complained that use of synthetic
depressed the use of reclaimed rubber. 20
In hearings conducted in Akron, Ohio, the Subcommittee
joined by Representative Lyndon B. Johnson, ranking member of
the full Committee, heard Big Rubber propose the selling of
the RFC's facilities to those who wished to buy.

The pro

posal was based on arguments that the time had come for the
industry to take its place in the free enterprise system.
The proposed method of plant disposal drew close questioning
from Johnson, who displayed considerable anomosity toward the
"free enterprisers," noting for the record that three of the
potential buyers, the Goodrich Rubber, Firestone, and General
Rubber and Tire Companies, were under Federal indictment for
price fixing m

the tire business. 21

The proposed method of

disposal of the plants became capsulized in Johnson's lexicon
as the "markdown, peel-off, and walkaway," a litany to be
-^Statement of Judge J. M. Coombs in U.S., Congress,
House, Committee On Armed Services, Synthetic Rubber, Hear
ings before a subcommittee of The Committee on Armed Ser
vices, H. Rpt. 220, 80th Cong., 1st. sess., November 7th and
15th, 1947, p. 500 (hereafter cited as House Subcommittee
Hearings;
Rubber Act of 194 8).
2QIbid., pp. 5Q0-5Q1.
See also Statement of William
Welch, Senate Hearings;
Rubber Act of 1 9 4 8 , p. 36..
2-*-House Subcommittee Hearings;
p. 5273.

Rubber Act of 1948,
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repeated several times before a bill would be passed.

22

The

plants were to be written off and sold at bargain prices over
a period of time as industry was disposed to absorb them, but
should the venture prove improfitable, the owner could aban
don the facility as a bad investment.

In short, Big Rubber

was willing to take the RFC's facilities so long as there was
no substantial capital risk involved.

However, the proponents

of sale also advocated the continued specification of synthe
tic use as the one sure means of keeping the national defense,
minimum production capacity on-line.

As Johnson was later

to report on the floor of the House, " . . .

what they wanted

f

was for the Government to step out of their end, the produc
ing end, while still keeping control over the consuming
3
end." 2 J

Apparently, the "markdown, peel-off, and walkaway"

proposal "closed out of town," for no such proposal came
before the more formal hearings held in Washington.^4

How

ever, Johnson's greatest objection was based upon his suspi
cion that the Big Four were the only ones capable of absorbing
^ Ibid., p. 5426.
23u.S., Congress, House, The Rubber Act of 1948, H.R.
5314, 80th Cong., 2nd. sess., March 5, 1948, Congressional
Record, Vol. 93, p. 2256 (hereafter cited as House Debate,
Rubber Act of 194 8).
^ U . S . , Congress, House, Committee On Armed Services,
Full Committee Hearings on H.R. 5314, To Strengthen National
Security . . . By Providing For The Maintenance Of An Ade
quate Domestic Rubber Industry . . ., H. Rpt. No. 2 30,
February 17, 1948, 80th Cong., 2nd. sess.
The full committee
approved the bill without change.
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the plants, and by so doing would create a monopolized indus
try.
The House Subcommittee was chaired by Representative
Paul Shafer who had chaired the Subcommittee in 1946-1947.
Though Crawford, the sponsor of the Rubber Act of 1947 re
mained, Shafer took the reins and sponsored the proposed
replacement legislation, H.R. 5314, A Bill to Strengthen
National Security . . . By Providing For The Maintenance Of
An Adequate Domestic Rubber-Producing Industry.

The require

ment for a synthetic production capacity as necessary to the
national defense, and the minimum level of on-line and stand
by capacity were assumed.

The questions at issue were:

should specification and allocation be continued; and should
the RFC's facilities be turned over to private industry?
The bill, as proposed by Shafer, incorporated all the
needs of defense and the mechanisms to insure that they were
met.

However, in treating the question of plant disposal,

the Shafer Bill authorized sale of the plants after April 1,
1948, but only with Congressional approval, such approval to
be requested by the President upon recommendation of the
National Security Resource Board.

S ^ f e r found himself meet

ing head-on with Johnson who was adamantly opposed to making
any facility available to the industry.

Johnson threatened

to introduce counter-legislation that would prohibit sale

until after June 1950.

Although he opposed sale on the

grounds that it benefited the purchasers to the distinct
disadvantage of the nonpurchasers, the proposed blocking
legislation spoke of the need to "remain free of foreign de
pendency . . . [and to]

be protected from crude [natural]

rubber cartels . . . including excessive increases in
price."

25

Though the Shafer Bill cleared the full committee

with the disposal provision intact, an understanding must
have been reached between Shafer and Johnson for Shafer
amended the Bill on the floor of the House to include a twoyear delay in plant disposal just prior to passage.

2g

Unlike the Rubber Act of 1947, the consideration of
H.R. 5314 was accompanied by a small measure of Government
lobbying against the proponents of sale.
Congressional view.

Crawford gave the

Noting the continuing disorder in Indo

nesia he predicted continued shortages of natural rubber.

In

support of the retention of the Government’s facilities, he
pointed to the price impact upon consumers of tires made with
synthetic produced by other than the RFC and sold at other
than a Government-fixed low price.
25

27

Admiral Charles E.

New York Times, January 31, 1948, p. 10.

2 fi

House Debate, Rubber Act of 1948, p. 2265.
For full
text of H.R. 5314 see ibid., pp. 2261-2264.
27
.
Address by Honorable Fred L. Crawford to the Chemi
cal Engineers Club of Washington, D.C., January 13, 1948 in
U . S . , Congress, House, Extension of remarks by Crawford, 80th
Cong., 2nd. sess., January 1948, Congressional Record, Vol.
94, pp. A423-A424.
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Braine, Chairman of The Army-Navy Munitions Board and spokes
man for the national defense argument, stated that the United
States did not wish to "ruin any country" by continuing
Government production but warned that, regardless of the
desire to cooperate, " . . .

we must always be in a position

where decisions regarding our national defense are in our
hands."

28

Phillips of the Department of State spoke of the

effect the rubber policy could have on world trade.
proach was slightly more articulated.

His ap

Assuming the need to

assure a minimum level of synthetic production, he warned of
the need to keep mandatory consumption to an absolute minimum.
He cited the gains being made in the establishment of the ITO
but noted that restrictive trade agreements were creeping
back into the system.

Indicating a concern not previously

raised, Phillips went on to caution against the use of Govern
ment stockpiles as a means of depressing price.29

There was

also some muted opposition to the proposed continuation of
specification and allocation in the general context that
Government control of any sort was "Socializing Industry.
^Ad d r e s s by Rear Admiral C. E. Braine to the Chemical
Engineers Club of Washington, D.C., in ibid., pp. A350-A352.
29"international Implication of Our Rubber Policy,"
Address by William T. Phillips to the Chemical Engineers Club
of Washington, D.C., in ibid., pp. A420-A421.
No. 963

•^"The Trend:
Socializing Industry," Business W e e k ,
(February 14, 1948), p. 120.
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The Shafer Bill passed in the House on March 5th,
followed by hearings before the Subcommittee of the Senate
Banking And Currency Committee.

Although the industry mus

tered its biggest guns in an effort to delete the two-year
delay on sale of the RFC *s facilities, the only point of
real discussion turned on a last moment of confusion among
O 1

representatives of the Executive.J

In a letter to the Sub

committee Chairman, Senator John W. Bricker, Presidential
Assistant John R. Steelman, formerly of the OWMR, requested
that the authority of the legislation be granted "indefinitely" m

lieu of the two-year period.

32

The request was

supported by the Department of Commerce suggesting a rekind
ling of the dispute between the Departments of State and
Commerce over the use of commodity controls in the ITO
P r o p o s a l s .

33

However, upon the recommendation of Kennedy of

the State Department and the RFC, the two-year delay was
retained.

Kennedy indicated that the Department favored

Government control over the next two years to insure that
synthetic was not used to depress the price of natural, but
31See statements of Harvey Firestone, Jr./ J. P.
Siberling, and Robert S. Wilson, officers of Firestone,
Siberling and General Companies in Senate Hearings:
Rubber
Act of 1948 , pp. 26ff, 31ff, and 43ff.
32Ibld., p. 52.
33Statement of Everett G. Holt, Advisor, Department
of Commerce in ibid., p. 46. For a summary of the disagree
ment see New York Times, March 3, 1948, p. 33.
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favored the June 1950 termination date as a means of insuring
an "automatic review" of the rubber situation.34
As passed by the Senate on March 23rd, the Rubber Act
of 1948 w a s , in effect, a continuation and confirmation of
the Act of 1947.

The powers to produce, sell, specify and

allocate synthetic were delegated to the Executive.

However,

the continuation of Government control of the synthetic in
dustry, backed by the clear intent contained in the legisla
tive history that the purpose of the Act was to insure only
that the defense minimum capacity be maintained, gave assur
ance to the producers of natural rubber.

The American syn

thetic capacity would not be set free to be used as a weapon
to control prices.

The British registered their pleasure

with the Act of 1948, seeing it as a means of injecting
stability into the price picture.

It could "pave the way in

further buying developments," a reference to increasing
demand as a result of European rearmament and American plans
to increase purchases of natural for military stockpiling
purposes.35

The matter of natural versus synthetic was

apparently settled until June 1950.

The prediction was that,

by then, the full natural capacity would be restored and that
improvements in natural production efficiency would allow a
34Statement of Donald B. Kennedy, Senate Hearings:
Rubber Act of 19 4 8 , pp. 75-76.
35NeW York Times, April 5, 1948, p. 30.
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decrease in price to a level capable of competing with, syn
thetic.

Though the Rubber Act of 1948 reflected a combina-

tion of defense consciousness, adherence to the principles of
the ITO Proposals, and a slight distrust of Big Rubber's
motives, it was a decision with potentially distinct advan
tages to the immediate economic future of the Malayan Federa
tion in that it gave some stability to the general market
picture.

141

CHAPTER VI
V

JUNE 1948 - JUNE 1950
Until mid-1948, the relationship of America to Bri

tish Malaya can only be described as indirect, the effect of
one upon the other being the result of causes not entirely
connected to or aware of the effect.

For example, the re

tention of the synthetic industry by the RFC was a result of
concern for national defense; the effect upon Malaya was not
intended, rather the opposite, as policy sought to minimize
any effect.

The withdrawal of the American Government from

the rubber markets in 1947 resulted in a price decline for
Malayan rubber; however, the intent was to adhere to the
principles of the ITO Proposals.

Part of the reason for the

indirectness of the American-Maiayan contact lay in the fact
that as a possession, Malaya had voice only through Great
Britain.

The relationship was much the same as the relation

ship might have been between the United States and/ for
example, Wales.

The interests of Malaya

(or Wales) were

subservient to the interests of the Empire; e.g., as sug
gested above, the British Government chose to fefrain from
official complaint concerning the American bid price for
British rubber in 1946, so as to avoid the possibility of
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jeopardizing or delaying Congressional passage of the much
needed Loan.
Excluding the question of economic policy, the gene
ral foreign policy of the United States regarding the, inter
nal affairs of Malaya was in consonant with the 1945 policy
statement which declared the principle of nonintervention in
the British areas of Southeast Asia.

However, the aura of

American detachment towards Malaya must be characterized.

It

was nonintervention by permissive accident rather than by
practiced, conscious effort.

There simply was no crisis or

threat of crisis in Malaya prior to 1948 which might have
given rise to concern in the American Department of State.
There was no occasion for the United States to suggest a
course for the British, or to offer assistance.

Even the near

occasions of the sin of intervention, which sometimes accom
panies the most humanitarian of aid, were avoided.^

The

British provided such aid as was needed in Malaya and did not
request any special, American assistance.

It could be argued

that America provided indirect aid through the Loan; however,
that view is to stretch a point.

The Loan provided the,^Bri

tish the means to aid Malaya; the terms of the Loan did not
specify the use of proceeds.
10ther than grains shipped immediately after the war
under UNRRA, no American aid of note went to Malaya.
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The uprising of the MCP in the spring of 194 8 would
suggest a reevaluation of the American view.

That it did not

requires comment.
The most generally accepted explanation for the com
munist rebellion in Malaya and the rest of Southeast Asia is
that it was, in reality, a Soviet-directed attack on the eco
nomic recovery of western Europe which was then beginning to
show promise under the stimulus of the Marshall Plan, the
European Recovery Program (E.R.P.).

It was presumed that the

Soviet intent was to wreck the productive capacity of South
east Asia; the desired effect was to deny to Europe the raw
materials and dollar exchange flowing from the area.

Malaya

was a target of primary importance as it was already a thriv
ing source of materials for England and America and the
largest source of dollar exchange for the sterling area,
whereas Indonesia and Indochina represented only the potential
to imitate the success of Malaya. 2
There were ancillary Soviet benefits to be gained by
fishing in the troubled waters of Southeast Asia.

First, by

attacking colonial control in Southeast Asia, energy needed
for European recovery could be bled-off in the colonialists*
2

Among others see Harry Miller, A Short History of
Malaysia (New York;
Frederick A. Praeger, 1965), p. 173;
Gullick, Malaysia, p. Ill; and Cady, Post-War Southeast Asia/
pp. 62-63.
For a contemporary analysis see B. H. M. Velke,
"Communism And Nationalism In South East Asia," International
Affairs, Vol. XXV (April 1949), pp. 149-154.
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effort to retain their possessions.

Second, there was the

possibility of adversely affecting relations between the
United States and the colonial nations, if the colonialists'
response could be made to appear as a heavy-handed suppres
sion of nationalist aspirations.

Third, in regard to non

colonial Southeast Asia, the pro-west, if not west-dependent,
governments of the Philippines, Burma, and Thailand could
also be discredited, weakened and subjected to communist
3
pressure .■

The order for the Southeast Asian communists to go on
the offensive was reportedly transmitted by the Cominform at
the Southeast Asian Democratic Youth Conference, sponsored by
the Communist World Federation of Trade Unions and held in
Calcutta in February 1948.

The resort to overt action was a

shift from the post-war Soviet strategy of peaceful coopera
tion with and subversion of nationalist groups.

As described

earlier, this took the form in Malaya of first subverting the
labor movement, and later, subversion of the political orga
nizations which formed in opposition to the Union, the UMNO,
and finally the Federation.

Space here does not permit a

full recounting of the uprisings of 1948; however, some
^Richard P. Stebbens and others, USWA;
194 9 (New
York:
Harper and Brothers for The Council On Foreign Rela
tions, 1950) , pp. 423-431.
See also "Peril For U.S. In
Malayan Unrest,11 U .S . News And World Report, Vol. 25
(August 29, 1948), pp. 24-25.
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analysis is necessary for, as in other matters, the Malayan
experience is again unique.
The Communist-instigated risings of 1948-1951
in Southeast Asia, historically considered,
were both ill-timed and ineffective.
In most
cases, the non-Communist elite still maintained
a measure of faith in alternative social innova
tions and nonrevolutionary means of implementing
political change.^
It appears now that the Soviet plan held little con
cern for the success of the rebellions; rather, the primary
objective was to retard European recovery.
a spoiler's plan.

In short, it was

The Southeast Asian communists were hurled

into the breach with little concern for their chances of
survival or success.

The various rebellions of 1948, which

broke out in Malaya, Burma, Siam and Indonesia, and the resur
gence of communist efforts in Indochina and the Philippines
received little else than moral and vocal support from the
USSR.

In the main, the revolutionaries lacked organization

and popular support, and became primarily a disruptive but
expensive nuisance.

There were exceptions; e.g., the tena

cious Viet Minh and the Burmese communists.

However, the

Viet Minh resistance to the French had long predated 194 8, and
the general chaos in Burma was as much a result of the Karen
and Shan tribes minority problem, which simply provided an
exploitable cause in the absence of British, imperialism and
4Cady, Post-War Southeast Asia, p. 81.

was as good a vehicle as any to serve the purposes of driving
the government to the left.^
Malaya was exceptional from at least two points of
view.

First, the M C P 's avowed purposes of driving the Bri

tish out and securing political dominance had, perhaps, the
least promise of success.

The terrorist forces consisted

almost entirely of the former Chinese members of the MPAJA.
A change in name, first to the Malayan Peoples' Anti-British
Army (MPABA) and later to the Malayan Races Liberation Army
(MRLA) altered nothing; the MRLA remained the Chinese enemy
to the Malays.

In addition, the rebels alienated the vast

majority of the middle-class, urban Malayan Chinese who re
mained either the "Queen's Chinese" or Kuomintang loyalists.
The announced objective of driving out the British had little
popular appeal for either noncommunist Chinese or Malay .-.
The Malays had no desire to risk dominance by the Chinese,
let alone Chinese communists; and, the noncommunist peninsula
Chinese were at least secure among the hostile Malays so long
as the British remained.

As a result, the MRLA was forced

from the outset to rely upon whatever support could be
secured through coercion, extortion, and terror.

Suffice it

to say that the MRLA was destructive and cost both the Bri
tish and Federation Governments billions in military and
^The moderate government of Thakin Nu was forced to
resign, January 20, 1949.
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police actions; but, as a political movement,, communism was
unable to leave the sanctuary of its jungle hiding place.
MRLA military efforts never advanced beyond the tactic of
hit-and-run attacks against the mines and plantations.
Though the enemy was the British, the victims of the ter
rorist attacks were more often Malays and Kuomintang Chinese
v
c
employed as managers and overseers.
The second unique aspect of the communist attack in
Malaya was its tenacity and longevity despite its lack of
appeal.

Whereas, for example, the rebellion in Indonesia

was quickly put down and the threat in the Philippines was
contained, the substantial efforts of the British in' Malaya
7
did not yield results until after 1951.
The initial strength
of the communists in 1948 was approximately 5,000, but it
grew until 1950 when it reached an estimated 8,000.

The

stubborn resistance of the MRLA was a result of a combination
of factors:

(1) the MRLA was able to continue to recruit

from among young, unemployed, frustrated Chinese;

(2) the

MPAJA had laid plans and secreted weapons for just such an
occasion following the Japanese collapse; and (3) the MRLA
^Gullick, Malaysia, pp. 112-117.
The pattern of
attacks; i.e., attacks against plantations and mines, was
recognizably early.
See "Malaya: Civil Wat/"' News Week,
Vol. 32 (July 9, 1948), pp. 32-33.
'
■ 7Though the Emergency officially lasted until July
1960, the rebellion was broken by 1953, primarily as a result
of a program to resettle Chinese away from the jungle areas
and the reign of extortion visited by the MRLA.
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did not have to build a terrorist organization.

It was

merely a case of the MCP personnel moving to preappointed
jungle hide-outs in May and June of 1948, taking up their
arms, and resuming life as it had been under the Japanese.
A final point is a question in equipoise.

8

It is

debatable as to which side, the MCP or the Labor Government,
miscalculated to the other1s advantage.

The MCP had, until

1948, counted on a measured, restrained British response to
their actions.

There is some evidence to support the

opinion that at the outbreak of the rebellion the British
initiative was lost because the High Commissioner, Sir Edward
Gent, was indecisive, thereby allowing the MCP sufficient
time to go underground and reform as the MPABA.

He did not

react to the increases in labor strikes and acts of lawless
ness, which occurred in April through June, despite the
advice of his military chiefs to take decisive action.

Gent

preferred not to exercise extraordinary powers without
express direction from Whitehall.1^

One report has it that

at the time of his death in an aircrash in July, while
enroute to London, Gent was contemplating resignation.'1''1'
^Gullick, Malaysiay- pp. 117-119.
^NeW York Times, July 24, 1948, p. 4.
10"Malaya:

Civil War," pp. 32-33.

'^New York Times, July 5, 1948, p. 1; and "Malaya:
Civil War,71 p.. 32.
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However, any MPABA hope for confusion or hesitation on the
part of the Labor Government quickly dissolved.

The British

sent reenforcements within a month of the June declaration
of the Emergency; and, while it ^took several years to render
the MRLA impotent, the rebels were unable to mount a decisive
offensive operation or secure and hold a so-called liberated
area.

It was forced instead to spend most of its efforts in

sustaining meager supply lines and defending itself against
increasing numbers of Commonwealth regulars, and Malayan
police and home guards.

12

During the first year of the M C P *s rebellion, the
British mounted strong countermeasures and gave no hint that
the situation would require aid from outside the Commonwealth.
The British correctly concluded the inevitability of the MRLA
defeat; though they initially underestimated the effective
ness of the guerilla tactic, and were forced to alter the
13
countertactic several times.
. That the British did not
l2Gullick reports 40,000 regulars, 70,000 police,
and 225,000 home guards at the height of strength in 19501951, Malaysia, p. 112.
13Major General Charles H. Boucher acknowledged in
early July 1948 that the rising had been expected.
In late
July, he admitted some rebel success, but added " . . . it
won't last," and stated that compared to experiences in
Greece and India the MPABA was the " . . . easiest I've ever
tracked."
See New frork Times, July 6, 194 8, p. 6; July 19,
1948, p. 32; and July 28, 1948, p. 2. By August, Boucher
was predicting a two-phase, fifteen month operation. New
York Times, August 6, 1948, p. 4.
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request American aid requires some explanation.

First, the

decline of the eastern colonial empire had been rapid.

India,

Pakistan, Burma, and Ceylon had been granted independence by
January 194 8.

There was political criticism at home that

under the Labor Government the Empire was "running off almost
as fast as the British Loan."^4

Second, the MRLA challenge

was a direct confrontation, a situation avoided in the free
ing of the other areas; therefore, the British were forced to
stand if prestige and authority were to be maintained before
the rest of the Empire.

Third, Malaya was of vital interest

to Great Britain as the "golden goose" of the dollar-earning
sterling area.

15

The stand m

.
Malaya is in contrast to Bri

tish economy elsewhere; for example, the withdrawal from
Greece in February 1947 and the granting of independence in
January 1948 to Burma, which chose to remain outside the
Commonwealth.

In both instances, the cost of forcibly main

taining British dominance outweighed any gain to be secured
l4Campbell, USWA:
1947-1948 (New York:
Harper and
Brothers, 1948), p. 218. As early as November 1948, James V.
Forrestal, the American Secretary of Defense, was told by
Churchill and the British Chiefs of Staff that should war
break out in the Far East, the British were fully committed
in Malaya and could make no further contribution.
See
Walter Millis, ed., The Forrestal Dairies (New York:
The
Viking Press, 1951), p. 525.
15Barbara Willingham-Jones, "Should Britain Quit
Malaya?"., The Contemporary Review, Vol. 178 (July 1950) ,
pp. 14-18. Willingham-Jones concluded, "The interests of
Malaya . .., no less than dollar pressure, preclude any
British Government from contemplating withdrawal at any
foreseeable date."
Ibid., p. 18.
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by that effort.

In Malaya, the stakes were high and the

odds were right.
The American perception of events in Malaya is dif
ficult to assess.

There is little doubt that the United

States accepted that the rebellions of 1948 were led by South
east Asian communists.

That the United States accepted the

claim that the rebellions were coordinated parts of a scheme
being directed by Moscow as an attack on ERP is not so clear.
In explaining the issuance of licenses for the export of
small arms to protect the American-owned rubber plantations
and the single American tin mine, the State Department stated
that the applications w e r e :
. . . approved in accordance with a policy of
viewing the disorder as caused by outlaws
rather than as a full-scale political revolt
against the Government.^
There were opinions that the uprising in Malaya was inspired
by the successes of Mao Tse-tung, if not directed by the
Chinese Communist Party.

Others opined that the uprising was

a local decision explaining that the spread of rebellion
elsewhere was a result of one local group being inspired by
another.

It appears that the United States did not

•^New York Times, July 26, 1948, p. 12. The British
made the requests for small arms direct to Pacific Tin Con
solidated, owner of the single American mine, and the U.S.
Rubber Co., subsidiary owner, of the Malayan Rubber Co., thus
avoiding the "red tapeM of a government-to-government arms
request.
See also New York Times, July 24, 194 8, p. 4; and
August 26, 1948, p. 2.
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categorically accept the world-plot explanation.

17

By exam

ple, a Department of State summary of conditions in Malaya,
written in 1953, gave the causes of the 1948 rebellion as
the strong British reaction to the Communist-controlled PMFTU,
and the frustration of the MCP in its inability to counter the
establishment of the UMNO-dominated Federation.

The immediate

cause was cited as the Federation's order, issued in April,
that all trade unions register with the Government and reveal
the sources of their funds.

There was no reference to the

Calcutta Conference, or a Soviet plan to wreck the ERP
through the destruction of the Malayan economy:
The Communists1 specific objective now was to
destroy the existing political organization
of Malaya, drive the British out, and ultimately
take control of the country for c o m m u n i s m . 18
Part of the explanation for the American reluctance to ac
cept the claim that the Berlin blockade and the Malayan rebel
lion were all part of the same Soviet-directed world plan may
lie in a belief that the British were using the communist
world-plot thesis as a means to mask the repression of a
6
■^Tillman Durdin, "Revolt In Malaya Local R e d fs
Work," ibid., August 1, 194 8, p. 17.
18y.s ., Department of State, Malaya:
Trouble Spot
In Southeast Asia: Background, Pub. 5061, Far Eastern
Series, No. 57 (Washington, D.C. : Government Printing Office,
1953), pp. 2-3. For a like account by a Congressional source
see U.S., Congress, House, Committee On Foreign Affairs,
Special Study Mission To Southeast Asia And To The Pacific,
reported by the Hon. Walter Judd, 83rd Cong., 1st sess.
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1954),
pp. 70-71.
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Chinese-led, Pan-Malayan nationalist movement which sought
only to hasten the British departure.-^

Though this suspi

cion may have had some foundation, a judgment should be made;
the evidence weighs for the Moscow-directed, Calcutta-ordered
resort to rebellion.
As early as June 1947, at least one observer put the
issues of rubber prices paid by the American industry and the
survival of a noncommunist Malaya into a dependent relation
ship.

"If the U.S. Lets The Rubber Market Go To Pieces -

Kiss Malaya Goodby."20

This rather pessimistic report saw

Malaya as all "that was left" in Southeast Asia and placed
the blame for the tenuous Malayan situation of June squarely
on the United States for failing to recognize the realities
of the day, and allowing the industry to keep the price of
rubber at prewar levels.

The United States Government, or

at least its economic representatives, were apparently
unmoved.

In January 1948, under agreements worked out by the

Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA), the United States
had agreed to purchase rubber from the British Government for
19See Gullick, Malaysia/ n. p. Ill; Tillman, "Revolt
in Malaya"; and "Malaya: Majority of Guns," Time, V o l . 53
(July 12), 1948, p. 33.
^G i l b e r t Burck, "Report From Singapore:
If the U.S.
Lets The Rubber Market Go To Pieces - Kiss Malaya Goodby,"
Fortune,; Vol. 37 (June 1948) , pp. 92-95ff. Also see "Peril
For U.S. In Malaya Unrest,"; U.S. News And World Report, .
Vol. 25 (August 27), 1948, pp. 24-25.

military stockpiling purposes.
agreement were twofold:

The purposes of the ECA

first, the primary objective was to

increase the flow of dollars to Europe; and, second, to
stimulate the strategic materials production industries.

The

quid pro quo was to increase the available supplies of stra
tegic materials and to increase the American defense stock
piles.

The British made note of the need to give "full con

sideration of the producers in the colonies and the rubber
market" and set the price at $.27.

The United States de

clined, and it was not until September that a bargain for
30,000 tons was struck, but at the market price of $.22.

The

remainder of the United Kingdom stock of 88,000 tons was then
taken off the market to be held in the British strategic
21
reserve.
In August 1948 , an- observer noted the interrelation
ship between the American policy and the British struggle
in Malaya.

This commentary focused upon the problem of

Malayan wages which were being held down because of low
rubber prices despite the sharp increase in the cost of
living caused by the Emergency.

Since April, the price of

rice had increased by a factor of fifteen.

The cause of

part of the problem; i.e., the low price of rubber, was
attributed to the United States policy and its continued
21

New York Times, January 21, 1948, p. 41; Septem
ber 4, 1948, pp. 4,13.
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production of synthetic rubber.

22

A muted criticism of the

synthetic industry was also made by Malcom MacDonald, British
Commissioner General for Southeast Asia, in November.

How

ever, his criticism included the British Government and
industry for their failure to take any action to limit the
23
increasing production of natural.
Despite the disruptions of 1948, Malaya maintained an
increase in rubber production.

It rose to the historical

high of 697,000 tons and accounted for the major portion of
Malaya's 1948 dollar earnings of $130 million.2^

However,

the volume increase in production was offset by declining
prices.

Malaya was repeating the mistake of the past:

overproduction.

In 1948, America's total consumption actual

ly decreased by nearly 100,000 tons in comparison to 1947?
the result was a decline in the price of natural to about
$.20 at year's end.

A second reason for the decline in

dollar earnings from rubber, totally unrelated to the United
States, was the illegal shipment of rubber to "sterling grey
22Andrew Roth, "Malaya:
Besieged Dollar Arsenal,"
Nation, Vol. 167 (August 7, 1948), pp. 150-151.
In addition
to the rubber problem, Roth, also notes the resistance of
planters and mine owners to Gent's moderate, pre-Emergency
policies, and the Soviet-Calcutta-MCP-ERP version of the
uprising.
23"Basic Problem Remains As Malaya Quells Communists,"
Foreign Policy Bulletin, Vol. XXVIII (November 12, 1948),
pp. 18-20.
24"Southeast Asia: A Glossary," Fortune, Vol. 39
(March 1949), p. 90; and New York Times, May 9, 1949, p. 33.
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areas"; that is, the buying of rubber in Malaya with soft
currency and the trans-shipment to nonsterling areas for
resale m

dollar markets. 2 5

However, the loss of dollar

exchange remained, in the British mind, the fault of the
United States.
After 1948, through the worst years of the Emergency
and into the Korean War, the American contact with Malaya
remained indirect and, with few exceptions, limited to a con
tinuation of discussions concerning the effect of the Ameri
can rubber policy.

However, the continuing encouragements to

restrain synthetic production to the advantage of natural
*rubber included the new incentive; i.e., to buy natural
rubber at a price comparable to other commodities was to aid
in the fight against communism.
By mid-1949, the price of rubber was down to $.16.
The British argument for American action to reverse the trend
was articulated by the Leader of the Conservative Party,
Anthony Eden, in May 1949.

First, Moscow was categorically

branded as the instigator of the Malayan rebellion.

Second,

the burden of the rebellion had driven the Malayan cost of
living to such a level that plantation labor was demanding
25por a complete explanation of how this yielded the
trans-shijper a 5-15 per cent profit see Frederick Kozle,
"Export-Import Problems In Southeast Asia," Southeast Asia
In The Coming World, Philip W. Thoyer, ed. (Baltimore: The
Johns HOpkins Press, 1953), pp. 113-125.
Also see "The World
Outlook In Rubber," U.S. News And World Report, Vol. 28
(January 6, 1950), p. 40.
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wage increases of up to. 200 per cent; at the same time, the
price of rubber remained below prewar levels.

In an argu

ment containing a considerable amount of unassailable logic,
the former Foreign Minister expressed a lack of " . . .
enthusiasm for America's costly synthetic industry . . ." and
added that " . . . if the price [of natural] were allowed to
rise the U.S. might pay more for rubber but less for aid."
Third, the stability of Southeast Asia was "indispensably"
tied to the prosperity of Malaya.

Malaya's success in the

fight against communism could serve as " . . . a prop and
guide" to her neighbors and the results would be to every
one's advantage " . . . including the U.S.".

The key to

success was a fair price for rubber, and " . . .

a salient

topic for discussion between Britain and America." °
The statement at that particular moment gave some
hint of the strain the Emergency continued to place on the
British economy.

It may also have been designed to serve as

a signal to America that Great Britain was contemplating a
request for direct assistance.

Eden's reference to a higher

price for rubber as an alternative to more foreign aid may
have been aimed at that portion of American public opinion
which was growing less generous in its view of costly foreign
^A n t h o n y Eden, "Asia's Welfare Is Held Vital To
Southeast Asia:
Current Price of Rubber Is Problem," New
York Times, May 2, 1949, p. 8.
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aid.

In either event, the British had come to. the realiza

tion that the Emergency was not going to be solved quickly
and, within weeks of Eden's plea, the British Government had
to float a bond issue to raise eight million pounds sterling
for Malayan assistance.

27

The British appeal of May 1949 was apparently noted
by Representative Shafer.

In August, he had completed an

examination of the operation of the rubber policy established
by his Subcommittee in February 1948.

It was his evaluation

that the various parts of the Rubber Act of 194 8 had become
disconnected from each other through bureaucratic mismanage
ment and had become counterproductive, in several respects.
In his view the intent of the Act to minimize the effect of
the National defense objective upon the world's natural
market had been circumvented.

Shafer was surprised to learn

that the Department of Commerce, which had assumed responsi
bility for allocation and specification from the OWMR in
August 1948, was requiring synthetic consumption above the
minimum defense level.

In 1948, the mandatory level had been

54,000 tons above the minimum despite the voluntary consump
tion of an additional 167,000 tons by industry.

In short,

the RFC made and sold 221,000 tons more than was necessary
under law; this amount constituted an equal loss to natural
producers.

In the summer of 1949, the Government was still

^7Ibid., May 9, 1949, p. 33.
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requiring consumption at an annual rate of 46,000 tons in
excess of the defense minimum.

He further noted that in a

period of declining natural prices, the Government had not
seized the opportunity to purchase natural for stockpiling
purposes.

The stockpile was still below the desired level.

Overproduction of synthetic; the failure to buy natural for
the stockpile; the leveling of demand; and the summer low in
demand caused by the industry's annual inventory liquidation;
had combined to drive the price of natural to a new low of
$.16.

The result was a lowering of the living standard in

Malaya and an estimated loss of dollar exchange for Great
Britain and Malaya of $100,000,000.

In consideration of the

British dollar position and the struggle in Malaya, Shafer
proposed an immediate suspension of all mandatory synthetic
consumption and an acceleration of natural rubber purchases
for the stockpile.

He noted the threat to Southeast Asia

posed by the successes of the communists in China, and the
offsetting effects of gains made in Europe under ERP and
losses in Asia, such as the tenuous situation in Malaya.
The advantages to be gained by Shafer's proposal were:

the

strategic stockpile would be increased; the British dollar
position would be improved; and, the increase in natural
demand would "create a happier condition in the rubber
countries."

In the alternative of no action, he cautioned,
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" . . .

the U.S. could be called on for aid that could wreck

the economy"; i.e.,

" . . .

the financial strain of saving

Asia."28
Opponents of the Shafer proposal, most notably Senator
Robert A. Taft, spurred by protests from among the industry
leaders, could see little justification for curtailing the
output of an American industry " . . . simply to assist Great
Britain to get dollars from Malaya."

In Taft's view, suspen

sion of mandatory synthetic consumption would cause only un
employment among American workers and a rise in the price of
29
natural rubber at a cost to the consumer.
In rebuttle, it
was pointed out that America had a choice, "outright grants
or trade"; to speak of aiding friends in the absence of a
willingness to do either was to try to "have our cake and
eat it too."

30

Shafer's plan was not adopted, most probably

due to the controversial domestic aspects of suspending man
datory synthetic consumption.

In addition, Taft's view was

28U.S. , Congress, House, Remarks and Report, "Our
Rubber Policy" by the Hon. Paul W. Shafer, 81st Cong., 1st.
sess., August 9, 1949, Congressional Record, Vol. 95,
pp. 1136-39.
29U.S., Congress, Senate, curtailment of requirements
for synthetic rubber, 81st Cong., 1st. sess., September 23,
1949, Congressional Record, Vol. 95, pp. 13211-13.
Though
little can be made of it, Taft's comments on the proposal
served his Ohio constituency as well as his general view of
American assistance schemes which imposed costs upon the
> American public.
30Senator Claude Pepper, ibid., p. 13211.
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supported by the National Security Council whereas Shafer's
proposal received support from the Department of State, which
was more a hinderance than a help.

The Department was coming

under increasing criticism from Congress for the general
management of foreign p o l i c y . ^
Just prior to the presentation of Shafer's proposal,
there was a report that Great Britain was preparing to ask
the United States for aid for Malaya in the form of capital
investment.

Britain realized the improbabilities of anything

approaching an Asian version of the Marshall Plan, but hoped
to receive aid through the International Bank For Reconstruc
tion and Development, or the Export-Import Bank under the
principles of assistance outlined in the Point-Four program.32
Whether the request was discouraged and never formally made,
or submitted and disapproved is not clear, but Britain may
have abandoned the request having observed the reaction to
Shafer's less ambitious proposal.

The explanation for the

disappearance of the British-proposed request for aid may
also lay in the confusion that surrounded Point-Four.
Following its announcement in January 1949, the Administra
tion was repeatedly required to explain to Congress and
expectant recipients of aid alike, that Point-Four was not
Jlg^nator Taft,: ibid., p. 13213.
33Benjamin Welles, "British Want U.S. To Invest In
Asia," New York Times, September 1, 19 49, p. 10.
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intended to be a massive, economic aid program comparable to
E R P , rather it was to be aid in the form of limited technical
assistance. J
The British economic situation continued to worsen
through 1949.

In July, the United Kingdom, followed by the

Commonwealth members, announced a restriction on dollar ex
penditures in an effort to conserve the United Kingdom's
reserves which, by July, had fallen below the danger level.
In September, in a move to increase the ability to earn
dollars by decreasing the value of export items, the pound
sterling was devalued.

However, due to the intricacies of

the world monetary system, the effect on Malayan rubber was
less than hoped for although an improvement in rubber sales
was a prime objective in the devaluation move.

The idea was

to reduce the price to a level which would stimulate American
33Acheson described the "fourth point" of Truman's
Inaugural Address of January 20, 1949 as the "hyperbole of
inaugural oratory" which ignored the realities of the foreign
aid budget.
It was included in the Address as an after
thought without the State Department's knowledge.
See
Acheson, Present At The Creation, p. 265.
It was misunder
stood to be an ERP-type commitment and required clarification
in the U.N. Economic and Social Council.
See "Statement By
William L. Thorpe," Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 20
(February 25), 1949, pp. 283-288. For a commentary and ex
planation see Annette Barker Fox, "The Fourth Point And The
United Nations," United Nations International Conciliation,
No. 452 (June 1949), pp. 459-503. Point-Four, administered
by the Technical Cooperation Administration fTCA), was not
funded until late 1950. For a summary of TCA through 1952
see U.S. , Department of State,: Point-Four: What It Is How It Works, Pub. No. 4863, Economic Cooperation Series,
No. 39, February 1953. Total aid to the Federation through
1952 was $4 00,000 in road-building equipment and technical
assistance.
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buying on the theory that a> price cut would reduce voluntary
synthetic buying, the loss to be made up on volume.

However,

the devaluation of the pound sterling was offset by an almost
equal, upward revaluation of the Malayan dollar.

The net

effect of all forces involved increased buying and raised the
price to $.17^; however, neither to the extent desired.34
The issue of American foreign policy towards the Far
East, rose to new levels of importance in 1950.

Despite the

successes in Europe, such as the breaking of the Berlin
blockade, the advances of the ERP and the signing of the
North Atlantic Treaty Alliance

(NATO), all were diminished by

the defeat of Nationalist China and the October 1949 estab
lishment of the Peoples' Republic of China.

The controversy

that followed in America is beyond the scope of this paper;
suffice it to recall that the Truman Administration and, in
particular the Department of State, was subjected to criti
cism for the loss.

At any rate, Asian policy took center

stage and, in January and March 1950, Secretary of State Dean
Acheson delivered two major addresses in an effort to explain
America's commitment to securing the remainder of the area
from communism.35

First, the idea of massive military and

34See John L. Collyer's explanation in "World Outlook
On Rubber," p. 40.
3^U.S., Department of State, "Crisis In Asia - An
Examination of U.S. Policy:
Remarks by Secretary Acheson
Before The National Press Club, Wash., D.C., Jan. 12, 1950,"
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economic aid was dismissed.
had saved China.

36

Neither, as Acheson pointed out,

Second, America did not oppose communism

on a purely ideological basis; rather, the United States saw
communist expansion in Asia as a device of the new imperialism
of Soviet Russia. 37

In defense of the charges that the State

Department lacked a clear policy, Acheson explained that the
complexities of the area; i.e., the diversity of people and
histories, defied a single policy.

38

American policy must,

therefore, be tailored to each circumstance.

In a statement

aimed at any advocate or potential recipient of American aid,
Acheson made it clear that Asia must choose for itself, and
that America would assist those who chose to resist communist
attempts to dominate.

"U.S. aid is good only when it is the

missing component in a situation which might otherwise be
solved . . . [The U.S.] can’t make the engine, it can just
provide the gas..

3Q
^

In a reference to Malaya, Acheson indi

cated American satisfaction with events there.

"The British

have and are discharging their responsibility harmoniously
Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XXII (January 23, 1950),
pp. 111-118; and "United States Policy Toward Asia: Address
by Secretary Acheson Before The Commonwealth Club of Cali
fornia, San Francisco, Calif., March 15, 195Q," Department
of State Bulletin,, Vol. XXXIII (March 27, 1950), pp. 467-472.
3 6 A c h e s o n ,

"Commonwealth Club Address," p. 471.

37Acheson, "National, Press Club Address," pp. 112113.
38Ibid., pp. 111-112.

39Ibid., p. 113.
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with the peoples of Malaya and are making progress.
Activity in the first half of 1950 regarding planning
for future aid to Southeast Asia was limited to considering
and selecting likely projects to receive Point-Four aid.

In

addition, Truman appointed Gordon Gray, a former Secretary of
the Army, to conduct a survey of America's total, foreign
41
economic policy.
The continued resistance of the MRLA, which was now
costing Great Britain and the Federation at a rate of 100
million pounds sterling per year, in combination with the
40Ibid., p. 115.
The Gray Report recommended a combination of private investment, public loans, technical assistance, and
grants.
See "Text of Summary of Recommendation In Gray's
Report On Foreign Economic Policies," New York Times, Novem
ber 13, 1950, p. 12ff. The opponents of foreign aid viewed
the recommendations as an attempt to continue ERP-levels of
aid beyond the termination date, 1951.
See U.S., Congress,
Senate, Senate Committee On Appropriations, Special Subcom
mittee On Foreign Economic Cooperation, Analysis of The Gray
Report, Subcommittee Print, 82nd Cong., 1st. sess., 1951.
For a typical opponent reaction see "The Gray Report Extends
Crackpot Socialist Programs" in Senate, Extended Remarks of
Senator George W. Malone, 81st Cong., 2nd. sess., 1950, Congressional Record, Vol. 96, p. A7865.
There were two schools
of thought concerning aid through capital investment:
public;
e.g., that contemplated by. the British and preferred by poten
tial recipients to avoid private interference in government;
and private investment which business preferred, provided tax
incentives and protection from expropriation were guaranteed
by the American Government.
See Richard P. Stebbins, and
others, USWA:
1950 (New York: Harper and Brothers for The
Council On Foreign Relations, 1951), pp. 87-88.
For an
interesting look at the issues see U.S., Department of State,
Pacific Coast Conference On Private Investment In Interna
tional Development:
Summary of The Discussions, Pub. No.
479 5, Economic Cooperations Series, No~ 36 (Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 19 52) .
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weakened position of the British economy, forced the Labor
Government to consider requesting American military assis
tance in the Malayan struggle.

Following preliminary dis

cussions between the British and Americans at a foreign
ministers meeting in May 1950, the British were persuaded to
abandon the request.

A request for aid at that time, the

British were told, had little hope for approval in the Con
gress and could prove to be a political embarrassment to the
Administration.

Congressional and public sentiment were run

ning high against Great Britain as a result of that Govern
m e n t 1s January 1950 extension of de^ jure recognition to the
Peoples' Republic of China.

49

At the same time as aid for

Malaya was denied, a French request for military aid to be
used in Vietnam was granted; approval was secured, in part,
by the French decision not to recognize Communist China so
long as it continued to supply aid to the Viet Minh.4^

As

Acheson later implied, the decision to aid Indochina was made
with little consideration of the future.
of a better course then or later . . .
through."

"We could not think

we tried to muddle

The decision to aid Indochina was, in his view,

the only alternative to the unacceptable choice,

" . . .

[to]

do nothing."42
42Raymond Daniell, "Britain Not To Ask U.S. Aid In
Malaya,"; New York Times, May 9, 1950, p. 2.
43Acheson, Present At The Creation, p. 673.
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The decision to deny Great Britain specific help in
her struggle with the MPLA appears to be one of those inci
dents in diplomatic history which involves little mystery.
The moment could not have been worse.

To expect the Depart

ment of State to go before Congress with a request on behalf
of England following that Nation*s recognition of Red China
was a political impossibility.

The State Department was

already on the defensive against the nonsense of Senator
Joseph R. McCarthy and could ill-afford running the risk of
inviting the additional wrath of those possessed by antiBritish sentiment.

On the other hand, the discouragement of

the Malayan aid request also suggests a decision with little
risk.

There was nothing to suggest that the British were

weakening in their resolve, or that the effort was in danger
4c
of collapse without American aid. J At any rate, though
there is little to suggest a parallel between American in
volvement in Indochina and Malaya— should aid have been
granted— the possibility of a similar course became a subject
^5ln June 1950, the British promised more aid to
Malaya but stressed the need to develop a long-range program
for social and economic development.
See statement of James
P. Griffiths, Secretary of State For The Colonies, in the
House of Commons in New York Times, June 22, 1950, p. 10. In
October 1950, Britain announced the Colombo Plan for Economic
Development in South and Southeast Asia, a cooperative pro
gram similar to Point-Four, for Malaya, North Borneo, Paki
stan, India, and Ceylon.
See U.S., Department of State, "The
Colombo Plan: New Promise For Asia," by Wilfred Malenbaum,
Pub. 4764, Economic Cooperation Series, No. 35 (Government
Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1952).
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for hindsight history after May 1950.

Beyond that date,

Britain knew full well that her job as part of the Americanled United Nations' battle against communism was to "muddle
through" alone.

CHAPTER VII
THE AMERICAN RUBBER POLICY AND
THE RUBBER BOOM OF 1950 - 1952
In the interest of completeness it is necessary to
recount the continued, but changed, application of the rubber
policy, first formulated in 1947, and its effects upon Malaya,
Great Britain, and the United States.

As a result of the

intensifying Cold War, world rearmament, and the Korean War,
natural rubber was to rise to a level of importance after
1949 not seen since 1942, and was to bring America and Britain
into arguments reminiscent of the old IRRC days.

Inasmuch as

the rubber policy reflected the principles of the ITO to a
considerable degree, it is best to start with the American
rejection of that blueprint for multilateralism.

Between 1946

and 1950, a Charter had been drafted by the Interim Commis
sion on ITO at meetings held in Switzerland, the United
States and Cuba.

At the time the Charter was submitted to

Congress in April 1950 for the purposes of providing legis
lative authority for United States' participation in the ITO,
only Australia and Liberia had formally ratified the Charter.
The Administration's proposal had little chance from the
outset in a recalcitrant Congress now divided into factions
with varied axes to grind, all anti-Administration; e.g.,
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the China Lobby, those opposed to free trade, and those who
were distrustful of the Department of State.

Whatever chance

ITO might have had evaporated in the outbreak of the Korean
War and America's shift to near full-scale mobilization.

It

is difficult to assign the failure to a single cause; perhaps
it is simplest to say that in 1950, it was an idea whose time
had passed.

The American Congress of 1950 was taking a cri

tical look at the effects of the work done by the Congresses
of 1945 and 1947 and was in no mood to be rushed into a
scheme which placed America on equal trade terms with all the
nations of the world.^

For one thing, the concerns of the

early post-war period, respecting world trade, were changing.
In 1947, the United States had had a trade surplus of $11.5
billion, an improvement over the nearly $13 billion figure
for 1946, but still a clear indication that the restoration
of world trade was lagging.

However by 1949, primarily as a

result of Marshall Plan aid, the trade surplus had declined
to $2.9 billion with signs of further reduction.

America

1For descriptions of the factions, moods, and incon
sistencies in the Congress see Richard Stebbins, USWA:
1950,
pp. 45-57, 85-90.
ITO participation was characterized by the
opponents of multilateralism, and the egalitarian aspects of
it, as American submission to " . . . domestic and foreign
trade governed by 50 countries . . . [making] . . . the U.S.
the same as Cuba or Siam."
See, for example, Senator Malone's
remarks and "The Gray Report Extends Crackpot Socialist Pro
grams" in Congressional Record, Vol. 97, p. A7865.
^Joseph Loftus, "Foreign Aid Program Enters A New
Phase," New York Times, November 19, 1950, p. iv.
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had reached a point at which the focus of concern was begin
ning to swing back to the maintenance of America1s trade
strength, whereas it had previously been occupied with the
weakness of others.
The Department of State made its last plea for the
ITO in April 1950 in a statement delivered by Dean Acheson
to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs.

Having outlined

the purposes to " . . . create conditions in the world in
which the private trader can buy and sell where he pleases
. . . to his best advantages," Acheson concluded:
The choice, therefore, which the Congress is
about to make is not only whether the United
States will accept membership in the Inter
national Trade Organization, but whether
there will be an International Trade Organi
zation .3
The question of ITO participation was overshadowed by the out
break of war in Korea:
Upon completion of the hearings, no further
action was taken on the measure . . . O n
December 6, 1950 the press reported that the
United States decided 'to shelve indefinitely
further plans for American participation [in
ITO]' . . . Further, President Truman acting
upon the recommendations of the Department of
State had agreed that the proposed charter
should not be resubmitted to the C o n g r e s s . 3
3"Statement by the Secretary of State (Acheson) be
fore the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Repre
sentatives, April 19, 1950: Excerpts," Raymond Dennet and
Robert K. Turner, c d ., Documents On American Foreign Rela
tions , Vol. XII, January 1 - December 31, 195Q (Binghamton,
New York: Vail-Ballow Press, Inc., 1951), pp. 290-291.
The
shelving of ITO was a refusal to subject American trade to
the authority of a world-governing body.
However, efforts
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The shift in commitment away from multilateralism, to
the extent envisioned in the rejected ITO, was reflected in
the post-1950 application of the national rubber policy.

As

noted by Shafer, there was a period of confusion, if not
governmental neglect, between passage of the 19 48 Act and its
renewal in 1950.

As mentioned earlier, the American demand

for rubber had begun to level in 1948 while supplies of
natural continued to rise.

Following the Congressional cri

ticism of the maintenance of mandatory synthetic above the
level required for defense purposes and the lag in the pur
chase of natural for stockpiling, the requirement for synthe
tic consumption was eased downward toward that needed to main
tain the defense minimum.

The adjustment in the rising supply

market of natural was only slight, and the price of natural
remained below $.20.

At the beginning of 1950, the price

was stable at about $.19.

However, despite the continued low

price, the American Government failed to take advantage to
bring the stockpile up to the desired level.

Though the

Executive was later to be criticized by Congress, there were
at least two contributing causes:

(1) the annual Congressional

appropriations for stockpiling operations had been lower than
to reduce trade barriers continued with the extension of the
Reciprocal Trade Agreements and the General Agreement On
Tariffs And Trade.
Though both had been viewed as interim
measures pending the ITO, they remained usable tools and
represented an improvement over, the prewar methods of trade
negotiation.
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requested; and (2) the Government had an obligation to
exercise caution when entering the market lest it raise the
price.

In addition t o .the lower than desired stockpile, the

voluntary use of synthetic above the required level had
declined to its lowest post-war level in January 1950.^

In

fact, the RFC had made plans to take a 30,000 ton-capacity
plant out of service in June.

At the same time, NATO was

beginning to receive assistance for rearmament through the
Mutual Defense Assistance Act passed in October 1949.

As a

result of NATO rearmament programs, the demand for natural
began to increase in 1950 at an accelerating rate.

The

American industry, presumably looking for bargains, had begun
to negotiate with producers in Indonesia, which had at last
been set free by the Dutch in December 1949 as the United
States of Indonesia.

However, the new Government devalued

its currency by fifty per cent and the Indonesian rubber pro
ducers held their stocks off the market in the hopes of an
upward stabilization.

The Americans turned back to Malaya

only to find themselves in competition with other nations,
including Russia and China, for Malaya's rubber.^

When the

^Between 1947-1949, the demand for tires was insati
able.
Inventories caught up in 194 9 and the rubber supply
went into surplus as the tire market fell off thirty per cent.
See Paul W. Litchfield's explanation in "Rubber Needs For
Peace and War," U.S. News And World Report, Vol. 28 (March 24,
1950), pp. 32-35.
5 "Rubber Demands Outstrip Supply," New York Times,
June '4,-1950, p. 8.
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Korean War broke out in June, there was a general world rush
to build up supplies.

The result was a boom in Malayan rub

ber which saw the producers using destructive strip-tapping
methods in an effort to meet demands, and a price rise that
carried rubber from $.19 in January 1950 to $.05 in March
1951.

Despite all its plans, America was caught short; the

stockpile was low and synthetic production was down.

It was

in the presence of these conditions that the Rubber Act of
1948 was extended.

There was nothing to do but to purchase

heavily in a demand market and pay the skyrocketing price.
It would be a year before the RFC's stand-by synthetic plants
could be brought back into production.^
By the end of 1950, the shortages and high price of
natural drove the United States Government to action that
would have been unthinkable two years earlier and which had
never been contemplated in the Rubber Act of 1948.

Intent

notwithstanding, the authority to control imports did exist
in the authority delegated to the Executive; the authority
really intended was the control of imports to prevent unfair
^For summary of rubber-related events and what the
Government did and did not do, see U.S., Congress, Senate,
"Synthetic Rubber Output Article by Charles Lucey," 82nd
Cong., 1st. sess.,June 19, 1951, Congressional Record, Vol.
97, pp. 2 792-2793; and Congress, House, "John L. Collyer Letter to Eric Johnson, Administrator, Economic Stabiliza
tion Agency dated March 3, 1951," Inflation and Government
Policy, Extension of Remarks of Hon. William H. Ayres,
March 22, 1951, Congressional' Record, Vol. 97, pp. A1647A1649.
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competition against the American manufacturer who was forced
by law to use synthetic.

In December 1950, importation of

nautral rubber by private concerns was banned and the General
Services Administration

(GSA) became the sole authorized pur

chaser for the United States.

Further, the authority to

bring the stand-by synthetic plants back into operation was
granted and capacity began to expand toward a level that was
to approach 950,000 tons before the crisis passed in 1952.
The effect of the reinitiation of Government purchase began
to take effect in early 1951, following a brief American
withdrawal from the market, and the price of natural started
a gradual decline that was to take it back to near the 1949
level by the end of 1952.

The GSA remained the sole pur

chaser until June 1952.7
7

'The demand market was extremely sensitive in 1950.
Private purchase stopped in December 1950 and the price
dropped to $.66 as the GSA sold out of the stockpile. As
soon as GSA entered the market, the price jumped $.10.
See
"Government Price In Rubber Puzzle," New York Times, Decem
ber 30, 1950, p. 3. The tactic evolved by the Government was
to reduce natural purchase and increase synthetic production,
in combination with strict controls on consumption.
During
1951, the United States took only twenty-four per cent of
Malaya's output compared to the historical, above-fifty per
cent. The price remained high but in slow decline during
1951,,-a net effect of reduced American consumption offset to
a degree by a rise in world consumption to nearly two million
tons.
In 1951, synthetic output was increased from 270,000
tons to over 900,000 tons. By June 1952, the price of
natural was down to $.28 and within $.02 of synthetic which
had been raised to $.26 in 1951. Again, the natural supply,
which had been expanded in the boom, was in surplus primarily
as a result of Indonesian recovery (Indonesia was to surpass
Malayan production in 1953).
See Joseph Fromm, "Britain Has
Her Korea Too," U.S. News: And World Report, March 2, 1951,
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The results of the rubber boom in Malaya proved to be
far less beneficial to the Federation than the long-time Bri
tish advocates of a "fair price" had assumed.

Fortunes were

made by speculators but the proceeds were invested overseas
or sunk into land acquisition rather than in projects to
expand the capital b a s e .^

Wages rose rapidly.

There could

be no argument against wage increases as rubber prices con
tinued to climb.

However, as wages rose, so did prices, and

the rate of inflation, already spurred by world inflation,
soared.

As a result, the rise in export values were eaten

away in higher-living costs and taxes.

When the boom col

lapsed in 1952, Malayan labor was unwilling to accept wage
cuts, though they had agreed to a wage tied to the price of
rubber at the beginning of the boom.^

A period of labor dis

putes followed— and the inevitable pleas for America to pay
more for rubber."^
pp. 18-19; U.S., Congress, 82nd Cong., 1st. sess., March 22,
1951, Congressional Record, Vol. 97, pp. 2891-92; and "People
Of The Week:
Gen. Sir Gerald Templer," U.S. News And World
Report, January 25, 1952, p. 65.
8New York Times, December 30, 1950, p. 3; and "The
Atlantic Report On The World Today: Malaya," Atlantic,
Vol. 187 (January 1951), p. 14.
9New York Times, July 1, 19 52, p. 8.
•*-°The High Commissioner to Malaya, General Sir Gerald
Templer (successor to Sir Henry Gurney who was murdered by
the MRLA in October 1951) criticized the United States' syn
thetic production in an address given in May 1952. However,
the strongest verbiage which linked the fight against
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The rubber boom had little tangible benefit in the
short run and even less in the long term.

Between 1945 and

1950, Malaya had been unable to reverse its trade balance.
In 1949, a s .a result of the disruptions and expenditures
caused by the Emergency, the deficit was $53,246,721.11

In

1950, the first year of the boom, the balance was reversed
yielding a surplus of $348,553,680; in 1951, the figure rose
further to $414,867,090.

However, as export values rose, so

did the value of imports:

in 1950, that value increased to

157 per cent of the 1949 value; in 1951, the value was 256
per cent of the 1949 level.

When the rubber boom collapsed,

the value of exports dropped by nearly half while the value
of imports remained well above the 1949 level.

Compared to

the boom year of 1951, 1952 exports dropped thirty-seven per
cent while imports fell only nineteen per cent; the figures
for 1953 showed exports down by fifty per cent while imports
were down by only thirty-two per cent.

The trade deficit for

1952 was $16,986,684; for 1953, it increased to $71,213,406.
There can be no argument that the loss of the surplus balance
communism and economic problems to "protection by arbitrary
government devices" was deleted from the draft by the Com
missioner General.
See New York Times, June 2, 1952, p. 4.
H T h e s e and following trade figures are calculated
from those in U.S., Department of Commerce, Bureau of
Foreign Commerce, Business Information Service: World Trade
Series, No. 597, Malaya - Summary of Basic Economic Informa
tion, 1953, Tables 1 and 2, p. 13a.
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achieved in 1951-52 was a direct result of the United States
Government's decision to use the nation's fifty per cent pur
chase position and the RFC synthetic industry to effect that
reversal, a most unmultilateralistic use of a national produc
tion and buying cartel.

However, in fairness, the pressures

of war and domestic inflation mitigated the decision.
The rubber boom brought some American criticism of
Great Britain in the form of charges that the British were
exploiting the situation for profit. 12

However, such charges

lacked conviction inasmuch as the price rise was a result of
international competition in a demand market; i.e., true
multilateralism.

After all, the United States had been en

couraged to raise the price in the supply market of 1948-49
in the interest of aiding Malaya and Britain and had refused.
There hardly seemed much justice in now asking Malaya to
lower its price because it was costing the American industry
- ^ A n n o y a n c e with rising prices was not limited to the
critics of the Administration's foreign policy. Among them
was Senator Paul H. Douglas, a usual supporter of foreign
aid, who attacked the "British . . . monopolies in tin and
rubber." See New York Times, November 25, 1950, p. 22. More
typical of the criticism was that of Senator Malone who
charged that in Malaya, the British only "fight for profit."
U.S., Congress, Senate, Debate On American Foreign Policy,
82nd Cong., 1st. sess., January 3, 1951, Congressional Record,
Vol. 97, pp. 167-169.
In 1950, Great Britain did improve her
gold and dollar reserve position by $1.4 billion? the im
provement was attributed to the 1949 devaluation and the
increase in American stockpiling.
The dollar gap was reduced
from $3.3 billion to $1.1.
See Stebbins, USWA:
1950,
pp. 299-300.
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and consumer more.

13

At any rate, the charge of exploitation

was minimal in comparison to later charges that the British
were increasing shipments to Russia and China and aiding both
the instigators of the Emergency and the enemy in the field
in Korea.
The charge of British aid to Russia and China actual
ly originated in the British press in early 1952.

The

story noted with alarm that the tonnage of rubber shipped
from the United Kingdom to Russia in June 1950 was eighteen
tons while the figure for January 1952 was 12,260 tons;
further, that rubber was still being shipped to China despite
the United Nations' condemnation of China as an aggressor.
The British Board of Trade's response was plausible. ^

The

l^U.S., Congress, House, Extension of remarks of
the Hon. Joseph R. Bryson, April 3, 1951, 82nd Cong., 1st.
sess., Congressional Record, Vol. 97, p. A1740.
There were
consumer complaints regarding conservation measures such as
reducing the number of tires sold with a new automobile from
five to four— a hardly compelling argument for Malaya to
lower the price of rubber.
There were also complaints about
the restriction on the manufacture of white side-wall tires.
I4"Sensational Rise '.In Vital War Export To Soviet Stop This Rubber For Russia - June 1950, 18 Tons; January
1952, 12,2.60," Sunday Dispatch (London) , March 16, 1952 in
U.S., Congress, Senate, 82nd Cong., 2nd. sess., March 1952,
Congressional Record, Vol. 9 8, p. 279 5. That the article
was seized upon in March 195 2 as a vehicle for baiting the
administration seems clear' since Malone had raised the issue
as early as January 1951.
See Senate, Debate on American
Foreign Policy, 82nd Cong., 1st. sess., January 11, 1951,
Congressional Record, Vol. 97., pp. 167-169 .
15See Reuter's news release containing comments of
Peter Thorneycraft, President of The British Board of Trade,
in U.S., Congress, Senate, May 2, 1952, 82nd Cong., 2nd.
sess., Congress iona1 Re cord, Vol.' 97, pp. 9595-96.
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explanation regarding shipments to Russia noted that the
amounts of rubber had not increased; rather, the amounts
shipped from the United Kingdom had increased by an almost
equal amount.

The rubber was exchanged for needed Russian

timber and feed grains.

With respect to the shipment of rub

ber to China, the Board of Trade had noted China's entry into
the Malayan market in 1950.

By 1951, it was clear that China

was purchasing for military stockpiling purposes.

Admittedly

at the urging of the United States, Britain had ordered a
halt to all Malayan shipments of rubber to China in April
1951.

The device used was destination controls on shipping

licenses.

The embargo was imposed only for the remaining

eight months of 1951; shipments were to be resumed in 1952 but
only at that level determined necessary for nonmilitary pur
poses.

Ceylon was requested to do the same.

Beyond 1951,

it would have been extremely difficult for Britain to have
continued a complete embargo of rubber to China.

In addition

to the British interests in South and Southeast Asia, China
posed a potential threat to the continued existence of Hong
Kong as a Crown Colony.

The Board of Trade's explanation for

the shipments to China and Russia would suggest only that
Britain was attempting to live in an imperfect and dangerous
world.^
l^While Britain could halt exports from Malaya to
China by revoking general export licenses, it could only
request that Ceylon do the same.
Britain was obligated to
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The charge of British perfidy received far more atten
tion than did the explanation.

In June 1952, the example of

British shipments of rubber was cited as the prime example
in support of a move in Congress, led by Senator James C. Kern,
to amend the pending Mutual Security Act (MSA) of 1952.^7
In effect, the Kern Amendment required that any country who
traded with either Russia or China in strategic or strategicrelated goods would be ineligible for aid under the Mutual
Defense Assistance

(MDA) Program.

The Amendment allowed

little room for interpretation to accommodate the realities
of the trade requirements of the MDA recipients; e.g., it
required cessation of trade and certification of cessation
by the MDA recipient.

Because of its specificity, the Kern

Amendment could have threatened passage of the MSA and tied
the hands of the Executive in its administration of the MDA
program.

Despite a reasoned attempt by Senator H. Alexander

Smith to strike the Amendment following its approval by the
halt shipments for military purposes as a member of the
United Nations (U.N.). Ceylon, an independent country with
in the Commonwealth, was not a member of the U.N. by
Russian veto.
See New York Times, August 15, 1952, p. 23ff.
Ceylon continued to ship to China, and America stopped
buying rubber in Ceylon until after the Korean settlement.
See ibid., June 2, 19 52, p. 32.
17Senator Herbert R. O'Connor speaking for the Kern
Amendment, Congressional Record., Vol. 98, p. 2795.
l^U.s., Congress, Senate, Debate On The Mutual Secu
rity Act Conference Report, June 9, 1952, 82nd Cong., 2nd.
sess., Congressional Record, Vol. 98, pp. 6838-6849.

Senate and House Conference Committee, the Kern Amendment was
retained.

19

However, the Congressional commitment to it

appears to have been more to passage of the MSA and a desire
to avoid being on the wrong side of an emotional issue, than
to Kem's demand that the British and all others cease trade
with all communist countries.

Implementation was simply

ignored? on advice of the National Security Council, it was
suspended pending clarification.

Implementation was a prac

tical impossibility; e.g., oil exploration equipment sold to
the Netherlands was traded to Poland with State Department
approval.

In short, there were valid reasons for discretion

ary interpretation of trade with communist nations as in the
example of Malayan rubber for Russian timber and g r a i n . ^
In June 1952, the Rubber Act of 1948 came up for
final renewal.

In January 1952, the Administration had recom

mended an end to allocation and specification controls in
l^Smith attempted to get Kern to withdraw the amend
ment; i.e., to withdraw that portion of the Conference*Report
He proposed, instead, amendment of the Mutual Defense^Assist
ance Control Act of 1951 (the Battle Act). The point was
that.the provisions of Title III of the Battle Act which
provided for a cutoff of MDA when a recipient shipped " . . .
to any nation . . . threatening . . . the United States in
cluding [USSR] and all . . . under its domination," was suf
ficient to Kem's purpose.
See ibid., p. 6844. At any rate,
having failed to dissuade Kem, Smith voted for adoption of
the Conference Report.
20’ipresidential Letter to The Chairman, Senate Commit
tee On Foreign Affairs, April 22, 1952" in ibid., p. 6844.

view of the world supply situation.

However, extension of

the Act, until 1954, was recommended to allow time for the
formulation of plans to sell the RFC's synthetic capacity to
private industry.

The biggest change in the American situa-

tion was that the Nation was now independent of foreign sup
ply, capacity having now approached a million tons? and, at
long last, synthetic was a quality competitor to natural.
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The House passed a Bill in substantial compliance with the
Administration's suggestion; however, the Senate disagreed
and passed a Bill that limited extension to one year, and
allowed sale and lease of some plants to private industry.

22

Senator Lyndon Johnson, who was still suspicious of the threat
of a synthetic monopoly, favored the two year extension and
led the Senate conferees.

A compromise was worked out wherein

the Act was extended until March

(rather than June)

1954, and

required submission of an administration plan for disposal of
the plants by March 1953.

23

The issue was no longer the

21

U.S . , Congress, House, Presidential Message;
Re
commendations Concerning The Synthetic Rubber Industry In
The U . S . , January 14, 1952, H. Doc. 326, 82nd Cong., 2nd.
sess., House Miscellaneous Documents, Vol. 118.
22

See U.S., Congress, House, Extension of The Rubber
Act of 1948, report to accompany H.R. 6787, H. Rept. 1513,
March 13, 1952, 82nd Cong., 1st. sess., 1952, House Miscel
laneous Documents, Vol. I; and Senate, Extension Of The
Rubber Act of 1948, S. Rept. 1581, May 15, 1952, Senate Mis
cellaneous Reports, Vol. 2.
23

Johnson, who had spiked Big Rubber's attempt to get
the plants in 1948, was now a member of the Senate Committee
On Armed Services.
As a member of the Conference Committee

survival of a private synthetic industry; all that remained
was to insure that American Big Rubber was not permitted to
monopolize the industry to the disadvantage of the rest of
the industry.

The question of natural rubber supply and

demand was hardly mentioned as the prediction was that the
natural demand would remain at a level sufficient to absorb
the capacity of the Far East.
Though the problem of the inelastic production capa
city of natural rubber and the accompanying price fluctuations
were to remain after 1953, the impacts were dampened by a
generally increasing world demand and advances in the effi
ciency of natural rubber production through restrictions on
new plantings and the substitution of high-yield trees for
older h e v e a . ^

In short, the price of Malayan rubber after

for resolution of the differences between the Senate and
House versions of the extension act, he was apparently able
to again delay sale of the plants.
One can but wonder if the
reason was in any way connected to the stability of RFC owner
ship, and the fact that a large portion of the RFC capacity
was located in Texas.
See U.S., Congress, House, Extension
Of The Rubber Act: Conference Report, H. Rept. 2168, 82nd
Cong., 2nd. sess., House Miscellaneous Reports, Vol. 3.
2^A s a resuit of the destruction of hevea during the
strip-tapping period of 1950-1952, and Federation programs
for high-yield replanting of existing trees, production de
clined and supply went into a shortage in 1954 followed by a
short-lived rubber boom in 19 55-1958.
Prices rose to about
$.40.
See Willard A. Hanna, Sequel To Colonialism; The
1957-1960 Foundations For Malaysia (New York: American Uni
versities Field Staff, Inc., 1965), p. 127.
The trade surplus,
lost in 1952, was regained in 1955-1956.
See United Nations,
Statistical Office, Yearbook Of International Trade: 1958
(New York: Office of Social and Economic Development, 1959),
pp. 364-65.
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1953 was no longer immutably and exclusively a function of
the American bid or the competition of a United States',
government-owned synthetic industry.
The actions of the United States to control the world
price of rubber, though explainable in part as a result of
the Korean War mobilization, was nonetheless a departure in
principle from the earlier rubber policy.

During the period

March 1947 - December 1950, the Government had refrained from
direct interference in the world's natural market; admittedly,
that this was true was in part a result of the bureaucratic
and Congressional neglect of the stockpile program.

In addi

tion, policy declared that the mandatory consumption of syn
thetic rubber should be kept at the minimum level for the
specific purposes of avoiding interference in the free opera
tion of the natural rubber market.

The minor lag in the

reduction of the mandatory level of synthetic consumption
noted in 19 4 8 notwithstanding the effect of synthetic was
minimized; like the lag in stockpile building, the lag in
synthetic reduction was inadvertent.

The policy then, was

in keeping with the principles of multilateralism— however,
it was adherence to the best facet of multilateralism.

It is

painless to allow free market operation when one is the pur
chaser and the price is both low and relatively stable.

It

is quite a different story when the free market is in a
demand condition and the price rises 400 per cent as did the
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price of rubber between June and December 1950,

It took

little rationalization to view Malayan rubber as "British"
rubber and to bring the full weight of the GSA's purchase
monopoly and the RFC's production monopoly to bear.

To

protect the American consumer and taxpayer from exploitation
by the British was one thing; to reject multilateralism in
the rubber trade and to break the Malayan rubber boom was
another.
latter.

The United States chose the former and ignored the
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CHAPTER VIII
ANTICOLONIALISM, ANTICOMMUNISM AND
THE PRICE OF RUBBER
The relationship of the United States to Malaya dur
ing the early post-war period is best characterized by its
indirectness and a sense of detachment.

It was indirect in

asmuch as the decisions of the United States, which had
affect in Malaya, were not prompted by an American interest
in, or specific concern for Malaya per s e .

For example, the

rubber policy of 194 7 was influenced primarily by the concern
for a National defense capability independent of foreign sup
pliers, and the principles of the ITO Proposals.

An even

more indirect relationship is suggested in the British han
dling of the resistance to the Malayan Union proposal; i.e.,
the degree of accommodation demonstrated by the British may
have been influenced by a desire to avoid a "bad press" while
the British Loan was before the American Congress.

Later,

during the American Government purchase monopoly of 1951 1952, the American decision was driven by the requirements
of the Korean War, and a retreat from the principles of multi
lateralism to the extent envisioned in the ITO Charter.

To

some degree, the decision was also influenced by American
annoyance at British recognition of Red China. . The American
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relationship to Malaya was detached in the sense that events
in Malaya did not call forth specific American decisions or
actions in the context of the more visible foreign policy
concerns such as colonialism, communism or economic assist
ance .
Malaya did fall within the scope of America's view
of colonialism; however, as the events related in Chapter I
indicate, Roosevelt's anticolonial sentiment was modified to
a policy best described as a gradualist approach to the end
of traditional colonialism.

Once the return of the British,

Dutch, and French to Southeast Asia was accepted, consonance
with American policy required only that the colonialists
recognize the justice of self-determination, and demonstrate
a sincere effort to move their charges toward self-government.
This is not to suggest that the policy was without commitment;
the second Dutch police action against the supporters of an
Indonesian Republic raised serious doubts about Dutch sin
cerity.

The United States demonstrated its commitment to

policy by joining in condemnation of the Dutch action before
the United Nations' Security Council, and in the suspension
of ECA aid to Indonesia.

However, in Malaya, the British

avoided any such action that would run counter to American
policy.

The Union proposal, though a false step, was a step

in the proper direction.

More importantly, the developing

Malayan nationalist and politico was content with both the
pace and direction of the British plan for the future.

There

Ib9

was no creditable charge of British repression.

The progress

and manner of British rule was acceptable to the majority of
parties.
The communist uprising of 194 8 in Malaya might have
been the circumstance which could have served to bring the
United States into closer contact with Malaya, if not direct
ly, as a supplier of aid.

However, the 1949 request for aid

in the form of capital investment was discouraged.

The

British argument concerning the connection between the fight
against communism, progress toward Malayan self-government,
and American investment in British colonial business inter
ests was specious at best.

In 1950, the British request for

military assistance to be used in Malaya was also discouraged;
however, American unwillingness was primarily a result of
Anglo-American relations, rather than an evaluation of the
Malayan situation.

The granting of aid in the face of the

British recognition of Red China could have presented a
potentially troublesome political issue to the Truman Admini
stration.

On the other hand, the refusal of aid did not

present an immediate threat to Great Britain or Malaya;
while the rebellion was costly, the British economy was im
proving, and the British showed no signs of losing control
of the situation.

Military assistance was not, as Acheson

had earlier described the conditions for American aid, "the
missing component in a situation which would otherwise be
solved."
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The American-Malayan contact remained, then, one of
commerce and trade.

The issues were those common to the

buyer-seller relationship, which paid little attention to the
issues of politics and ideology.

Between 1947 and 1950, the

trade relationship was primarily influenced by an American
commitment to multilateralism.

However, that commitment

worked more to the advantage of America in the rubber trade
as a result of the American domination of a buyer's market.
After 194 9, the commitment to free trade was modified.

The

pragmatism of America drew the line on multilateralism at
that point where the market advantage went to the other
fellow; i.e., the point at which the free market price was
to the decided disadvantage of the United States.
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